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Abstract 
   It has long been a great riddle why Hobbes expressed his 
bizarre view about Christian religion in Leviathan. This thesis is 
a serious attempt to explain it. The procedure followed is, in the 
first place, to identify the precise nature of arguments distinctive 
of Leviathan and of the new religious challenges Hobbes faced in 
Leviathan, and then to connect them with religious issues in the 
English Civil War. The issues identified are enthusiasm, “the 
Foole” in Chapter 15, and the toleration controversy.  
   The first context investigated is several rational justifications 
for the authority of the Bible as a reaction to enthusiasm. Works 
by William Chillingworth, Edward Leigh, John Goodwin, Seth 
Ward and Henry Hammond are examined, and the originality of 
Hobbes’s view on biblical authority in comparison with them is 
clarified. It lies in Hobbes’s radical scepticism towards all forms of 
the pretended word of God as his solution to the political threat of 
enthusiasm, and in the correspondent certainty of his answer, the 
civil sovereign as the foundation of biblical authority. Clarification 
has been given of several layers of his scriptural interpretation 
underlying the conclusion, such as the philological investigation 
about revelation in the Bible in Chapter 36, the foundation of 
Moses’s authority in Chapter 40. This conclusion, in turn, lays a 
theoretical foundation for Hobbes’s eschatology in Chapter 38. 
   The second context examined is the Anglican defences of 
toleration as part of the toleration controversy most relevant to 
Leviathan. The possible influence Hobbes and Jeremy Taylor had 
on each other concerning mutual toleration is shown, together 
with their originalities compared with Chillingworth. Moreover 
an explanation is supplied of some arguments specific to 
Leviathan as Hobbes’s reaction to the general toleration 
controversy. 
4 
 
 
  
5 
 
Table of Contents 
Table of Contents ......................................................................................................... 5 
1. Introduction ......................................................................................................... 6 
2. Identifying religious contexts relevant to Leviathan ....................................... 21 
3. Contexts of Leviathan ....................................................................................... 41 
3.1. Controversy over Biblical Authority .......................................................... 41 
3.2. Anglican Defences of Toleration ................................................................ 66 
4. Leviathan ........................................................................................................... 88 
4.1. De Cive and New Principles of Christian Religion in Leviathan ............. 88 
4.2. Philological and Epistemological Refutation of the 
Enthusiasts: Chapter 36 ..................................................................................... 105 
4.3. The Foundation of Biblical Authority in Leviathan ................................ 127 
4.4. Practical Conclusions about Religious Liberty and Authority in 
Leviathan ............................................................................................................. 152 
5. Conclusion........................................................................................................ 185 
6. Bibliography .................................................................................................... 192 
 
6 
 
1. Introduction 
 
If our aim is to abandon our own standpoint and to regain that of the 
ancients, we cannot afford to discard all the elements which seem 
foreign to our own ways of thinking, any more than the historian of 
religion can afford to discard as ‘superstition’ beliefs and practices 
which educated people in the civilized world have outgrown. Rather we 
should fix attention on elements which strike us strange and 
unaccountable. We may find in them a clue to the attitude of mind we 
are trying to recover.1 
 
 
Ⅰ 
   Leviathan, written by Thomas Hobbes and first published in 
1651, is today recognized as one of the classical works in social 
and political thought. The state of nature and the construction of 
the state through contracts, in particular, are renowned and often 
referred to. However, the latter half of Leviathan, Parts 3 and 4, 
where Hobbes treated Christian religion, is much less read or 
known.2 One modern edition of Leviathan omitting some of the 
                                               
1 Francis Macdonald Cornford, Principium Sapientiae: The Origins of 
Greek Philosophical Thought, ed. W. K. C. Guthrie (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1952), 5. 
2 The title of Part 2, “OF COMMONWEALTH” changes into “OF A 
CHRISTIAN COMMONWEALTH” in Part 3. Lev, 17: 254, 32: 576. 
   The abbreviations for Hobbes’s works are as follows: 
EL: Thomas Hobbes, The Elements of Law, Natural and Politic, ed. 
Ferdinand Tönnies (London: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 1969). References are 
to part, chapter, and section. 
DC: De Cive: The Latin Version Entitled in the First Edition Elementorvm 
philosophiæ sectio tertia de cive, and in Later Editions Elementa 
philosophica de cive, ed. Howard Warrender (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1983). References are usually to chapter and section, but as with the 
editorial and supplementary materials, to page number. Unless otherwise 
mentioned, the following translation is used in the quotation. On the 
Citizen, ed. and trans. Richard Tuck and Michael Silverthorne (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997). 
Lev: Leviathan, ed. Noel Malcolm (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2012). As for 
the text of Leviathan, references are given to chapter and page number, (e.g. 
Lev, 12: 174 refers to chapter 12 of Leviathan at p. 174 of this edition), but 
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arguments about Christian religion in it illustrates this.3 This 
situation indicates that the religious argument in Leviathan is 
hard to comprehend for a reader today. Even among scholars of 
Hobbes, it has frequently and long been described as “bizarre,” 
“idiosyncratic,” or “eccentric.”4 The aim of this thesis, therefore, is 
to explain why Hobbes developed the bizarre religious argument 
found only in Leviathan. 
   Compared with Hobbes’s earlier works of political philosophy, 
The Elements of Law and De Cive, the idiosyncratic characteristic 
peculiar to Leviathan lies in the addition of new and utterly 
unconventional interpretations of the Scriptures. The 
enlargement of the scriptural interpretation means undermining 
one of the merits of De Cive, its brevity, in spite of the fact that 
even in Leviathan Hobbes still found some value in shortness.5 
Moreover, probably what is most puzzling about the new 
interpretation in Leviathan concerns the difficulty with 
understanding its specific political relevance. 
   Certainly, Hobbes’s own account in his Latin verse 
autobiography suggests the religious situation in the English 
Civil War as the background of Leviathan, by associating his 
writing of Leviathan with divine law and with the arrival of 
                                                                                                                       
as with the introduction of this edition, references are given without 
abbreviations in the same way as other articles or books. 
3 Leviathan, ed. Richard E. Flathman and David Johnston (New York: W. W. 
Norton, 1997). 
4 “It is still far from clear exactly what Hobbes was up to in systematically 
rewriting Christianity in such a radical, and occasionally downright bizarre 
fashion.” Jon Parkin, Taming the Leviathan: The Reception of the Political 
and Religious Ideas of Thomas Hobbes in England, 1640-1700  (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007), 92; Richard Tuck, "The Civil Religion of 
Thomas Hobbes," in Political Discourse in Early Modern Britain 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 128; Nicholas D. Jackson, 
Hobbes, Bramhall and the Politics of Liberty and Necessity: A Quarrel of 
the Civil Wars and Interregnum  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2007), 164; Frank Lessay, "Hobbes's Protestantism," in Leviathan after 350 
Years, ed. Tom Sorell and Luc Foisneau (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004), 
266; Patricia Springborg, "Leviathan and the Problem of Ecclesiastical 
Authority," Political Theory 3, no. 3 (1975): 289, 97. 
5 Lev, 31: 574. 
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Prince Charles in Paris, where Hobbes lived at that time.6 
Nevertheless, it has still been a great riddle why it was necessary 
for Hobbes to write another work on theologico-political problem, 
Leviathan, despite the publication in 1647 of De Cive, which 
already included some religious arguments and interpretation of 
the Scriptures; in addition, the difference of the political 
conclusions about religious matters between the two works was 
not, at first sight, great enough to justify enlarging the religious 
and interpretative argument so expansively. In the case of Part 4 
of Leviathan, Hobbes specified, at least to some extent, his 
political adversaries: Presbyterians, Catholics, and to a much 
smaller extent Anglicans. However, as for Part 3, it is not clear 
even what type of political adversaries and arguments Hobbes 
had in mind and was responding to with the new discussions 
presented there. As a result, while in Part 3 there are a number of 
arguments specific to Leviathan, their political significance 
remains unclear.  
   Therefore, this thesis will mainly focus on the religious 
argument peculiar to Leviathan, especially Part 3. Examining The 
Elements of Law and De Cive in the religious context of the 
English society during and before the 1630s is not the subject of 
this thesis.7 This means in particular that this thesis does not 
deal with the theme of Hobbes and atheism in the sense of the 
                                               
6 Thomas Hobbes, Thomæ Hobbes Malmesburiensis Opera Philosophica 
Quæ Latine Scripsit Omnia: In Unum Corpus Nunc Primum Collecta 
Studio Et Labore Gulielmi Molesworth, ed. William Molesworth, vol. 1 
(London: Joannem Bohn, 1839), 92. 
   For a biographical account of Hobbes’s life and Leviathan, see Aloysius 
Martinich, Hobbes: A Biography  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1999); Noel Malcolm, "A Summary Biography of Hobbes," in Aspects of 
Hobbes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 1-26; Hobbes, Leviathan, 
1-12. 
   Also, in the preface of the second edition of De Cive, Hobbes revealed a 
clear interest in the political situation in his homeland. DC, 82. 
7 For this type of investigation, see, for example, Luc Foisneau, Hobbes et la 
toute-puissance de Dieu  (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 2000), 
339-58; Eric Nelson, The Hebrew Republic: Jewish Sources and the 
Transformation of European Political Thought  (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2010), 7-50, 88-123. 
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denial of the existence of God, because Hobbes’s argument about 
what may be called natural religion including his view on the 
existence and nature of God changes little from De Cive to 
Leviathan.8 The aim here is to compare Leviathan with his earlier 
works and place the argument distinctive of Leviathan in the 
specific political and religious contexts of the English Civil War 
during the 1640s.9 
 
Ⅱ 
   So far it has been shown that the main tasks of this thesis are of 
two kinds. The first is to identify new religious elements in 
Leviathan by comparing it with Hobbes’s earlier works of political 
philosophy. The second is to explain the elements in the specific 
context of the English Civil War. The choice of the English Civil 
War as the relevant context is partly derived from Hobbes’s own 
assertion about the origin of Leviathan, and partly from his 
concern with war and peace. Another major factor for the choice is 
that the religious upheaval during the Civil War was the only 
major change in the religious situation after Hobbes wrote De 
Cive. 
   Now that our task and aim have been clarified, the fruit of 
existing Hobbes scholarship will be reviewed and the position of 
this thesis in it will be clarified. In the first place, although 
Martinich, Curley and Schotte discuss the religious argument of 
Leviathan, they rarely distinguish the layer of De Cive from that 
                                               
8 See Chapter 15 in De Cive and Chapter 31 in Leviathan. There has been 
much discussion about this theme. Yet if our focus is not on his 
contemporaries’ view on Hobbes but only on Hobbes’s own argument, the 
question to be asked is why Hobbes developed his argument about natural 
religion for the first time in De Cive, and not in The Elements of Law. For a 
useful overview of how Hobbes began to be regarded as an atheist, see 
Parkin, Taming the Leviathan: The Reception of the Political and Religious 
Ideas of Thomas Hobbes in England, 1640-1700, 133-35, 52-54. 
9 Another theme beyond the scope of this thesis is the main characteristics 
of the Latin version of Leviathan and its context. For this, see Hobbes, 
Leviathan, 146-95. 
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of Leviathan.10 As a result, though both their researches and this 
thesis focus on Leviathan and both aim to explain Hobbes, the 
direction of our investigation is rather different from theirs. 
Perhaps the difference can be described as follows: while they try 
to clarify what Hobbes says, this thesis aims to explain why 
Hobbes says as he does. Similarly, while Schuhmann’s useful 
article focuses on the similarity between De Cive and Leviathan, 
this thesis mainly pays attention to the difference between them 
and thereby clarifies the distinctive features of Leviathan.11 
   More close to our approach and aim are Tuck and Sommerville, 
who published the standard and seminal works on Hobbes’s view 
on religion around two decades ago.12 They distinguish the layer 
of De Cive from the new one in Leviathan. They explain the 
political conclusion of the religious argument in historical context. 
They have established the importance of the Great Tew Circle for 
understanding Hobbes’s religious argument.13 These are their 
chief achievements. Moreover they ask questions very similar to 
ours, and their answer is still the standard one today.14 
Nevertheless, there remains room for improvement in answering 
our research question in three respects. In the first place, their 
                                               
10 Aloysius Martinich, The Two Gods of Leviathan: Thomas Hobbes on 
Religion and Politics  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); 
Edwin Curley, "'I Durst Not Write So Boldly': How to Read Hobbes’s 
Theological-Political Treatise," in Hobbes e Spinoza, ed. Daniela 
Bostrenghi (Naples: Bibliopolis, 1992); Dietrich Schotte, Die Entmachtung 
Gottes Durch Den Leviathan: Thomas Hobbes Über Religion  (Stuttgart: 
Frommann-Holzboog, 2013). In relation to Schotte, it should also be noted 
that the research question in this thesis requires a contextual investigation. 
Cf. ibid., 28-29. 
11 Karl Schuhmann, "Leviathan and De Cive," in Leviathan after 350 Years, 
ed. Tom Sorell and Luc Foisneau (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004), 13-31. 
12 Richard Tuck, Hobbes: A Very Short Introduction  (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2002); Philosophy and Government, 1572-1651  
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); "The Civil Religion of 
Thomas Hobbes; J. P. Sommerville, Thomas Hobbes: Political Ideas in 
Historical Context  (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1992). 
13 Before them this point had been noted by Johnson. Paul J. Johnson, 
"Hobbes's Anglican Doctrine of Salvation," in Thomas Hobbes in His Time, 
ed. Ralph Ross et al (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1974). 
14 Cf. Parkin, Taming the Leviathan: The Reception of the Political and 
Religious Ideas of Thomas Hobbes in England, 1640-1700, 92-93. 
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answer does not explain why De Cive was insufficient and why it 
was necessary for Hobbes to go beyond De Cive, developing and 
expanding the religious theory further in Leviathan. The more 
recent works have not explained this point either, and thus 
explaining this is one of our chief tasks. In the second place, the 
contexts they explored are mainly the France during the Civil 
War or the religious discussions before the 1640s. They did not 
inquire to a great extent into the new religious situation during 
the Civil War. However, as we have indicated, this is, to say the 
least, one of the most relevant contexts for Leviathan. Thirdly, 
they have mainly focused on the political conclusion of Hobbes’s 
religious argument, but his philological argument specific to 
Leviathan also needs explaining. 
   In the past two decades, Hobbes scholars have made some 
progress in situating Leviathan in the context of the English Civil 
War. Here the distinction should be made between understanding 
Hobbes himself and the reception of Hobbes. The contextual 
approach to Hobbes can contribute to both of them, but our main 
focus is on Hobbes, and not on his reception.15 As for the reception 
of Hobbes, Parkin’s work is the definitive one, consciously 
focusing on the reception of Hobbes, and not on Hobbes himself.16 
Collins dealt with both of them.17 His contribution to answering 
our question lies in distinguishing clearly the argument about 
religious liberty in De Cive or The Elements of Law from that in 
Leviathan, and in trying to explain the latter in the context of the 
Civil War. On the other hand, while Collins mainly chose political 
                                               
15 Similarly, while Jackson investigates the controversy between Hobbes 
and Bramhall, our main concern is on Leviathan. Jackson, Hobbes, 
Bramhall and the Politics of Liberty and Necessity: A Quarrel of the Civil 
Wars and Interregnum. 
16 Parkin, Taming the Leviathan: The Reception of the Political and 
Religious Ideas of Thomas Hobbes in England, 1640-1700. For an earlier 
work dealing with the reception of Leviathan during the Interregnum, see 
Hans-Dieter Metzger, Thomas Hobbes und die Englische Revolution 1640-
1660  (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 1991), 172-254. 
17 Jeffrey R. Collins, The Allegiance of Thomas Hobbes  (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005). 
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events as relevant contexts, we pay attention to arguments or 
controversies, especially religious ones.18 Also, apart from 
arguments about religious liberty, there are also numerous new 
religious elements in Leviathan, and Hobbes’s Erastianism, which 
Collins emphasised, cannot explain these new elements, because 
his Erastianism does not change between De Cive and 
Leviathan.19 
   As for Hobbes’s notorious eschatology in Leviathan, Overhoff ’s 
work is worth mentioning. Although this topic has long been 
discussed by various Hobbes scholars,20 among Hobbes scholars 
he for the first time noted that part of Hobbes’s eschatology, 
including his use of the Bible, had specific precedents in the Civil 
War, such as the views of Richard Overton and John (or Henry) 
Archer. This thesis aims to give further thought to the political 
significance and theoretical foundation of Hobbes’s eschatology. 
   Lastly, the work perhaps most close to our concern and approach 
is Hoekstra’s article on Hobbes and prophets.21 He noted Hobbes’s 
increasing concern with prophets, and tried to explain this in the 
context of the Civil War. In particular, he not only pointed out the 
importance of the enthusiasts for Leviathan, which in itself was 
noted by Skinner and others, but also showed Hobbes’s 
endorsement of scepticism in Leviathan as the reply to the threat 
of the enthusiasts.22 This thesis agrees with Hoekstra’s general 
                                               
18 In this respect, Sommerville’s article on Independency is more relevant to 
our work than the work of Collins. J. P. Sommerville, "Hobbes and 
Independency," Rivista di storia della filosofia, no. 1 (2004).  
19 Collins places the main chapter dealing with Hobbes’s argument about 
Christian religion before his explanation of the Civil War. This suggests 
that his concern is different from ours. Collins, The Allegiance of Thomas 
Hobbes, 11-57. 
20 J. G. A. Pocock, "Time, History, and Eschatology in the Thought of 
Thomas Hobbes," in Politics, Language, and Time: Essays on Political 
Thought and History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989); Tuck, 
"The Civil Religion of Thomas Hobbes; David Johnston, "Hobbes's 
Mortalism," History of Political Thought 10(1989). 
21 Kinch Hoekstra, "Disarming the Prophets: Thomas Hobbes and 
Predictive Power," Rivista di storia della filosofia, no. 1 (2004): 97-153. 
22 Ibid., 124-41. Quentin Skinner, Reason and Rhetoric in the Philosophy of 
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position. What we explore further is the precise relationship 
between De Cive and Leviathan, and the significance of Hobbes’s 
philological investigation in relation to his reply to the 
enthusiasts. 
 
Ⅲ 
   In our review of Hobbesian scholarship so far we have not 
mentioned one major field of our investigation: Hobbes’s use of the 
Bible. This is still a rather new theme in the vast Hobbes 
scholarship. Even in Schotte’s systematic treatment of Hobbes’s 
view on religion, or Farr’s article on Hobbes’s “interpretative 
practice,” his use of the Bible does not necessarily come to the 
fore.23 However, two works deserve mentioning here. One is 
Fukuoka’s work on the comparison of Hobbes’s and Spinoza’s 
interpretation of the Old Testament.24 She probably for the first 
time paid full attention to how Hobbes interpreted the Scriptures 
in Leviathan, and elucidated clearly Hobbes’s treatment of 
supernatural things in the Old Testament and the subtle 
difference between Hobbes and Spinoza. Nevertheless, this is a 
work mainly on Spinoza and its chief task is to investigate his 
thought in the context of the Dutch Republic. It is the task of 
Hobbes scholars to examine Leviathan in the context of the 
                                                                                                                       
Hobbes  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 400-1, 4, 9-10, 13-
14, 20-21; Hobbes, Leviathan, 42. 
23 Schotte, Die Entmachtung Gottes durch den Leviathan; James Farr, 
"Atomes of Scripture: Hobbes and the Politics of Biblical Interpretation," in 
Thomas Hobbes and Political Theory (Lawrence: University Press of 
Kansas, 1990), 172-96, esp. 75. 
24 Atsuko Fukuoka, State, Church and Liberty: A Comparison between 
Spinoza's and Hobbes's Interpretations of the Old Testament  (Tokyo: 
University of Tokyo Press, 2007). Also noteworthy is Nelson’s investigation 
of the interrelationship between political thought and the interpretation of 
the Old Testament in the early modern era. Nelson, The Hebrew Republic: 
Jewish Sources and the Transformation of European Political Thought. 
Other works are Justin Champion, "Hobbes and Biblical Criticism: Some 
Preliminary Remarks," Institut D'histoire de la Reformation 31(2010); H.W. 
Jones, "Thomas Hobbes and the Bible: A Preliminary Enquiry," in Arts du 
spectacle et histoire des idées: Recueil offert en hommage à Jean Jacquot 
(Tours: Centre d'Etudes Supérieures de la Renaissance, 1984), 271-85. 
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English Civil War. Also, in the case of Hobbes it is necessary to 
consider his handling not only of the Old Testament but also of 
the New Testament. 
   Another major contribution has been made by Malcolm in his 
new edition of Leviathan and its introduction, though he modestly 
remarks, “Hobbes’s handling of biblical texts is a very large 
subject, which can be treated only very briefly here; a full study 
remains to be written.”25 Drawing on Malcolm’s achievement, as 
an introductory remark on Hobbes’s use of the Bible we shall here 
touch on the problem of which versions of the Bible Hobbes used 
and quoted. 
   This could be an important issue because translations played a 
great role in transmitting the Christian doctrine in the Scriptures, 
and here grave problems could arise. There are possibilities of 
erroneous translations, and they can be sources of attack on some 
existing Christian doctrines.26 In political or doctrinal 
controversies based on the interpretation of the Bible, the 
suitability of translations can be a topic of dispute. The most 
famous controversy related to the translation of the Bible 
concerned the authority of the Vulgate, and this was one of the 
principal watersheds between Catholics and Protestants. While 
Catholics defended the authority of the Vulgate, Protestants 
denied it, turned to the original Greek and Hebrew texts and 
produced new vernacular translations based on them.27 
Furthermore, each party of Protestants embraced its own 
translation(s), and the differences between translations could lead 
to distinct doctrines. 
                                               
25 Hobbes, Leviathan, 109.   
26 See the exemplary case of Valla, whom Skinner mentioned as the leading 
pioneer in the application of philological techniques characteristic of 
humanism to Biblical scholarship. Quentin Skinner, The Foundations of 
Modern Political Thought, 2 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1978), 1: 210.  
27 Malcolm, "Hobbes, Ezra, and the Bible: The History of a Subversive 
Idea," 414-20. 
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   In view of the possible political implications involved in the 
translation of the Scriptures, which particular attitude Hobbes 
adopted toward this problem can be a matter worth investigating. 
In De Cive, Hobbes mentioned translators of the Bible from the 
original languages as a possible choice for the authoritative 
interpreter.28 This suggests that Hobbes was aware that 
translators of the original languages in the Bible could acquire 
some political influence. On the other hand, he denied translators 
the status of authoritative interpreter of the Bible.29 Similarly, he 
was certainly conscious that the accuracy of translations could be 
a matter of controversy; in several places in Leviathan, he 
compared and examined translations of some scriptural 
passages.30 However, this kind of examination of translations was 
quite rare in the argument of Leviathan as a whole. This rarity 
might be related to Hobbes’s knowledge of the original Hebrew 
and Greek languages. Of course, as a humanist and translator of 
Thucydides’ historical work, Hobbes had a deep understanding of 
Greek. As for the Hebrew language, however, as Malcolm 
convincingly remarks, Hobbes was simply unable to read it at the 
stage of writing the English version of Leviathan.31       
   Another related and much more complicated issue is how 
Hobbes himself cited the Bible in Leviathan, and here Malcolm’s 
research and annotations added to the text are the path-breaking 
groundwork.32 Certainly, there are numerous cases where Hobbes 
followed faithfully one version of the Bible (the King James 
Version or KJV in Leviathan and the Vulgate in De Cive).33 
                                               
28 DC, 17:18. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Lev, 35: 636, 38, 42: 836. Also in Behemoth, a dialoguer B says, “The 
interpretation of a verse in the Hebrew, Greek, or Latine Bible, is 
oftentimes the cause of Ciuill Warre, and the deposing and assassinating 
Gods anointed.” Thomas Hobbes, Behemoth, or, the Long Parliament, ed. 
Paul Seaward (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 302. 
31 Leviathan, 109, 92-93. 
32 Ibid., 108-14. 
33 In the case of De Cive, it can safely be said that Hobbes cites the Vulgate, 
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However, especially in Leviathan, there are also a number of 
places where Hobbes diverted from the versions above mentioned. 
The versions of the Bible he could have used were original Greek 
texts, translational versions he clearly mentioned, and two 
English versions prior to the KJV. While in some cases Hobbes 
used one of the editions, in others he diverted from any existing 
versions. 
   Several reasons can be adduced for the diversion. One possible 
reason is that, based on the comparison with the original text, he 
regarded the translation in his text as more accurate. Another 
possibility is that he changed the wording so that it could become 
more suitable for his doctrine. However, Hobbes might have been 
simply negligent in the wording of translations. Malcolm remarks 
at the end of the investigation of this topic that Hobbes’s 
“combination” “of careful analysis and negligent… delivery is 
quite typical” in Leviathan.34 In this investigation of Hobbes’s use 
of the Bible, exactly how Hobbes diverted from the existing 
translations will be clarified, and possible reasons for it will be 
offered.35 There will also be a comparison of how Hobbes cited 
biblical texts in De Cive and in Leviathan. Moreover, several 
versions of the Bible contain not only the text but also marginal 
                                                                                                                       
and not the Junius-Tremellius translation with the Beza translation, 
though this does not exclude the possibility that he also refers to the latter. 
34 Hobbes, Leviathan, 114. 
35 The biblical translations referred to are the KJV, the Geneva Bible, the 
French Geneva Bible, the Bishops’ Bible, the Junius-Tremellius translation 
with the Beza translation, and the Vulgate. For the editions used, see the 
article of the Bible in the Bibliography. Otherwise mentioned, the KJV is 
cited, whose verbal expressions are usually the closest to Hobbes’s own. 
This thesis fails to refer to the original Hebrew and Greek versions of the 
Bible. 
   The distinctive characteristics of each of these versions and their 
positions in the England of the early 17th century would be interesting 
themes to be pursued. As for the Septuaginta, see a valuable article by 
Mandelbrote. Scott Mandelbrote, "English Scholarship and the Greek Text 
of the Old Testament, 1620-1720: The Impact of Codex Alexandrinus," in 
Scripture and Scholarship in Early Modern England, ed. Ariel Hessayon 
and Nicholas Keene (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006). 
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notes appended to the text.36 These notes can be seen as 
interpretations of the Bible prior to Hobbes, and this thesis will 
compare the interpretations of the notes attached to passages of 
the Bible with those of Hobbes. This will help to gauge more 
precisely the originality or unconventional character of Hobbes’s 
interpretation of the Bible. 
 
Ⅳ 
   The research question of this thesis requires a contextual 
approach, or going beyond Hobbes’s text into the wider historical 
context. However, it is often considerably difficult to connect 
Hobbes’s argument with known historical issues, partly because 
Hobbes is a highly original thinker and his theory seems to have 
little to do with his contemporaries’. Another difficulty with it is 
that Hobbes scarcely specified the precise sources he might have 
been drawing on or disagreeing with. As a result, there is almost 
always some uncertainty in identifying contexts relevant to 
Hobbes.  
   In the light of the difficulties, then, it would not be futile to 
explain the contextual approach taken in this thesis. In the first 
place, this thesis limits the relevant context in several ways. The 
first limitation is the focus on the England of the Civil War period 
for the reasons already mentioned. It is true that this does not 
involve denying the existence of other possible factors. Actually in 
order to identify the new religious situation during the Civil War 
it is necessary to have some idea about the pre-war religious 
situation. For this reason this thesis deals with William 
Chillingworth as a leading religious controversialist before the 
Civil War and as a friend of Hobbes. However, the focus on the 
English Civil War does involve emphasising this factor as the 
                                               
36 For some political implications in England of the marginal note in the 
Geneva Bible, see Hill, The English Bible and the Seventeenth-Century 
Revolution, 56-66. 
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most immediate and relevant context for Leviathan, and 
insistence that without reference to this aspect any answer to our 
question would be insufficient. The second limitation is that in 
investigating the religious context of Leviathan, we try to start 
from the text of Leviathan by identifying religious problems and 
themes specific to this work. The third limitation is to pay 
attention to Hobbes and not to the reception of Hobbes. In so far 
as the text of Leviathan itself is provided, the commentary on 
Hobbes, even by his contemporaries, is of secondary importance 
for understanding Hobbes. Rather, the motive and possible bias of 
the commentary should be investigated.37 This limitation in 
particular means excluding most texts published in the 1650s. 
Within these limitations, however, this thesis tries to explore 
every possible factor to explain the religious argument specific to 
Leviathan. 
   Next, in exploring the factors, the ideal of this thesis would be to 
conduct two types of investigation. In the first place, there are 
new religious topics in Leviathan, such as the philological 
investigation of the word “spirit,” the authority of the Bible, and 
eschatology. If there are people who argue about these topics 
during the Civil War, we include them in our investigation. That 
will help explicate Hobbes’s discussing the new topics in 
Leviathan, especially because Hobbes’s contemporaries, unlike 
Hobbes, often explicitly explained the reason why they discussed 
the topics, and they often referred to the religious upheaval as the 
main factor. In comparing the treatment of the same topic by 
Hobbes and by his contemporaries, there are two possible cases. If 
their handling has some similarities with Hobbes’s, they might be 
regarded as possible influences on Hobbes. It is true that Hobbes’s 
new discussion might be entirely due to his ingenuity and the 
similarities might be mere coincidences. Nevertheless, to the 
                                               
37 Cf. Parkin, Taming the Leviathan: The Reception of the Political and 
Religious Ideas of Thomas Hobbes in England, 1640-1700, 9-10. 
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extent Hobbes’s contemporaries expressed the same view as his, 
Hobbes’s argument will no longer be so strange or inexplicable. 
Our aim, strictly speaking, is not to identify the influence of 
Hobbes’s contemporaries on him but to explain the bizarre 
argument in Leviathan. The other possibility is that the handling 
of the topics specific to Leviathan by Hobbes’s contemporaries is 
quite different from Hobbes’s own. In this case, we clarify the 
nature of the difference between them, which certainly helps little 
to answer our question. Nevertheless, it does help to explain why 
Hobbes did not take other possible approaches to the subject and 
to that extent why he took the one as he did. Also, the 
investigation in both of the cases will at least help us to grasp the 
precise nature of Hobbes’s originality, or of his position in the 
spectrum of his age. 
   The second type of investigation which this thesis will hopefully, 
but in fact only partially, carry out is to identify Hobbes’s enemies, 
or the kind of argument Hobbes refuted or might have refuted in 
and only in Leviathan. While in the first kind of investigation 
both Puritans and Anglicans discussed similar topics to Hobbes, 
the target of Hobbes in the context of the Civil War was, it can 
safely be said, mainly Puritans, especially radical Puritans as will 
be shown. However, since Hobbes stayed in France during the 
period, the report or criticism of Puritans by Anglicans, or that of 
radical Puritans by Presbyterians, are also important and 
relevant sources. The extent to which Hobbes’s presentation of his 
enemies corresponds to the argument presented by Puritans 
themselves varies according to the situation. However, taking 
Hobbes’s presentation as the main control by which we must test 
our hypothetical context, we will explore various possibilities. In 
particular, we take into account three possibilities. The easy case 
is where Hobbes presented Puritan arguments faithfully. Or 
Hobbes might have used Anglican or Presbyterian report of 
Puritans or sectarians. The most difficult case is where Hobbes 
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made his own original presentation of Puritans based on the 
sources he used. In the third case the relevancy of the designated 
context for Leviathan is most dubious, because this case 
presupposes some gap between the presentation of Puritans by 
themselves and by Hobbes without any contextual help for 
bridging the gap. Nevertheless, if such contextual help cannot be 
found and the second possibility is excluded, then this third 
possibility should still be taken into account. 
   As we have already indicated, our starting point and goal of 
contextual investigation is Hobbes’s text itself. In particular, the 
context to be investigated has to explain why the religious 
argument in De Cive became insufficient for Hobbes in the late 
1640s. Then, before turning to the contextual research itself, this 
thesis will consider the subtle change in Hobbes’s presentation of 
the religious problem among his works of political philosophy. 
Then the identified contexts will be considered. Finally Leviathan 
itself will be examined. The new factors in Leviathan will be 
explained in relation to the investigated contexts, or to put in 
another way, the value of the examined contexts as explanatory 
factors will be tested. 
 
21 
 
2. Identifying religious contexts relevant to 
Leviathan 
 
Ⅰ 
   In this chapter an attempt will be made to clarify more specific 
contexts relevant to Leviathan through a close examination of 
how Hobbes articulated the religious problem in his three works 
of political philosophy. This examination, hitherto undone, will 
shed new light on why Hobbes wrote Leviathan as it was.1 
   In all of the three works of political philosophy, Hobbes 
articulated the religious problem before discussing what is 
necessary for salvation. However, the articulations changed 
slightly between the works. To understand his expanded 
treatments of the religious problem, therefore, it will be useful to 
compare the three articulations of the problem and capture 
accurately the distinctive characteristics of his perception of the 
religious problem in Leviathan. 
   In The Elements of Law, Hobbes identified the problem as 
follows: “we have amongst us the Word of God for the rule of our 
actions; now if we shall subject ourselves to men also, obliging 
ourselves to do such actions as shall be by commanded; when the 
commands of God and man shall differ, we are to obey God, rather 
than man: and consequently the covenant of general obedience to 
man is unlawful.”2 Then he specifies his antagonists: “they that 
follow their own interpretation, continually demanding liberty of 
conscience; and those that follow the interpretation of others not 
ordained thereunto by the sovereign of the commonwealth, 
requiring a power in matters of religion either above the power 
                                               
1 Among others, if the following argument is valid, it will give us some 
textual evidence related to the composition of Leviathan other than the 
data Malcolm offered. Hobbes, Leviathan, 1-60, esp. 57-59. 
2 EL, 2:6:1. 
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civil, or at least not depending on it.”3 The problem here was that 
the interpretation of the Bible was not unified under the 
sovereign. 
   Two years after writing The Elements of Law, Hobbes provided 
his developed theory of religion in De Cive. In it, he articulated 
the problem as follows: 
 
Because one must obey God rather than man, a difficulty has arisen as 
to how obedience can be safely offered if an order is given to do 
something which CHRIST forbids. The reason for this difficulty is that 
God no longer speaks to us in a living voice through CHRIST and the 
Prophets, but by the holy scriptures, which are understood differently 
by different people.4 
 
Here again Hobbes similarly presented his problem as the 
diversity of the interpretation of the Bible, though he made some 
theoretical development concerning the articulation of the 
religious problem in De Cive.5 In view of the new articulation of 
the religious problem in Leviathan, on the other hand, the added 
important point in this presentation is that it clearly presupposes 
that there are no prophets in Hobbes’s age. It also assumes that 
the word of God reaches people in whatever way, though the 
routes might be various. It was these assumptions that were 
called into question in Leviathan. 
 
Ⅱ 
                                               
3 EL, 2:6:2. 
4 DC, 18:1. 
5 De Cive explains why such diverse interpretations occur. The key lies in 
the contrast between the living voice and writings, and Hobbs elaborates on 
this contrast in Section 18, Chapter 17 of De Cive. “It is universally true of 
language that … it cannot do the job on its own; it needs the help of a 
context. A living voice has interpreters right there in the time, the place, 
the expression, gesture and purpose of the speaker,” and so on. The lack of 
“interpreters right there” in writings causes various interpretations. 
23 
 
   Before turning to Leviathan, however, this thesis will examine 
the second edition of De Cive published in 1647, and here also 
some new arguments can be observed which were beyond 
Hobbes’s perception of the religious problem in the first edition of 
De Cive. In the preface peculiar to the second edition,6 Hobbes 
presents, though in an abstract form, some religious arguments of 
his adversaries. 
 
As for those who refuse to be subject to the civil magistrate and want 
exemption from public burdens and yet demand to be in a 
commonwealth and to be protected by it from violence and wrongs, I 
hope that you will regard them as enemies and saboteurs and not 
gullibly accept all that they put before you openly or secretly as the 
Word of God. I will speak more plainly. If any preacher or confessor or 
casuist says that this doctrine is consistent with the Word of God: that 
a sovereign may rightly be killed, or any man without the sovereign’s 
orders, or that citizens may rightly take part in any rebellion, 
conspiracy or covenant prejudicial to their commonwealth, do not 
believe him, but report his name. Anyone who approves of this will also 
approve my design in writing.7 
 
There are two new important elements in the argument. Firstly, 
though the allegations of the word of God might depend on the 
interpretation of the Scriptures, here it is not, at least, specified 
so. Secondly, this religious opinion challenges directly sovereign 
power itself. To see its fuller significance, it is necessary to turn 
back to the argument in the first edition and to examine Hobbes’s 
view in the last section of De Cive on the mechanism of how 
dangerous possibilities of civil war arise from religious opinions 
related to civil matters. 
                                               
6 In his letter to Sorbière in 1646, Hobbes mentions the preface. Thomas 
Hobbes, The Correspondence, ed. Noel Malcolm, vol. 1 (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1997), 125-27.  
7 DC, 83. 
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   Hobbes, after dismissing these opinions as not related to faith or 
salvation, but only as matters of power, profit or intellectual 
eminence, identifies disagreements over such questions as the 
accelerating factor for the bitter enmity between different 
religious positions.8 This discussion corresponds to a former 
section, where he compares religious sects to factions: “The 
bitterest wars are those between different sects of the same 
religion and different factions in the same country, when they 
clash over doctrines or public policy.”9 Here Hobbes sees the origin 
of both types of conflict in intellectual dissension and ultimately 
in human desire for honour. Though intellectual dissensions about 
religious matters can certainly lead to fierce civil wars, still they 
are fights between sects, and not against the sovereign. Therefore, 
the instigation of the rebellion against the sovereign was not 
within Hobbes’s perception of political implications of religious 
opinions in the first edition of De Cive. 
   In this identification of the religious problem, it was not 
necessary for Hobbes to specify religious sects by name. Moreover, 
he tried to avoid possible dangers. In the epistle dedicatory 
written in 1641 Hobbes remarked that he paid careful attention 
not to mention any specific laws, “i.e. not to approach shores 
which are sometimes dangerous because of current storms.”10 This 
is a remark fitting for a man who had just escaped from the 
troublesome political situation in his homeland. It is also known 
that the first edition of this radical work, despite being published, 
was circulated only among learned friends of Hobbes or Mersenne.  
   By contrast, the second edition of De Cive not only was a full-
scale publication and actually sold well,11 but also included an 
annotation explicitly mentioning religious sects by name. The 
                                               
8 DC, 18:14. 
9 DC, 1:4. 
10 DC, 76. 
11 Parkin, Taming the Leviathan: The Reception of the Political and 
Religious Ideas of Thomas Hobbes in England, 1640-1700, 61-62. 
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annotation, attached to Section 11, Chapter 6, begins with the 
confirmation of the insight in the last section of De Cive. Religious 
disagreements are a major cause of wars, but “this is not because 
the dogma is false, but because of human nature: men want to 
believe themselves wise and appear so to others…. This is why I 
have not spoken of opinions of that kind in this passage.”12 This 
sentence shows that even at the stage of the second edition of De 
Cive, Hobbes felt it unnecessary to refute religious opinions 
related to civil matters as in Leviathan, especially in Part 4. 
However, the next passage indicates a departure from the attitude 
abovementioned. “There are certain doctrines which lead citizens 
imbued with them to the belief that they have the right and the 
duty to refuse to the commonwealth, and to struggle against 
sovereign Princes and sovereign authorities.”13 This passage 
suggests that Hobbes himself was aware that the type of the 
doctrine here and in the preface which opposes directly to the 
sovereign was not within the framework of the first edition. 
Hobbes then mentions explicitly the politically harmful doctrines 
of “the Roman Church” “on the pretext of religion.”14 His 
awareness of the peculiar significance of the explicit designation 
can be seen in the remark, “I do not conceal:”15 he could have 
refrained from mentioning specific names or doctrines.   
   Nevertheless, in spite of his new awareness of the politically 
dangerous implications of some religious opinions, Hobbes’s 
answer here was still the same as in the first edition: he left the 
sovereign to judge whether those religious opinions were 
pertinent to peace or not.16 This answer, however, leaves the 
possibility that the sovereign, not being aware of perilous political 
implications of such religious opinions, allows them to spread. In 
                                               
12 DC, ann. 6:11. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid. 
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Part 4 of Leviathan, on the other hand, he eliminated this 
possibility by refuting directly such opinions. The above 
interpretation helps to explain Hobbes’s increased concern with 
errors in Leviathan.17 
   So far the significance of the religious type of seditious opinion 
against the sovereign for Hobbes’s religious framework has been 
examined. However, this new kind of opinion also poses a major 
problem for Hobbes’s theoretical framework of civil matters proper. 
It was difficult for Hobbes’s scheme of human psychology and 
nature to explain the passions which drove those who expressed 
the religious type of seditious ideas to do so. In De Cive, religious 
conflictions were concerned with honour, one of the three passions 
which led human beings to violence in the state of nature. 
Certainly, Hobbes was keenly aware that those who pursued 
honour and political offices were likely to hope for “the failure of 
current public policies” or “opportunities for revolution” due to the 
discontent with failing to gain access to political offices.18 
Nevertheless, the offices themselves were part of the organisation 
of the state, and in this sense seekers of honour were, strictly 
speaking, not in pursuit of overthrowing the state. On the other 
hand, those who asserted the religious kind of seditious opinion 
targeted at the sovereign right itself. For this reason, it was 
necessary for Hobbes to develop new elements in his civil theory 
which could explicate the motive of those advocating this opinion. 
Here it is certain that the new notion of “dominion” in the state of 
nature in Leviathan plays this role. In all of the three works of 
political philosophy Hobbes specifies the same three factors of 
passion which induce people to violence: desire for commodity, 
                                               
17 Malcolm’s explanation of the reason for this change misses the point, 
because it is about Hobbes’s increasing concern with people’s opinions and 
not with errors, nor about the insufficiency of just demonstrating the truth 
as in De Cive. Hobbes, Leviathan, 47-51. 
18 DC, 12:10. 
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honour and fear. However, in Leviathan he connects desire for 
commodity and fear to desire for dominion.19 
   This consciousness of human desire for dominion, in turn, would 
enable Hobbes to gain the new awareness that, basing themselves 
on religious arguments and speaking in the name of God, people 
searched not only for honour but rather for dominion. This idea 
can explain several new elements in Leviathan. In the first place, 
while in both De Cive and in Part 4 of Leviathan Hobbes refuted 
false opinions, in Chapter 47 of Part 4 Hobbes associated the 
religious type of false opinions with the private benefit which the 
false opinions would bring to those who claimed them, Catholics 
and others. This new type of refutation reflects the above 
awareness. 
   Secondly, this opened the way for the change of Hobbes’s view 
on religion. In De Cive, Hobbes regarded religion mainly as 
matters necessary for entering the kingdom of God or heaven as 
opposed to those concerning human kingdom.20 In Chapter 12 of 
Leviathan, by contrast, Hobbes made a scandalous identification 
of religion as a kind of politics. While the founders of the religion 
of the gentiles have nourished and ordered the seeds of religion 
“according to their invention,” “the other, have done it, by Gods 
commandement, and direction: but both sorts have done it, with a 
purpose to make those men that relyed on them, the more apt to 
Obedience, Lawes, Peace, Charity, and civill Society.… The 
Religion of the later sort is Divine Politiques; and containeth 
Precepts to those that have yeeled themselves subjects in the 
Kingdom of God.… Of the later sort, were Abraham, Moses, and 
our Blessed Saviour.”21 Here the realization of the human pursuit 
of dominion in the name of religion affects Hobbes’s explication 
                                               
19 Lev, 13: 190, 192; 17: 254. This introduction of the notion of dominion, it 
seems, is difficult to explain only within his theory of the construction of 
the state. 
20 DC, 18:14. 
21 Lev, 12: 170. 
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about the intention of the founders of the religion: it points to the 
maintenance of dominion. However, in the case of Moses or 
Abraham, their establishment of religion could be explained 
simply as an act of obedience to the commandment of God. In the 
fact that Hobbes captured their intentions in terms of civil society, 
it can be seen that his general thrust was to go through with this 
framework and identify religion in general as a kind of politics, 
which is different from De Cive.22 Although associating religious 
dominion with false religion such as paganism or false Catholic 
doctrines was common at that time, the radical nature of 
Leviathan lies in applying this religious dominion even to true 
                                               
22 Thirdly, though this is not, by itself, a religious matter, the new 
consciousness that people aim at dominion in the name of religion concerns 
Hobbes’s changed view and wider use of rhetoric in Leviathan. As long as 
people search for dominion under the pretext of religion, their aim 
contradicts the civil sovereign’s maintenance of dominion and peace. In this 
sense, they are enemies of Hobbes. In turn, Hobbes’s two tasks in 
Leviathan, refuting his adversaries’ opinions and thereby searching for 
victory over them on the one hand, and searching for religious truth on the 
other, fit together. This new possibility was missed in Hobbes’s presentation 
in De Cive of the contradiction between rhetoric as the search for victory 
and logic as the search for truth. (DC, 12:12.) This would have led to his 
wider use of rhetoric in Leviathan. Another factor for the change is Hobbes’ 
refutation of many more religious opinions in Leviathan than in De Cive. 
Even in De Cive, in spite of his hostile remark about rhetoric, Hobbes made 
some use of rhetorical techniques, especially in confuting common opinions. 
(DC, 1:2, 9:1.) Hobbes’s wider use of rhetoric in Leviathan, especially 
against his religious enemies, can be seen as an elaboration of this practice. 
Though, as Nauta points out, Skinner’s argument that one of the main 
reasons for Hobbes’s changed attitude toward rhetoric is his lost confidence 
in reason in Leviathan is problematic, there still needs some kind of 
explanation for this change. Skinner, Reason and Rhetoric in the 
Philosophy of Hobbes, 347-50, 426-36; Lodi Nauta, "Hobbes the Pessimist?," 
British Journal for the History of Philosophy 10, no. 1 (2002): 48-54. Apart 
from this, Skinner’s account of Hobbes’s use of rhetoric in Leviathan is 
invaluable. 
   It is also to be noted that this view of religion as a kind of politics reveals 
another departure from De Cive. While here the kingdom of God is 
regarded as a kind of civil society, in De Cive it was characterised by lack of 
human subjection. (DC, 16: 8, 9, 15.) As will be discussed later, this 
cognition of the kingdom of God as a kind of civil society in contrast to De 
Cive, is in turn based on Hobbes’s epistemological argument about the 
foundation of Moses’ authority, also peculiar to Leviathan. 
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Christian religion, especially to authoritative biblical characters 
such as Moses.23 
    
Ⅳ 
   Now that the significance of the new religious problem in the 
second edition of De Cive has been clarified, the next topic to be 
examined is Hobbes’s identification of religious problems in 
Leviathan. 
 
The most frequent praetext of sedition, and Civill Warre, in Christian 
Common-Wealths hath a long time proceeded from a difficulty, not yet 
sufficiently resolved, of obeying at once, both God, and Man, then when 
their Commandments are one contrary to the other. It is manifest 
enough, that when a man receiveth two contrary Commands, and 
knows that one of them is Gods, he ought to obey that, and not the 
other, though it be the command even of his lawfull Soveraign 
(whether a Monarch, or a soveraign Assembly,) or the command of his 
Father. The difficulty therefore consisteth in this, that men when they 
are commanded in the name of God, know not in divers Cases, whether 
the command be from God, or whether he that commandeth, doe but 
abuse Gods name for some private ends of his own.24 
   
The problem articulated here is that when people are commanded 
in the name of God, they do not know whether the 
commandments really come from God or not, which could be 
defined as “the problem of pretended prophets.” There are several 
distinctive characteristics in this new presentation of the religious 
problem in comparison with De Cive. Firstly, the situation Hobbes 
had in mind became more specific: sedition or civil war. This 
reflects new types of seditious allegation found in the second 
edition of De Cive. Correspondingly, this new articulation of the 
religious problem calls our attention to the political significance of 
                                               
23 Schotte, Die Entmachtung Gottes durch den Leviathan: Thomas Hobbes 
über Religion, 49-53. 
24 Lev, 43: 928. 
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the allegation of the word of God: it amounts to a form of 
command. This suggests that if the allegations are true or 
believed, pretended prophets acquire dominion, a new insight in 
Leviathan.25 Hence, to prevent this acquisition of dominion, which 
is likely to lead to rebellion, the audience’s attitude towards the 
divine word becomes vital. Thus in Leviathan, Hobbes not only 
refuted false religious views but also placed great emphasis on 
and encouraged a critical and sceptical attitude of the audience 
towards the pretended word of God. 
   Actually, the critical attitude was the second feature of the 
formulation of religious problem in Leviathan. In De Cive the 
voice (in the name) of God was assumed to come truly from God, 
and the problem was only the diverse interpretation of the content 
of God’s voice. Here, on the other hand, doubt has been cast on 
this assumption: the problem is whether the voice in the name of 
God is really from God or not. It was this doubt which was an 
important stepping stone for the theoretical development from De 
Cive to Leviathan in Hobbes’s general argument on Christian 
religion and his approach to the Bible. 
   Thirdly, while the formulation of the problem in De Cive 
contrasted the time of Hobbes with the past and characterised his 
time as lacking in prophets as opposed to the writings of the word 
of God, the Scriptures, the identification here does not presuppose 
such a contrast. It can deal with the pretended word of God both 
through the Scriptures and through prophets. However, what does 
this inclusion of the possibility of prophets in Hobbes’s age 
precisely mean? To see the significance, it is useful to have a look 
at the type of the argument Hobbes refutes in Chapter 32. Here 
Hobbes mentions allegations of the word of God, not only through 
the Scriptures, that is to say, “by mediation of the Prophets, or of 
                                               
25 Lev, 36: 232. “He that pretends to teach men the way of so great felicity, 
pretends to govern them; that is to say, to rule, and reign over them.” Also 
see Lev, 47: 384. 
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the Apostles, or of the Church,” but also through immediate and 
supernatural revelation, that is to say, through dreams, visions, 
the voice, and supernatural inspiration.26 The latter type of 
argument was beyond the scope of De Cive.27 However, it is 
known that during the 1640s this allegation of immediate 
revelation independent of the Scriptures became prevalent. Those 
who alleged this have been called the enthusiasts.28 Thus it is the 
enthusiasts that will be the focus in order to understand contexts 
of Leviathan. 
   Certainly, Hobbes also treated the topic related to the 
enthusiasts, namely spirits and inspiration, in The Elements of 
Law.29 However, while in The Elements of Law only spirits were 
handled as a means of direct revelation, in the abovementioned 
passage in Leviathan, other mediations of immediate revelation 
such as dreams and visions are also dealt with. Also in Leviathan 
there are many more arguments which deal with immediate 
revelation. This development is partly due to the insight unique to 
Leviathan into the political implications of allegation of the word 
of God: the acquisition of dominion over believers in the allegation, 
incompatible with the sovereign power. Another related factor is 
that the enthusiasts during the Civil War, in so far as they were 
                                               
26 Lev, 32: 580. Also see the same distinction in Hobbes, Behemoth, or, the 
Long Parliament, 225. 
27 DC, 16:13, 18:1. Here the following questions Tuck and Sommerville 
posed are not sufficiently sharp. “Why should Hobbes have felt so deeply 
about the theology in Part Ⅲ [of Leviathan] ? The political point could have 
been made independently of the theology – to say that the sovereign is the 
sole authoritative interpreter of Scripture is a sufficiently striking and 
alarming claim, without the added complication of a new theology.” Tuck, 
"The Civil Religion of Thomas Hobbes," 132. “Why did he [Hobbes] bother 
to analyse its [the bible’s] meaning at such great length? One answer is 
that he intended to persuade his contemporaries of the truth of his ideas, 
and by so doing prevent future civil wars.” Sommerville, Thomas Hobbes: 
Political Ideas in Historical Context, 106-7. 
28 Although the term “enthusiasts” or “enthusiasm” can be used in various 
ways, and Hobbes himself used this term only a few times in Leviathan, the 
issue here is that only in Leviathan Hobbes dealt consciously and 
extensively with the claim of immediate revelation, or what is called 
“enthusiasm” here. 
29 EL, 1:11:7. 
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Puritans, fought against the Royalists and the king as the civil 
sovereign. 
 
Ⅴ 
   The emergence of the enthusiasts helps to explain distinctive 
features of Leviathan to a certain extent. However, it still leaves a 
puzzle about one of the most notorious chapters in Leviathan: 
Hobbes’s eschatology in Chapter 38. The difficulty with 
understanding the political significance of this chapter is that 
even in De Cive and of course also in Leviathan Hobbes showed 
the way to salvation. If the way to salvation is shown, why is it 
necessary to discuss further an afterlife, especially a quite 
peculiar version? Though the significance of Chapter 38 has been 
a great riddle among Hobbes scholars for a long time, at least 
since the publication of Pocock’s article, previous studies have 
never shown this precise difficulty.30 
   If Hobbes’s own word is used as a starting point for considering 
the context of this chapter, one obvious clue is his mention of 
justice at the beginning of the chapter.31 Then, on turning to the 
corresponding chapter on justice, Chapter 15, a new argument is 
found, or more precisely new kinds of people: what Hobbes called 
“the Foole.”32 Although the argument of the fool comprises both 
civil and religious elements, attention will now be paid to the 
discussion related to the kingdom of God. Major characteristics of 
the fool’s argument lie not only in its support of injustice, but 
especially in its disregard for the fear of God. This means that it 
                                               
30 Pocock, "Time, History, and Eschatology in the Thought of Thomas 
Hobbes," 174-87; Tuck, "The Civil Religion of Thomas Hobbes," 128-38. For 
a useful research review on this topic with its own answer to the question, 
see Jürgen Overhoff, Hobbes's Theory of the Will: Ideological Reasons and 
Historical Circumstances  (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000), 200-11. 
Even Johnston’s articulation of the problem, the most accurate so far, fails 
to capture this central point. Johnston, "Hobbes's Mortalism," 655-59, esp. 
59. 
31 Lev, 38: 698. 
32 Lev, 15: 222. 
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defies the basic articulation of the religious problem at the 
beginning of the religious part both in De Cive and Leviathan: 
what the divine law is.33 If the fear of God is taken away, the 
discussion about divine law and punishment becomes irrelevant. 
Based on this disregard of the fear of God, the fool focuses on the 
enormous good which might arise from unjust actions. 
 
He [the fool] questioneth, whether Injustice, taking away the feare of 
God, (for the same Foole hath said in his heart there is no God,)34 may 
not sometimes stand with that Reason, which dictateth to every man 
his own good; and particularly then, when it conduceth to such a 
benefit, as shall put a man in condition, to neglect not onely the 
dispraise, and reviling, but also the power of other men. The kingdom 
of God is gotten by violence: but what if it could be gotten by unjust 
violence? Were it against Reason so to get it, when it is impossible to 
receive hurt by it? And if it be not against Reason, it is not against 
Justice: or else Justice is not to be approved for good.35 
 
                                               
33 DC, 15:1; Lev, 31: 554. 
34 Even though the fool appeals to the notion of the kingdom of God, Hobbes 
regards the fool as an atheist. This is probably the reason why the fool is 
called as such. (For different views, see Patricia Springborg, "Hobbes's Fool 
the Stultus, Grotius, and the Epicurean Tradition," Hobbes Studies 
23(2010): 30-31. Kinch Hoekstra, "Hobbes and the Foole," Political Theory 
25, no. 5 (1997): 622. While Hoekstra’s article focuses on the validity of 
Hobbes’s reply to the fool, our concern is on the role of this type of 
argument for the formation of Leviathan.) In De Cive, Hobbes counts, 
among several categories of the atheist, the fool or “insipiens”, the 
translated word for “the Foole” in the Latin Leviathan as well. (DC, 14:19 
ann.; Lev, 15: 223.) It is ironical that in spite of his refutation of the atheist 
in both De Cive and Leviathan, Hobbes himself was later to be taken for an 
atheist.  
   In relation to this, Hobbes’s sincerity or internal belief has often been a 
topic of discussion. For example, Curley, "'I Durst Not Write So Boldly': 
How to Read Hobbes’s Theological-Political Treatise," 497-593. However, as 
Springborg argues, this is a matter different from “the relevance of his 
[Hobbes’s] theological arguments to his political theory, for to accept that he 
considered a settlement of the question of ecclesiastical authority crucial to 
his civil case does not presuppose any religious beliefs on his part at all.” 
“Hobbes’s theological arguments are to be judged … not on the basis of his 
private religious beliefs but on his public commitment to resolve this 
problem in the terms in which he understood it.” Springborg, "Leviathan 
and the Problem of Ecclesiastical Authority," 289-90. 
35 Lev, 15: 222. 
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Here it can be seen that the huge gap between the large benefit 
arising from entering the kingdom of God and the possible 
punishment of the civil sovereign makes the civil law null and 
void. Certainly, as regards this type of argument Hobbes could 
offer some refutation. “As for the instance of gaining the secure 
and perpetuall felicity of Heaven, by any way; it is frivolous: there 
being but one way imaginable; and that is not breaking, but 
keeping of Covenant.”36 As long as the matter was concerned with 
the way to salvation, he was able to defend his position. However, 
Hobbes provided another modified version of the fool’s argument 
more difficult to deal with. 
 
There be some that proceed further; and will not have the Law of 
Nature, to be those Rules which conduce to the preservation of mans 
life on earth; but to the attaining of an eternal felicity after death; to 
which they think the breach of Covenant may conduce; and 
consequently be just and reasonable.37 
 
   The gist of this argument and its more radical character 
compared with other common fools probably lies in the expression, 
“may conduce.” The enormous amount of benefit which they think 
comes from entering the kingdom of God renders the mere 
possibility of a mere help for the entry a sufficient motive of 
“unjust” action or breaching their covenants. However, if a tiny 
possibility is sufficient, the demonstration that such an action is 
quite unlikely to lead people to enter the kingdom of God, or even 
the one that it never leads people to, would lose much of its 
momentum. Now it is obvious that the notion of eternal felicity, or 
of the extraordinary benefit of going into the kingdom of God, 
assumes, by itself, dangerous political implications. The way 
Hobbes refutes this argument here is by pointing out it is based 
                                               
36 Lev, 15: 224. 
37 Lev, 15: 226. 
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on faith, and thus cannot be called “natural” law.38 However, there 
is no wonder that in Parts 3 and 4, where the argument is based 
not only on natural knowledge but also supernatural revelation, 
Hobbes deals with this new threat; this would be one of the major 
political significances of Chapter 38.39 Therefore, together with 
the enthusiasts, it is this fool that we have in mind as part of 
religious contexts of Leviathan. Here it is to be noted that, as far 
as is known, Hobbes scholars have so far failed to pin down who 
could be thought of as what Hobbes called the fool in the context 
of the English Civil War. 
    
Ⅵ 
   It will be appropriate here to pay some attention to one great 
difficulty related to allegations of both the enthusiasts and the 
fool: they are concerned with supernatural matters. The 
enthusiasts claim supernatural revelation, and the matter of after 
life was, at least in De Cive, dependent on Christ’s authority as 
opposed to natural reason.40 In De Cive, these supernatural 
matters were thought to be beyond the scope of philosophy and 
impossible to investigate.41 In Leviathan, however, Hobbes did 
discuss numerous things once regarded as impossible to analyze.42 
                                               
38 Ibid. 
39 Though the religious implication of the argument of the fool has been 
investigated in the main text, the fool was also a contributing factor for 
Hobbes’s stronger emphasis on the importance of people’s opinion in 
Leviathan; for in the very place where Hobbes emphasised it, he mentioned 
the fool. Lev, 30: 522. 
   In turn, seeing that in the same place Hobbes argued that without the 
cognition of justice punishments would be regarded as an act of hostility, 
the distinction peculiar to Leviathan between them in the beginning of 
Chapter 28 was, it can be said, also a product of the fool. Compare DC, 10:7 
and Lev, 28: 484, 486. 
40 DC, 17:13. 
41 DC, 17:14, 28, 18:4. 
42 Fukuda points out that in Leviathan Hobbes “marched forward even into 
the territory which in De Cive had been protected as belonging to the 
domain of faith.” Our point is the difficulty with this march. Arihiro 
Fukuda, Sovereignty and the Sword: Harrington, Hobbes, and Mixed 
Government in the English Civil Wars  (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 
36 
 
Hobbes’s treatment of supernatural things in Leviathan became 
more subtle and sophisticated than in De Cive.  
   On the other hand, his concern with things supernatural had 
already begun in The Elements of Law. In it, discussing the 
relationship between natural law and divine law, Hobbes 
defended his argument against “the opposition and affronts of 
supernaturalists now-a-days, to rational and moral argument.”43 
This defence of rational argument against “supernaturalists” was 
one of the underlying tones of Hobbes’s religious argument. 
Though this was tacitly presupposed in De Cive, in Leviathan 
Hobbes again explicitly defended natural reason in the treatment 
of supernatural revelation. In the first chapter concerning 
Christian religion, Hobbes initially points out that the discourse 
henceforth depends much on supernatural revelations of God. 
“Nevertheless,” he continues, “we are not to renounce our Senses, 
and Experience; nor (that which is the undoubted Word of God) 
our naturall Reason.”44 In this sense, the most sophisticated 
argument in Leviathan was the culmination of his defence of 
natural reason.45 One of the main tasks of this research is to 
clarify this aspect: the way in Leviathan Hobbes analyzed 
“supernatural” things once regarded as beyond human cognition 
and its subtle nature. 
                                                                                                                       
144. 
43 EL, 1:18:12. 
44 Lev, 32: 576. 
45 This poses the problem of the relationship between the “supernaturalists” 
and the enthusiasts, a topic regrettably beyond the scope of this thesis. 
   Mintz points out and Parkin agrees that Hobbes contributed to the 
English Enlightenment by forcing his adversaries to argue on rational 
grounds. Parkin, Taming the Leviathan: The Reception of the Political and 
Religious Ideas of Thomas Hobbes in England, 1640-1700, 415-16; Samuel I. 
Mintz, The Hunting of Leviathan: Seventeenth-Century Reactions to the 
Materialism and Moral Philosophy of Thomas Hobbes  (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010), passim. From our viewpoint, the theme 
of Hobbes and the English Enlightenment will also require investigating 
how Hobbes’s adversaries discussed supernatural phenomena, which 
Hobbes regarded as a major impediment to rational argument. For 
Hobbes’s nuanced influence on the continent, see Malcolm, "Hobbes and the 
European Republic of Letters." 
37 
 
   One of the important signs which indicate the subtle nature in 
his treatment of supernatural things in Leviathan is a new 
distinction between things “above Reason” and things “contrary to 
it,” though this distinction itself was conventional.46 While he 
refuted irrational religious opinions held by the pagans and his 
contemporaries in Chapter 12 and Part 4, he saw in the 
Scriptures themselves only supernatural phenomena and denied 
irrational elements in them. Probably this subtle distinction 
prompted Hobbes to capture religion in general with human 
errors and deceptions as in Chapter 12 of Leviathan, in addition 
to religion suggested by natural reason, which can also be found 
in De Cive. 
    In relation to previous Hobbes studies, this fuller-scale research 
into the development of Hobbes’s handling of supernatural things 
from De Cive to Leviathan has two immediate implications. First, 
this thesis calls into question one prevalent explanation of the 
reason why Hobbes wrote Leviathan anew, such as “Hobbes’s 
increasing awareness of the real implications of his general 
philosophical position”, or his ambition to “render Christianity 
consistent with the thoroughgoing materialism.”47 It is true that 
Hobbes made a much more markedly materialistic interpretation 
of the Bible in Leviathan than in De Cive. The issue here, 
however, is how to explain this change, in particular why he 
applied his materialism to his scriptural interpretation only in 
Leviathan, and not in De Cive, even though he had already held a 
materialistic view of the world at the time of writing De Cive. 
Here it is not clear whether the motive to explore further the 
                                               
46 Lev, 32: 576. 
47 Tuck, Hobbes: A Very Short Introduction, 97; Parkin, Taming the 
Leviathan: The Reception of the Political and Religious Ideas of Thomas 
Hobbes in England, 1640-1700, 92-93. For similar views, Overhoff, 
Hobbes's Theory of the Will: Ideological Reasons and Historical 
Circumstances, 177-81, 92 201; Collins, The Allegiance of Thomas Hobbes, 
31; Martinich, The Two Gods of Leviathan: Thomas Hobbes on Religion and 
Politics, 5, 7-8, 14-15. 
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religious implications of first philosophy can explain a new 
inquiry into what was thought to be beyond the sphere of 
philosophical or human exploration in the first place as opposed to 
unsolved riddles within the scope of philosophy.48 Rather it seems 
that the emergence of new political threats based on allegations 
appealing to supernatural phenomena forced Hobbes to reconsider 
his treatment of supernatural things in De Cive. What is more, 
the general notion of implication does not explain specific 
differences between De Cive and Leviathan. Hobbes’s religious 
argument in Leviathan is much more multifaceted and complex 
than this explanation suggests, and the precise role Hobbes’s 
materialism played in the argument specific to Leviathan as a 
whole has to be specified.49 
   Second, this research emphasises the distinction between the 
supernatural and the false, which comments on Hobbes’s wider 
and more emphatic refutation of errors in Leviathan are likely to 
blur.50 Based on this distinction this study does not accept the 
widespread opinion that in Leviathan Hobbes undermined 
Christian religion or the Scriptures themselves, as well as what 
he saw as false ideas prevalent in his age.51  
 
Ⅶ 
                                               
48 Similarly, Johnston maintains that for Hobbes “theological truths based 
upon faith and revelation were perfectly compatible with the philosophical 
truths.” Johnston, "Hobbes's Mortalism," 649-55, esp. 54. 
49 For example, Hobbes’s new cases in Leviathan for religious liberty or 
toleration are, as will be shown, largely independent of his materialism, 
and thus are to be explained by other factors. 
50 For example, Johnston’s dichotomy between the rational and the 
irrational cannot capture the peculiar character of the supernatural. David 
Johnston, The Rhetoric of Leviathan: Thomas Hobbes and the Politics of 
Cultural Transformation  (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 
213, 18. 
51 Skinner, Reason and Rhetoric in the Philosophy of Hobbes, 405, 11-12, 17, 
23-25; Christopher Hill, The English Bible and the Seventeenth-Century 
Revolution  (London: Penguin Books, 1994), 415-17; Collins, The Allegiance 
of Thomas Hobbes, 27-32. 
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   So far matters concerned with peace in Leviathan have been 
examined. However, in the religious argument of Leviathan, there 
is yet another remarkable feature. Hobbes’s notable remark in the 
dedication is a good starting point to see this. 
 
I know not how the world will receive it [Leviathan], nor how it may 
reflect on those that shall seem to favour it. For in a way beset with 
those that contend, on one side for too great Liberty, and on the other 
side for too much Authority, ‘tis hard to passe between the points of 
both unwounded.52 
 
While Hobbes’s caution concerning “too great liberty” is shared by 
all of his three works of political philosophy, his defence of liberty 
against “too much authority” is new and peculiar to Leviathan. 
Certainly, this remark on authority can be understood in 
connection with civil parts of Leviathan.53 However, also in Parts 
3 and 4 of Leviathan, Hobbes devotes a large amount of space to 
the discussion of various kinds of religious authority and their 
foundations. Correspondingly, in Leviathan Hobbes’s new defence 
of minimal internal liberty and more famously of “Christian 
liberty” can be seen.54 It is true that his defence of liberty can also 
be found in De Cive. Hobbes counted securing harmless liberty of 
citizens, “essential to happy lives for citizens,” among the duties of 
the sovereign offices.55 More fundamentally, the construction of 
the state meant acquiring secure enjoyment of freedom, or 
freedom from fear of other people’s intervention or violence.56 
                                               
52 Lev, Dedication: A2r. 
53 For example, one of the implications of the argument concerning the 
basis of the sovereign right to punish would be to deny the sovereign the 
authority to punish, because the sovereign’s right to punish is not the 
product of the authorisation in the establishment of the state. (Lev, 28: 
482.) Also, against some Royalists, Hobbes specifies exceptional 
cirsumstances under which the obligation of citizens to the sovereign no 
longer lasts. Lev, 21: 344, 46. 
54 Lev, 47: 1114, 16. 
55 DC, 13:15-17. 
56 DC, 10:1, 13:17. 
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Nonetheless, Hobbes’s several defences of religious liberty are 
found only in Leviathan. Then, it seems possible to understand 
this general assertion in the dedication in relation to religious 
affairs. 
   As a clue to understanding what Hobbes might have meant by 
the controversy over religious liberty and authority, it can be seen 
in the manuscript version in Chapter 18 his mention of “doctrinal 
factions of Presbyterians and Independents,” which in the 
published version is converted into “Dissenters about the liberty 
of Religion.”57 This doctrinal dispute is what is now called the 
toleration controversy. This is the third aspect which is paid 
attention to for exploring contexts of Leviathan. 
    So far three specific contexts have been identified for 
understanding Leviathan: the enthusiasts, the fool or the political 
use of heaven as eternal happiness, and the toleration controversy. 
The next chapter will explore the identified contexts. 
 
 
 
                                               
57 Lev, 18: 278. 
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3.    Contexts of Leviathan 
3.1. Controversy over Biblical Authority 
  
Ⅰ 
   One of the most significant characteristics of the Civil War was 
that as a result of the fragmentation of Puritanism1 it saw the 
emergence of some fundamental challenges to Christian religion. 
Before the Civil War, religious controversies were made between 
Catholics and Protestants, or among English Protestants between 
Laudian Ariminians and Puritans about, for example, 
predestination.2 During the Civil War, authorities’ rein on schism 
and heresies became lax, and new radical opinions became 
conspicuous which challenged common basic assumptions that the 
parties engaged in the controversies before the war had held.3 
One obvious example was Socinianism, which opposed the 
doctrine of the Trinity.4 More fundamentally, however, there arose 
some opinions which questioned and impugned, in one way or 
another, one of the basic principles of Christian religion, the 
divine authority of the Scriptures.5 One of them was enthusiasm, 
which alleged immediate revelation outside the Scriptures. 
Another was antiscripturism, a flat denial of biblical authority. 
                                               
1 For a balanced and reliable account of Puritanism in general, see John 
Spurr, English Puritanism 1603-1689  (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998). 
Although Hobbes did not use the term “Puritanism” or “Puritans,” this 
term is useful for describing at the same time the continuity and change of 
the English religious situation before and after the outbreak of the Civil 
War. 
2 For Hobbes’s view on these pre-war controversies, see EL, 2:6:9, 2:7:1. 
3 For a valuable attempt to connect radical Puritanism before and 
during the Civil War, see David R. Como, "Radical Puritanism, C. 1558-
1660," in The Cambridge Companion to Puritanism, ed. John Coffey and 
Paul Chang-Ha Lim (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008). 
4 For a general account of the influence of Socinianism on the English 
society mainly between 1610 and 1660, see Sarah Mortimer, Reason and 
Religion in the English Revolution: The Challenge of Socinianism  
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
5 The increasing concern with atheism in this age can be seen in this 
context. 
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   Now, this chapter provides only a brief view of what radical 
Puritans, main proponents of these radical opinions, themselves 
said.6 Instead, it examines mainly the report of the conspicuous 
appearance of the radical views, and some new rational 
justifications for biblical authority and Christian religion as a 
response to the radicals, with some comparative perspective with 
the pre-war discussion. It is certain that some radical views 
existed among Puritans even before the Civil War,7 and that the 
forerunners of the radical opinions can be traced back to the early 
period of the Reformation. However, what was significant about 
the Civil War period in English history was that it was only in 
this era that the radical opinions became conspicuous, and that 
people, including Hobbes, started to consider seriously how to deal 
with the challenges the radicals posed. 
   Among people who defended the fundamental principle of 
Christian religion in this age, some were Puritans, while others 
took the side of the king and the episcopacy. The latter Anglican 
group were closer to Hobbes both personally and intellectually. To 
begin with, as a starting reference point and an example of the 
pre-war argument, there will be a brief examination of the 
discussion about the authority of the Scriptures by William 
Chillingworth. Then, Puritan and Anglican arguments for biblical 
authority during the Civil War will be investigated in turn.8  
   This study will try to develop previous research in three 
respects. Firstly, many of the people to be discussed here are 
                                               
6 For this, see Christopher Hill, The World Turned Upside Down: 
Radical Ideas during the English Revolution  (London: Penguin Books, 
1991); J. F. McGregor and Barry Reay, Radical Religion in the English 
Revolution  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984). For a more recent 
work, Nicholas McDowell, The English Radical Imagination: Culture, 
Religion, and Revolution, 1630-1660  (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003). 
7 David R. Como, Blown by the Spirit: Puritanism and the Emergence of 
an Antinomian Underground in Pre-Civil-War England  (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2004). 
8 This distinction is provisional, because here Baxter ’s work is not 
treated. 
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known as proponents of reasonable Christianity, and this chapter 
tries to clarify the distinctive feature of each of their reasons.9 
Secondly, compared with the erudite and standard treatment of 
this topic by Christopher Hill, this study gives a more detailed 
account of each person discussed and the relationship between 
them.10 Thirdly, this study aims to show the specific significance 
of Hobbes’s multi-layered and complicated discussion on biblical 
authority in Leviathan in relation to his English contemporaries. 
   William Chillingworth was one of the chief members of the 
Great Tew circle, a cultivated learned circle flourishing in the 
1630s, which Hobbes himself took part in.11 Chillingworth and 
Hobbes were friends, and John Aubrey reports Hobbes’s comment 
on Chillingworth’s character as a fervent controversialist.12 
Hobbes scholars have already discussed the relationship between 
Chillingworth and Hobbes, and on the topic of biblical authority, 
the influence of the Great Tew circle on Hobbes has been known.13 
                                               
9 It is to be noted that this examination is quite different from just 
comparing the definition of the “reason” each of them gives. Cf. G. E. R. 
Lloyd, Magic, Reason and Experience: Studies in the Origin and 
Development of Greek Science  (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1979). 
10 Hill, The English Bible and the Seventeenth-Century Revolution, 223-
48; The World Turned Upside Down: Radical Ideas during the English 
Revolution, 259-68. 
   For another insightful argument, see Joseph M. Levine, "Matter of 
Fact in the English Revolution," Journal of the History of Ideas 64, no. 2 
(2003). 
11 For this circle in a wider perspective, H. R. Trevor-Roper, "The Great 
Tew Circle," in Catholics, Anglicans and Puritans: Seventeenth Century 
Essays (London: Secker and Warburg, 1987). This article covers the 
period from its formation to the dispersion, and examines not only 
intellectual but also political aspects of the circle. 
12 John Aubrey, Brief Lives, Chiefly of Contemporaries, Set Down by 
John Aubrey, between the Years 1669 and 1696, ed. Andrew Clark, vol. 1 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1898), 173. 
   For a more general biographical account of Chillingworth, see Warren 
Chernaik, “William Chillingworth,” Oxford Dictionary of National 
Biography (hereafter as ODNB) and Robert Orr, Reason and Authority: 
The Thought of William Chillingworth  (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1967), 1-44. 
13 Sommerville, Thomas Hobbes: Political Ideas in Historical Context, 
108-12; Hobbes, Leviathan, 45. 
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   Chillingworth’s most renowned work, The Religion of 
Protestants a Safe Way to Salvation (1638), takes the form of the 
refutation of the Jesuit Edward Knott, who in turn rebutted the 
Laudian divine Christopher Potter, who had formerly argued 
against Knott’s work. Thus Chillingworth’s book is the fourth 
work produced in the controversy. Knott provided some standard 
Catholic arguments in defence of tradition, the authority of the 
Pope and his infallibility, and against the Protestant principle 
sola scriptura. Knott’s strategy was to emphasise lack of certainty 
in the Protestant side. He notes possible corruptions of the 
Hebrew text, and different readings among the copies, and as for 
translation, possible mistranslations and different results of 
translation. Then, the only way to certainty was to rely on the 
infallibility of the Catholic Church.14 Against this, Chillingworth 
answers that these problems are not related to the church. The 
problem concerning original texts can be dealt with by a basic 
technique of textual criticism, a collation of various copies. As for 
translations, learned people can examine them by comparing 
them with the original Hebrew text.15 However, more 
fundamentally, Chillingworth accused Knott of demanding 
something impossible (equally for Catholics and Protestants) and 
unnecessary for salvation, that is, mathematical and absolute 
certainty in matters of faith.16 Against this demand of Knott, 
Chillingworth maintains that the nature of faith admits of only 
moral certainty, probability or a lower degree of certainty.17 This 
notion of moral certainty also helps to solve the problem posed in 
relation to the plurality of translations and copies of the 
Scriptures. Though some minor parts might contradict each other 
                                               
14 William Chillingworth, The Works of William Chillingworth, 3 vols. 
(Oxford: University Press, 1838), 1: 141-44. References are to volume 
and page numbers. 
15 Ibid., 1: 179. 
16 Ibid., 1: 3, 10, 114-15, 75, 79, 84, 89, 266-67. 
17 Ibid., 1: 115, 267. 
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in several translations and copies, still the main part retains the 
unity, and the moral certainty necessary for salvation remains 
intact.18 
   When it comes to the authority of the Bible itself, both Knott 
and Chillingworth agree that its foundation must be sought 
outside the Bible. While Knott appeals to the Catholic Church, 
Chillingworth refers to “the goodness of the precepts of 
Christianity” and to “a constant, famous, and very general 
tradition,” or “original and universal tradition” “descended to us 
from Christ” as opposed to the Catholic Church.19 He regards the 
universal tradition as authoritative, and says, “it is upon the 
authority of universal tradition that we would have them 
[Catholics] believe scripture.”20 Though Chillingworth defended 
the use of reason against the Catholic doctrine of infallibility,21 to 
that extent Chillingworth admitted authority. He did not develop 
a more detailed argument about the foundation of biblical 
authority than this. Here it is also to be noted that he viewed the 
Bible as the common principle both to Catholics and 
Protestants.22 He pointed out that as opposed to atheists and 
Jews, Christians had both Testaments as the sufficient means to 
determine all controversies among themselves.23 Thus it was not 
necessary for him to examine the foundation of the authority of 
the Bible in further details. 
 
Ⅱ 
   The Civil War saw the radicalization of Puritanism. Thomas 
Edwards, a well-known Presbyterian reporter of “heretical” 
                                               
18 Ibid., 1: 175-76, 80. For Chillingworth’s use of Socinian ideas in his 
refutation of Catholicism, see Mortimer, Reason and Religion in the 
English Revolution: The Challenge of Socinianism, 67-82. 
19 Chillingworth, The Works of William Chillingworth, 1: 115, 89, 271. 
20 Ibid., 1: 238. 
21 Ibid., 1: 235-39. 
22 Ibid., 1: 164-65, 195, 230. 
23 Ibid., 1: 271. 
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opinions in his age, gives a comprehensive account of what kinds 
of opinions there were at that time. Some of them were concerned 
with the authority of the Bible: “that … the Scriptures are a dead 
letter, and no more to be credited then the writings of men, not 
divine, but humane invention;” “that the Scripture, whether a 
true manuscript or no, whether Hebrew, Greek or English, is but 
humane, and so not be able to discover a divine God.”24 Yet in this 
report the political significance of enthusiasm was not apparent. 
In the late 1640s, however, more direct justifications of the 
military and political action based on enthusiasm began to appear. 
Here we have the direct testimony of William Erbery. In his 
defence of the New Model Army, he characterised the Army as 
“the Army of God,” and put a great emphasis on the dwelling of 
Godhead in the body of the “saints” or soldiers.25 This dwelling, he 
argued, justifies the Army’s fight against the king or 
Parliament.26 
   This kind of argument is also reported by William Walwyn, a 
Leveller leader closely connected with the gathered churches 
supporting the Army. In his description of the gathered churches, 
the members of the churches are reported to assert that they 
speak “from the inward suggestion of the Spirit.”27 With this 
teaching of God within them, they subordinate the Scriptures to 
their inward spirit, “not examining their opinions by the Text, but 
                                               
24 Thomas Edwards, Gangraena  (Exeter: The Rota at Imprint Academic, 
1977), 1: 18. 
25 William Erbery, The Armies Defence, or, God Guarding the Camp of the 
Saints, and the Beloved City. Shewing, That All Oppressions in Governors, 
and Government Shall Case by the Appearance of God in the Saints. 
Whether the Appearance of God in the Army, with the Saints, Be in 
Contrariety or Enmity to the Good Spirit and Minde of God. Not to Rebuke 
an Evil Spirit in Any, but Soberly to Enquire Whether God Doth Not Act 
with Highest Power in the Saints, When They Are at Lowest Weakness. 
And Whether It Be Their Weakness to Act in This Way of Povver  (London: 
Printed by T. N. for Giles Calvers, 1648), passim. 
26 Ibid., 10. 
27 William Walwyn, The Writings of William Walwyn, ed. Jack R. 
McMichael and Barbara Taft (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1989), 
317. 
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urging that the Text is to be interpreted by their Opinions and 
experiences.”28 They also present their word as the word of God, 
not the word of man, “as if it were the sin of the sinnes, for men to 
doubt it.”29 This assertion, Walwyn infers, amounts to pretending 
infallibility.30 
   Though in the report of Walwyn the connection between the 
allegation of revelation and the political action of the gathered 
churches is not so clear, in our third example, which comes from 
Henry Hammond, the link is more marked.31 In his Address to 
Fairfax, Hammond urged him to consider several opinions which 
impelled him and the Army to proceed with their political action. 
The first issue Hammond raised was their reliance on the spirit of 
God and their belief that political action had been led by the 
spirit.32 Here Hammond sorts the problem into two cases. If the 
voice of the spirit is the same as the Bible, Fairfax should be able 
to point out the specific scriptural passages on which he relies. Yet 
the main problem lies in the second case, where the voice of the 
spirit is different from the Scriptures. Hammond’s argument here 
is noteworthy, because his treatment of enthusiasm is somewhat 
reminiscent of Hobbes’s identification of the religious problem 
specific to Leviathan. Here Hammond’s asks Fairfax to present 
the ground of the revelation,  
 
so that pretended Spirit may a  ccording to the rules prescribed by God 
in his acknowledged Word be tried and examined regularly, whether it 
be of God or no? before the subject-matter of such Revelation be 
believed infallible.33 
  
                                               
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid., 313. 
30 Ibid., 331. 
31 For Hammond, see the latter part of this chapter. 
32 Henry Hammond, To the Right Honourable, the Lord Fairfax, and His 
Councell of Vvarre: The Humble Addresse of Henry Hammond  (London: 
Printed for Richard Royston, 1649), 2. 
33 Ibid. 
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Hobbes was probably dealing with this kind of political and 
military action based on the claim of immediate revelation. 
   However, enthusiasm itself was a serious challenge to most 
Christians, and there were several kinds of reactions to it. One 
was to write a heresiography about contemporary heresies and to 
warn people against them, as did Thomas Edwards.  Another 
major move made by the Parliament was the enactment of the 
Blasphemy Act, a crackdown by legal force. However, yet another 
reaction which is focused on now was to offer a rational ground of 
the authority of the Bible. During the Civil War at least two 
Puritans are known to have discussed the authority of the Bible: 
Edward Leigh and John Goodwin. 
   Edward Leigh is today known mainly for his philological study 
of the Bible, Critica Sacra. Born in 1603, he received a Puritan 
education and by the late 1630s he himself belonged to a member 
of a godly circle. He was appointed a JP for the first time in 1641, 
and during the civil war he actively supported the Parliament as 
a JP, and tackled the ecclesiastical issues of the day.34 The work in 
which he discussed biblical authority is A Treatise of Divinity, 
published in 1647. His aim was to go through a difficult middle 
way “between the Socinians reason, and the Famalists [sic] spirit. 
Socinians wil have nothing but reason, no infused habits, and so 
they destroy the testimony of the spirit; the Familists wil have 
nothing but Spirit they rest wholy in an immediate private 
spirit.”35 This suggests the difficulty for standard Presbyterians in 
undertaking rational defences of authority of the Bible against 
                                               
34 See John Sutton, “Edward Leigh,” ODNB. 
35 Edward Leigh, A Treatise of Divinity Consisting of Three Bookes. The 
First of Which Handling the Scripture or Word of God, Treateth of Its 
Divine Authority, the Canonicall Bookes, the Authenticall Edition, and 
Severall Versions; the End, Properties, and Interpretation of Scripture. 
The Second Handling God, Sheweth That There Is a God, and What He 
Is, in His Essence and Several Attributes, and Likewise the Distinction 
of Persons in the Divine Essence. The Third Handleth the Three 
Principall Workes of God, Decree, Creation and Providence.  (London: E. 
Griffin for William Lee, 1647), 24. 
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enthusiasm. Actually, precisely because Leigh’s approach, despite 
his erudition, is not especially original, it reveals the difficulty all 
the more.  
   On the one hand, he kept a distance from the Socinians by 
limiting the scope of the arguments. He notes that it is only the 
holy spirit within us that provides the certainty about faith 
(certitudo fidei).36 While Chillingworth only admitted of moral 
certainty or probability, Leigh saw the source of solid certainty in 
the holy spirit. On the other hand, Leigh tried to distinguish 
himself from the enthusiasts. The function of the spirit was 
concerned about witnessing the divine authority of the Scriptures, 
and not about individual salvation. In addition, the spirit did not 
work directly for laying foundations for biblical authority, but 
ultimately after and combined with other rational grounds.37 
Furthermore, in opposition to the Catholics, he asserts that the 
Scriptures have authority in themselves, “not borrowed from any 
persons in the world.”38 “The Scriptures prove themselves by their 
own naturall light.”39 This assertion was meant to refute the 
papist position, which saw the foundation of biblical authority in 
the testimony of the church.40 However, this also meant that he 
did not want to rely on any external actors in the vindication of 
biblical authority as Chillingworth had done. 
    Though he mentioned two external factors as rational grounds, 
miracles and the testimony of the church in all ages, of martyrs, 
and of the gentiles,41 Leigh was mainly concerned with the 
                                               
36 Ibid., 23. 
37 The spirit does not witness “that the Scripture is the word of God 
immediately but ultimately.” Ibid., 24. 
38 Ibid., 25. 
39 Ibid., 26. 
40 Against the heathens, he makes a distinction between biblical 
authority itself and that in respect of us. Though the Bible is in itself 
divine, in human viewpoint they are divine only when people 
acknowledge them to be. Ibid., 10. 
41 Ibid., 19-23. 
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content of the Bible.42  He refers to contents such as the divine 
and supernatural matter beyond the reach of human reason, the 
nature and excellency of God, the requirement of the most exact 
and perfect goodness, the glory of God as the end of the Scriptures, 
impartial commandments, lack of contradictions and so on. Or the 
grounds are inferences from the content, such as the fulfilment of 
biblical prophesies, and its antiquity based on the biblical history. 
Or one ground is about the style of the argument. The Bible is 
different from all other writings in the phrase and manner of 
writing. While the Bible speaks things without proof 
authoritatively, other authors use many arguments to confirm the 
truth of what they say.  
   Whereas Leigh had several kinds of adversaries in his mind and 
his argument concerning biblical authority had a composite and 
eclectic character, John Goodwin, another Puritan who discussed 
the authority of the Scriptures, made a more straightforwardly 
rational defence. While Goodwin is today mainly known as one of 
the principal proponents of toleration during the Civil War, he is 
also known as an advocator of rational religion, and his Divine 
Authority of the Scriptures Asserted (1648), one of his major 
theological works, evinces this latter feature.43 In contrast with 
Leigh, Goodwin did not mention the spirit. This would mean that 
Goodwin’s position could look too close to the kind of Socinians 
which Leigh tried to avoid. On the other hand, from Goodwin’s 
own viewpoint, the underlying cause of the problem in his age, the 
sudden appearance of people denying the authority of the 
Scriptures, was “dead faith.”44 It was people’s negligent reliance 
                                               
42 Ibid., 11-18. 
43 For John Goodwin in general, see John Coffey, John Goodwin and the 
Puritan Revolution: Religion and Intellectual Change in Seventeenth-
Century England  (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2006). For Coffer’s 
comment on this work, ibid., 154-58.  
44 John Goodwin, The Divine Authority of the Scriptures Asserted, or 
the Great Charter of the Worlds Blessednes Vindicated. Being a 
Discourse of Soveraigne Use and Service in These Times; Not Only 
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on their teachers, orthodox opinions, the civil sovereign and so on, 
or their failure to give grounds for their faith which could reply to 
every kind of opposition. Therefore, he advocated offering rational 
grounds for the article of faith without any hesitation. This work 
on the authority of the Bible was part of this strategy and an 
expression of his faith.  
   In addition to his neglect of spirit, another related characteristic 
of Goodwin’s argument is that he also failed to make such a 
distinction between moral certainty or probability and 
mathematical certainty as Chillingworth had made. It seems that 
Goodwin was not aware of the possibility of the absolute certainty. 
This might be related to the different characters of their 
adversaries. While Chillingworth confronted the Catholic demand 
for absolute certainty and denial of any other form of credibility, 
Goodwin was faced with the denial of the authority of the 
Scriptures. Even if his arguments were just relative and not 
conclusive, he was probably satisfied with them as long as they 
would contribute to the credibility of the Scriptures as the word of 
God. Then he provided as many pieces of evidence as he could find. 
   The most immediate cause of his writing this work was some 
criticisms against his other work in defence of toleration, 
Hagiomastix.45 In this work Goodwin demanded the clarification 
of the meaning of the word “the Scriptures” when the denial of the 
Scriptures as the word of God and the foundation of Christian 
                                                                                                                       
against That King of Errours, and Heresies Anti-Scripturisme, Who 
Hath Already Destroyed the Faith of Many, and Hath All the Faith in 
the World yet Remaining, in Chase, but Also against All Such Inward 
Suggestions and Secret Underminings of Satan, by Which He Privily 
Attempteth the Ruine of the Precious Faith and Hope, Wherewith the 
Saints Have Built up Themselves with Much Spirituall Industry and 
Care. Together with Two Tables Annexed; the Former, of the Contents, 
and Severall Arguments More Largely Prosecuted in the Treatise; the 
Later, of Such Texts of Scripture Unto Which Some Light Is Given 
Therein.  (London: A.M. for Henry Overton, 1648), sig. ar, a2r-a3v. 
45 For this work, see Coffey, John Goodwin and the Puritan Revolution: 
Religion and Intellectual Change in Seventeenth-Century England, 142-
45. 
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religion was said to deserve capital punishments. “The Scriptures,” 
on the one hand, could not mean the English translation.46 There 
were different versions of the translation, contradicting each 
other in some parts. Also, the translation was authentic only as 
long as it accorded with the original. On the other hand, it could 
not mean the original copies.47 The writing was preceded by the 
preaching of the apostles, which was complete in itself. In 
addition there are again differences among copies, and 
possibilities of errors by the scribes. If some copies were to be 
perfectly divinely inspired, it would not be possible to be certain 
about this.48 In sum, the foundation of Christian religion is not 
any books or writings but the “substance of matter, those gracious 
counsels of God concerning the salvation of the world by Jesus 
Christ.”49 
   Goodwin’s main argument is generally an amplification and 
elaboration of Leigh’s rational arguments. He divides it into both 
“intrinsecall” and “extrinsecall.” The former depends on the body 
of the Scriptures themselves, while the latter comes out of the 
Scriptures.50 Again, Goodwin divides the former internal part into 
subsections: 1. the phrase, language and manner of framing the 
Scriptures; 2. substance with divine characters. The latter 
external is also divided into subsections: 1. divine providence, 2. 
acts and saying of men in accordance with the divine providence. 
More specifically, he discusses the preservation of the Scriptures, 
the propagation of Christianity, and the fulfilling of predictions in 
the Scriptures, and others.51 As shown here, for Goodwin external 
factors do not signify some human actors like the Pope, but events 
related to the Scriptures. 
                                               
46 Goodwin, The Divine Authority of the Scriptures Asserted, 4-10. 
47 Ibid., 10-11. 
48 Ibid., 14. 
49 Ibid., 17. 
50 Ibid., 31. 
51 Ibid., 228. 
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   In each subsection, Goodwin picks up several topics. In the 
phrase or language subsection, he discusses the nature of the 
style, authoritative speaking, the Bible’s antiquity, and other 
topics. In the next subsection of the substance, Goodwin chooses 
topics such as a tendency to godliness, a denial of one’s own, a 
heart-searching character, transforming power, and wisdom. To 
view Goodwin’s argument about the antiquity of the Scriptures in 
a little more detail, he pays special attention to the parts which 
bear the most ancient date: the Pentateuch.52 Moses was the most 
ancient writer, more ancient than Homer, Hesiod, and the like. 
Goodwin accepts the view that ancient writers of the heathen 
borrowed from Moses when they wrote about divine things.  
   Goodwin oftentimes shares topics he selects with Leigh, but he 
amplifies and elaborates the structure of the argument. First he 
shows what the Bible teaches, for example, godliness. Then he 
connects the teaching of godliness with the assertion that the 
Bible is from God, not from men. In this second part, Goodwin 
takes into account possible rival opinions, a major feature of his 
argument. Firstly, he frequently admits that heathen 
philosophers taught similar things to a certain extent.53 Yet the 
teaching and power of the Bible is beyond the limit of human 
wisdom. Secondly, he considers factors which hinder people from 
believing. For example, reports which contain contradictions are 
not likely to be believed. In this respect he acknowledges that the 
Bible, with superficial contradictions, is on the surface not in a 
good position.54 Thirdly, he gives consideration to the rival claim 
of Islam, another positive and powerful religion.55 Goodwin’s 
answer is that the success of Islam owes its fitness to human 
natural disposition, while the greatness of Christianity lies in its 
propagation despite its teaching being opposed to human carnal 
                                               
52 Ibid., 41-48. 
53 For example, ibid., 75-77. 99-100, 138. 
54 Ibid., 279-84. 
55 Ibid., 296-305. 
54 
 
nature. This concern with the heathens can also be seen in his 
discussion about the sin of unbelievers.56 While people who can 
access the teaching of the Gospel have means to believe, it might 
sound unreasonable to talk about the sin of unbelief concerning 
those who cannot. Goodwin answers that those who cannot access 
the Gospel have still sufficient means of believing in God based on 
the providence of God. The concern with the heathens, together 
with the clarification of the meaning of the “Scriptures,” is, it can 
be said, his contribution to the controversy over the authority of 
the Scriptures. 
    
Ⅲ 
   Next let us turn from the Puritans to two Anglicans who 
considered the foundation of Christian religion after 1640: Seth 
Ward and Henry Hammond. Ward published his work on biblical 
authority in 1652,57 and Hammond, well-known as one of the 
main intellectual founders of the Church of England in the 
Restoration era, published Of the Reasonableness of Christian 
Religion in 1650.58 Both of them were intellectually closer to 
Hobbes than Leigh or Goodwin; while Ward probably wrote the 
epistle of Humane Nature, the former part of The Elements of 
Law containing Hobbes’s epistemological analysis of human 
nature and published in 1650,59 Hammond was, like 
                                               
56 Ibid., 183-88. 
57 For a biographical account of his life, see John Henry, “Seth Ward,” 
ODNB. 
58 It is certain that he was energetically engaged in the defence of the 
Church of England in the difficult period. Trevor-Roper, "The Great Tew 
Circle," 219-27; Mortimer, Reason and Religion in the English 
Revolution: The Challenge of Socinianism, 129-37. However, it should 
be noted that this work was not the vindication for the Church of 
England against Puritans, but that of Christian religion in general 
against radical scepticism. Here we do not agree with Hugh de Quehen, 
who views this work in relation to the cause of the Church of England. 
“Henry Hammond,” ODNB. For Mortimer’s treatment of this work, see 
ibid., 127-28. 
59 Parkin, Taming the Leviathan: The Reception of the Political and 
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Chillingworth, a chief member of the Great Tew circle.60 Moreover, 
both of them were the earliest commentators on Leviathan.61 This 
indicates that they were anxious to catch up with the intellectual 
journey of Hobbes, if not to absorb his ideas.  
   The fact that Ward and Hammond published their works on 
biblical authority or the foundation of Christianity almost at the 
same time as Hobbes indicates that Hobbes’s new consideration of 
this topic was a product of the new religious situation in which 
principles of Christian religion were called into question. Though 
Ward’s work was published later than Leviathan, and he included 
some comments on Leviathan in the introduction,62 this comment 
was probably added at the last stage, and the main part of this 
work was written independent of Leviathan. Ward says that he 
spent several years writing the work, “destitute of the assistance 
of his Bookes,” and that he had no leisure nor intention to alter 
his argument even after he knew that other people dealt with the 
same topic.63 Moreover, the influence of Leviathan cannot be seen 
in Ward’s main discussion. Then, this work, like Hammond’s, can 
be seen as a kind of a parallel to Leviathan, dealing with a similar 
topical theme, fundamental principles of Christian religion. 
   The two Anglicans had some features common to the Puritans 
discussed so far. Both of them found some role in miracles in the 
justification for biblical authority. This view on miracles, as will 
be seen later, is one of the main differences between them and 
Hobbes. Also, in contrast with Chillingworth, who could point out 
that both he and his adversary Knott had the Bible as a common 
                                                                                                                       
Religious Ideas of Thomas Hobbes in England, 1640-1700, 76, 118. 
60 See Hugh de Quehen, “Henry Hammond,” ODNB. 
61 Parkin, Taming the Leviathan: The Reception of the Political and 
Religious Ideas of Thomas Hobbes in England, 1640-1700, 116-19. 
62 Seth Ward, A Philosophicall Essay Towards an Eviction of the Being 
and Attributes of God. Immortality of the Souls of Men. Truth and 
Authority of Scripture. Together with an Index of the Heads of Every 
Particular Part  (Oxford: Leonard Lichfield, 1652), sig. A3r-A4r. 
(hereafter as A Philosophicall Essay.) 
63 Ibid., sig. A2v. 
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principle, Ward was clearly aware, similar to Leigh, that in the 
current dispute, the Bible as the common principle among 
Christians was under threat and in need of a renewed 
justification. Ward says that his adversary is “those who beleeve 
too little, and not those who beleeve too much,” that is to say, the 
Catholic Church.64 This remark, like Leigh’s, indicates the change 
of the religious context before and after the outbreak of the civil 
war.  
   On the other hand, the approach of the Anglicans to biblical 
authority was, generally speaking, quite distinct from the 
Puritans. While the Puritans relied mainly on the content of the 
Bible as the grounds of biblical authority, the Anglicans took a 
historical approach, viewing the problem of biblical authority as a 
matter of fact, of which neither Leigh nor Goodwin were aware.65  
This was partly related to the fact that the Anglicans were aware 
of the challenge of a more radical type of scepticism and tried to 
respond to it. 
   Ward’s argument provides a good reference point. Though he 
was aware of the kind of argument Leigh and Goodwin offered, he 
himself did not take this approach.66 It is true that he does not 
deny the efficacy of those other arguments. However, the fact that 
he adopted a historical approach and this approach only suggests 
that he found his own approach both sufficient and most 
convincing. 
   In particular, his division of the Scriptures into doctrinal and 
historical parts indicates that Ward was aware that the relevant 
pieces of evidence for biblical authority were limited. The main 
foundation for biblical authority is concerned with the historical 
                                               
64 Ibid., 79-80. 
65 For this approach in general, see a useful article, Levine, "Matter of 
Fact in the English Revolution." He makes a careful analysis of Ward 
and Hammond in ibid., 322-29. We have clarified further the 
relationship between this approach and others in the age. Yet ideally, a 
comparison with Grotius should also be made. 
66 Ward, A Philosophicall Essay, 136. 
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parts, and especially with the reliability of the narrator of the 
doctrine. This focus on the historical part, in turn, suggests that 
the presentation of the doctrine itself leaves room for doubt. Ward 
gives the examples of Moses and Jesus Christ, the central and 
most important people in the Christian religion. From Ward’s 
sceptical viewpoint, even their claim of divine authority, so far as 
they depended only on the doctrine, was just a pretension of 
divine doctrines.67 Though this sceptical attitude was only a short 
concession and soon followed by the main evidence, manifest 
miracles,68 it plays a great part in the limitation of relevant 
evidence. This sceptical attitude also incidentally reveals the 
merit of paying attention to pretenders of the word of God, in 
contrast to books as in the case of Goodwin. In Goodwin’s contrast 
between books from humans and books from God, the ambiguity 
of pretended prophets or biblical authors as human narrators of 
the pretended divine word remains hidden. 
   Ward’s preliminary scepticism was probably influenced by 
scepticism in his age. To his eyes what characterised his age was 
scepticism or allegation of uncertainty, even concerning 
fundamental principles of religion, including Christian religion. 
The method he took for confronting this challenge was to 
demonstrate from the “common Elements and Fundamentals,” 
and to “leade on the weakest from such things as they themselves 
cannot deny, to the acknowledgement of the mysteries of our faith, 
and to the practice and injunctions of our Religion.”69  The 
recourse to “elements” as a way of overcoming general scepticism 
can also be seen in Hobbes.70 Thus it is quite understandable that 
Ward was interested in Hobbes’s intellectual enterprise. It also 
                                               
67 Ibid., 84, 86. 
68 Ibid., 84-88. 
69 Ibid., 3. 
70 The full title of De Cive, his first published scientific work of political 
science, is Elementa philosophica, de cive. DC, 89. For Hobbes and 
scepticism, see Tuck, Philosophy and Government, 1572-1651, esp. 283-
310. 
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shows that the kind of scepticism which Ward replied to was 
rather radical, requiring “the weakest” to be led. 
   This awareness of the challenge of radical scepticism is found 
not only in Ward but also in Hammond. In Hammond’s eyes, there 
was a trend in his age of “disputing and questioning the most 
established truths,” rather than the deductions from the 
principles.71 Thus, “the foundation itself” of the Christian religion, 
or “Christianity itself” was now under the attack of such radical 
scepticism.72 To reply to the scepticism, Hammond took a 
historical approach, also similar to Ward. Both of them paid 
particular attention to the apostles in the New Testament,73 and 
tried to show the reliability of their accounts or narration.  
   However, the type of historical approach was different from each 
other. Ward compared the New Testament with ordinary 
historical writings, and showed the greater reliability of the 
reports of the apostle. Hammond, on the other hand, based his 
argument on divine testimonies, and in particular focused on the 
two most “authentic” ones: the voice from heaven and the descent 
of the holy spirit.74 His main concern was the divine revelation to 
the apostles. 
   The difference between them was related to the fact that while 
Hammond responded to the most sceptical type of argument, 
Ward replied to both scepticism and enthusiasm or 
                                               
71 Henry Hammond, The Miscellaneous Theological Works of Henry 
Hammond, D.D.: Archdeacon of Chichester and Canon of Christ Church, 
ed. J. Fell and N. Pocock, vol. 2 (Oxford: J. Parker, 1849), 5. 
72 Ibid. 
73 Hammond scarcely treated the Old Testament. Ward did handle the Old 
Testament, but he was mainly concerned with the transmission of the text 
from the age of the first reception among Jews to his era, and from Jews to 
Christians. (Ward, A Philosophicall Essay, 119-37. The different ways of 
demonstration for the Old and New Testament is a distinctive feature of 
Ward.) So far as he did not examine the direct report of revelation but only 
the human transmission of the report, this part moved away from the crux 
of the matter. The point that Christ did not doubt the text of the Old 
Testament may be strong, but it depends on the case for the New 
Testament. 
74 Hammond, The Miscellaneous Theological Works, 8-9, 12. 
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antinomianism. In his view, both of them are connected. The rise 
of scepticism in his age and lack of a sufficient answer to 
scepticism made people recourse to the spirit.75 However, this 
reliance on the spirit for the faith in biblical authority, says Ward, 
brought forth “diverse prodigies lately broken into the Church.”76 
The prodigious men inferred in the following way: believers in the 
Gospel have the holy spirit, the sole sufficient foundation of the 
faith, but people with the spirit are free from sin. Therefore, 
believers are free from sin, and may commit injustices such as 
murder or adultery.77  
   Hammond, seeking the kind of certainty which would withstand 
radical scepticism, found his evidence in infallible divine 
testimonies in contrast with fallible human ones. 78 However, his 
reliance on divine revelation makes his argument vulnerable to 
the challenge of enthusiasm. Ward’s argument, mainly limited to 
merely human matters, is invulnerable to that.  
   Then, how did Ward show the greater credibility of the New 
Testament compared with other historical writings, without 
recourse to divine issues? Firstly, Ward examines the reliability of 
historical evidence in general, and shows criteria applicable not 
                                               
75 Ward, A Philosophicall Essay, 76-77.  
76 Ibid., 77. 
77 Ibid., 78. The reference to the specific argument suggests that 
although the work treats three topics (the existence and providence of 
God, the immortality of the soul, and the authority of the Scriptures), he 
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authority he looked at it historically.  
   Seeing Ward included the immortality of soul not in the section about 
Christian religion but about religion in general, it makes sense that he 
later called Hobbes “atheist.” Parkin suggests Ward was afraid of his 
association with Hobbes, but it should also be noted that his refutation 
of Hobbes was in that sense a serious defence of his own belief. Parkin, 
Taming the Leviathan: The Reception of the Political and Religious 
Ideas of Thomas Hobbes in England, 1640-1700, 117-18. 
78 Hammond, The Miscellaneous Theological Works, 8. 
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only to the New Testament but also to other historical writings. 
His criteria are no obvious contradiction to some natural 
principles, outward events of things as the objects of common 
sense as opposed to secret or indiscoverable causes of the events, 
the narrator’s access to the event, and the narrator’s integrity.79 
The narration in the New Testament, Ward asserts, meets the 
criteria in every respect.80 The subject matter was what Christ did 
and spoke, and thus easily to be known, as opposed to the motive 
of Christ. Moreover, the performances and speeches were mostly 
public acts, and left enough room for contradiction in the case of 
false reports. In addition, the apostles as narrators were direct 
eyewitnesses of actions of Christ or their fellows. Finally, as for 
the integrity of the narrator, Ward maintains that the integrity of 
the apostle is rather greater than other historians. The general 
principle is that unless the narrator is known to be corrupt or 
there is some visible benefit the narrator can gain by lying, the 
integrity can be assumed. However, far from acquiring any 
pleasure or reputation, the apostles suffered to death, and gained 
a terrible reputation among the Jews and the Greeks. 
   So far Ward’s judgement is certainly based on the criteria 
applicable to all historical writings. When Ward tries to show the 
greater reliability of the apostles and refers to special features of 
the apostles, however, he begins to rely on divine matters, such as 
miracles as a testimony of God himself and the fulfilling of the 
predictions the apostles made.81 Nevertheless, Ward’s argument is 
much less reliant on divine revelation, and less susceptible to the 
challenge of enthusiasm than Hammond’s.  
   On the other hand, Hammond’s argument has its own great 
merit: he responds to two types of most sceptical question 
reminiscent of Cartesian doubt, and shows the unreasonableness 
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of such scepticism.82 The first asks “whether there were even 
indeed heard such voices.”83 Hammond regards this question as “a 
matter of fact,”84 and offers a theoretical explanation for the 
limitation of attainable certainty about this kind of matter.85 The 
revelation is necessarily confined in specific time and place. As for 
place, Jesus, being one person, could not be everywhere. Moreover, 
if people all over the world were to receive some revelation, people 
in the next and future generation would have to rely on the 
testimony of the current generation. For those who do not live in 
the age of revelation, there is no other reasonable evidence than 
the testimony; another new voice of heaven, apart from being 
unnecessary and improper, would be doubtful again for the next 
generation. Certainly God immediately reveals some important 
truth. However, once the revelation is repeated and made certain, 
the content of the revelation is conveyed sufficiently by human 
means. To demand any higher testimony such as continued voice 
from heaven for daily assurance would be unreasonable; it would 
be a confusion of knowledge with belief.86 In everyday life or 
businesses, though people do not demand grounds or 
demonstration for every action, still they are thought to be 
reasonable. In a similar way it is sensible to believe the report of 
the apostles without demanding demonstration, so far as the 
report has credibility.  
   The second sceptical argument poses the possibility of the 
delusion of the hearers. Hammond divides the sceptics into theists 
                                               
82 The great influence this work had on Restoration England may be 
ascribed to this part. Cf. Theodore Waldman, "Origins of the Legal Doctrine 
of Reasonable Doubt," Journal of the History of Ideas 20, no. 3 (1959): 303-
7; Richard Henry Popkin, The History of Scepticism: From Savonarola to 
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208-18. 
83 Hammond, The Miscellaneous Theological Works, 19. 
84 In the next chapter, a matter of fact, as opposed to supernatural 
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85 Ibid., 19. 
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and those who only admit the Old Testament such as the Jew. To 
the former he replies that there is no greater assurance 
imaginable than the voice from heaven or the descent of the holy 
spirit, and thus that if this sceptical argument is valid, “there 
could be no way for God to reveal Himself to man.”87 “If all the 
ways God can use be not able to give assurance that it is God that 
speaks, what are we the nearer for knowing that God cannot lie, 
as long as there is supposed for us no way to know what at any 
time he saith?”88 As for the second type of people, Hammond calls 
their attention to the similarity of the revelation in the New 
Testament to the types of revelation in the Old Testament. If they 
had been present at the moment of the revelation described in the 
New Testament, there would have been no room left for any 
further doubt. After answering these two types of sceptics, he 
mentions several ways of distinguishing real and delusive voices: 
concordance with acknowledged divine predictions, and with 
divine truths, and miracles casting out devils. 
 
Ⅳ 
   Finally, some preliminary thought will be given to the 
relationship between the works examined so far and Leviathan. 
First of all, apart from Chillingworth, who wrote before the Civil 
War, the four people investigated in this thesis emphasised their 
time, the Civil War period as the chief background of their works, 
mentioning radical sceptics and the enthusiasts. Against the 
backdrop of these views on the religious situation of the age and 
corresponding answers, it is not surprising that Hobbes provided 
in Leviathan his renewed analysis of the enthusiasts and the 
authority of the Bible. Still, the characteristics of Hobbes’s view 
on the religious problem in his age should not be missed. For 
Hobbes’s contemporaries, the problem of biblical authority, 
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however serious it might be, was a matter of faith, or at the 
widest, of morals; it was not a matter of politics, violence or civil 
war. On the other hand, with his insight into de facto domination 
of pretended prophets over their followers, Hobbes connected two 
characteristics of the Civil War period, the revolt against the king 
and the emergence of radical religious opinions.89  
   In the second place, with regard to the method of proving 
biblical authority, Leviathan has some newly introduced passages 
which remind us of the factual approach. Firstly, in the discussion 
of faith, Hobbes compared the credibility of the Bible as the word 
of God and the allegation of pretended prophets to that of other 
historical writings.90 The implication of the comparison, though, is 
contrasted between Hobbes and Ward or Hammond. While the 
latter invoked the reliability of historical writings to show that of 
the Bible, Hobbes, to provide a further illustration of the precise 
object of belief or unbelief concerning the allegation of the word of 
God, gives an example of casting doubt on a passage about divine 
matters in historical writings. Hobbes’s comparison in turn 
induces readers to realize what it would mean precisely to doubt 
the authority of the Bible or pretended prophets. This can be seen 
as part of Hobbes’s strategy to encourage a sceptical attitude 
towards pretended prophets as will be seen later. 
   Secondly, Hobbes in Leviathan makes a clear contrast between 
two kinds of knowledge, one of fact in history and one of “the 
Consequences of one Affirmation to another” in philosophy.91 In 
The Elements of Law, Hobbes had already distinguished history 
and “the sciences.”92 In his reply to Thomas White’s De Mundo 
also written in around 1643, Hobbes contrasted historical with 
                                               
89 This view was not necessarily wide of the mark. Mortimer mentions some 
army preachers who emphasised the holy spirit. Mortimer, Reason and 
Religion in the English Revolution: The Challenge of Socinianism, 167-71. 
90 Lev, 7: 102. 
91 Lev, 9: 124. 
92 EL, 1:6:1. 
64 
 
philosophical knowledge. It is certain that already at this stage, 
the notion of philosophical knowledge was as clear as in 
Leviathan. However, history was seen as a narration, and the 
contrast of two kinds of knowledge and the notion of history as 
knowledge of fact were not clarified.93 On the other hand, the new 
contrast in Leviathan clarified the relationship between factual 
matters and philosophy. This clarification can be seen as a part of 
a response to the factual approach to biblical authority. Actually, 
the new contrast was used in Hobbes’s investigation as to the 
antiquity of the Scriptures, a topic traditionally regarded as 
related to biblical authority. Here, Hobbes first shows that the two 
types of investigation above were insufficient. Natural reason 
concerns consequences and not fact, while the “testimony of other 
History” is not sufficient in this case.94 Then he goes on to the new 
third way of investigation peculiar to Part 3 of Leviathan, 
reasoning from “the Bookes themselves.”95 However, here what is 
suggestive in relation to the factual approach to biblical authority 
is the notion of testimony. Hobbes uses this concept again in 
relation to the authority of Moses, denying Moses’ own “testimony” 
as a valid ground for it.96 This suggests that Hobbes was aware 
that the problem of pretended prophets could be seen as that of 
testimony. 
   Later there will be a more detailed discussion about the 
significance of Leviathan against the background which has been 
investigated. Nevertheless, the preliminary consideration so far 
                                               
93 Thomas Hobbes, Critique du De Mundo de Thomas White, ed. Jean 
Jacquot and Harold Whitmore Jones (Paris: J. Vrin, 1973), Section 1, Parts 
2-3. I also consulted Thomas White's 'De Mundo' Examined, ed. and trans. 
Harold Whitmore Jones (London: Bradford University Press, 1976). 
   For a more detailed comparison in the light of the relative merit of history 
and philosophy in Hobbes’s thought, see Johnston, The Rhetoric of 
Leviathan: Thomas Hobbes and the Politics of Cultural Transformation, 11-
14. 
94 Lev, 33: 588. 
95 Ibid. 
96 For a detailed analysis of this topic, see 3.1. in this thesis. 
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indicates amply that Leviathan can be seen against this 
background in the first place.  
 
66 
 
3.2. Anglican Defences of Toleration 
 
Ⅰ   
   The second context this thesis will investigate is the Anglican 
defences of toleration as a part of the toleration controversy. The 
toleration controversy during the civil war was mainly conducted 
among Puritans. When dealing with Leviathan, this thesis will 
examine some particular arguments which can be seen as a 
response to the Puritan toleration controversy. However, the Civil 
War also saw a remarkable Anglican defence of toleration by 
Jeremy Taylor. It was his plea for toleration rather than Puritan 
tolerationists’ that, it seems, had possibly the greatest influence 
on Leviathan. Furthermore, there is a good possibility that 
Taylor’s case for toleration itself was influenced by Hobbes’s 
earlier works of political philosophy. Therefore, the main focus of 
this chapter will be on Taylor’s intellectual achievement, and not 
on the Puritan toleration controversy, except for one major feature 
of radical tolerationists about which they and Hobbes in 
Leviathan could share their opinions.1 In the concluding part of 
                                               
1 For the toleration controversy during the Civil War, see W. K. Jordan, The 
Development of Religious Toleration in England, 4 vols. (Gloucester: Peter 
Smith, 1965), vols. 3, 4; John Coffey, "Puritanism and Liberty Revisited: 
The Case for Toleration in the English Revolution," The Historical Journal 
41, no. 4 (1998); "The Toleration Controversy during the English 
Revolution," in Religion in Revolutionary England, ed. Christopher Durston 
and Judith D. Maltby (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2006); 
Carolyn Polizzotto, "Liberty of Conscience and the Whitehall Debates 1648-
9," Journal of Ecclesiastical History 26(1975). As for An Apologeticall 
Narration as the occasion for this controversy, see Thomas Goodwin, An 
Apologeticall Narration Humbly Submitted to the Honourable Houses of 
Parliament by T.Goodwin ... [Et Al.] London 1643, ed. R. S. Paul 
(Philadelphia: United Church Press, 1963), 43-125. 
   As with the wider dimension of the English toleration controversy, see 
Jordan, The Development of Religious Toleration in England, vol. 2; John 
Coffey, Persecution and Toleration in Protestant England, 1558-1689  
(Harlow: Longman, 2000); Alexandra Walsham, Charitable Hatred: 
Tolerance and Intolerance in England, 1500-1700  (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2006); Mark Goldie, "The Theory of Religious 
Intolerance in Restoration England," in From Persecution to Toleration: 
The Glorious Revolution and Religion in England, ed. Ole Peter Grell, 
Jonathan I. Israel, and Nicholas Tyacke (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991); 
67 
 
Leviathan, Hobbes admits the novelty of some of his religious 
views and defends it in relation to his age, the Civil War.  
 
In that part which treateth of a Christian Common-wealth, there are 
some new doctrines, which, it may be, in a State where the contrary 
were already fully determined, were a fault for a Subject without leave 
to divulge, as being an usurpation of the place of a Teacher. But in this 
time, that men call not onely for Peace, but also for Truth, to offer such 
Doctrines as I think True, and that manifestly tend to Peace and 
Loyalty, to the consideration of those that are yet in deliberation, is no 
more, but to offer New Wine, to bee put into New Cask, that both may 
be preserved together.2  
 
Milton and Goodwin, two major tolerationists, envisaged an era of 
further discovery of new truths.3 They not only advocated the 
toleration of sectarians as proponents of new religious ideas, but 
were themselves keen to absorb novel ideas, thereby diverting 
from orthodox Puritan ideas.  Radical Puritans in general 
advanced new opinions, or “new light.” This willingness to absorb 
and propose new ideas was also expressed by Hobbes. Both 
Hobbes and radical Puritans were also of the view that new and 
unpopular truth had the power to win against falsehood held by 
the majority in a fair fight by itself and without any social 
assistance.  
   However, they disagreed about the function of truth in relation 
to peace. Puritans accused the Royalists of their false religion, 
and conducted war with them. For Puritans, peace without the 
                                                                                                                       
Justin Champion, "'Willing to Suffer': Law and Religious Conscience in 
Seventeenth Century England," in Religious Conscience, the State, and the 
Law: Historical Contexts and Contemporary Significance, ed. John 
McLaren and Harold G. Coward (Albany: State University of New York 
Press, 1999). 
2 Lev, conclusion: 1139. 
3 John Milton, Complete Prose Works of John Milton, ed. Ernest Sirluck, 
vol. 2 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959), 551, 53-55, 62, 66; Coffey, 
John Goodwin and the Puritan Revolution: Religion and Intellectual 
Change in Seventeenth-Century England, 71, 97-98, 115. 
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truth of religion was meaningless.4 On the other hand, for Hobbes, 
truth always promotes peace. “Doctrine repugnant to Peace, can 
no more be True, than Peace and Concord can be against the Law 
of Nature.”5 One of the main tasks for Hobbes in Leviathan was to 
dismantle the idea of the war for the truth of religion advocated 
by Puritans.6 How he did it will be seen later.  
   Before turning to the argument of both Hobbes and Taylor 
concerning toleration, it is necessary to examine another person 
that both of them probably took into account, William 
Chillingworth;7 for by clarifying their differences from 
Chillingworth, their specific ingenuity can be appreciated. On the 
other hand, Taylor and Chillingworth had some common 
characteristics as Anglican defences of toleration as distinct from 
Puritan ones. First, while Puritans detested Roman Catholics, 
and, like Milton, frequently excluded them from the scope of 
toleration,8 Anglicans took into serious consideration the 
                                               
4 Samuel Rutherford, Lex, Rex: The Law and the Prince, a Dispute for the 
Just Prerogative of King and People, Containing the Reasons and Causes of 
the Defensive Wars of the Kingdom of Scotland, and of Their Expedition for 
the Ayd and Help of Their Brethren of England. In Which a Full Answer Is 
Given to a Seditious Pamphlet, Intituled, "Sacro-Sancta Regum Majestas," 
or the Sacred and Royal Prerogative of Christian Kings  (Edinburgh: Robert 
Ogle and Oliver and Boyd, 1843), 118; Milton, Complete Prose Works of 
John Milton, 2, 563-64; John Goodwin, Hagiomastix, or the Scourge of the 
Saints Displayed in His Colours of Ignorance & Blood: Or, a Vindication of 
Some Printed Queries Published Some Moneths since by Authority, in Way 
of Answer to Certaine Anti-Papers of Syllogismes, Entituled a Vindication 
of a Printed Paper, &C.  (London: Matthew Simmons, for Henry Overton, 
1647), 99. 
5 Lev, 18: 272. 
6 The keener sense of the union of truth and peace, in turn, led Hobbes to a 
harder view on the pre-war England. “Those men that are so remissely 
governed, that they dare take up Armes, to defend, or introduce an Opinion, 
are still in Warre; and their condition not Peace, but only a Cessation of 
Armes for fear of one another.” (Ibid.) The fact that the Royalists had to 
raise the army to defend the Episcopacy and Anglican doctrines suggested 
that the pre-war England was not in peace. This view is harsher than that 
in De Cive, where Hobbes, more close to the common notion of war, 
distinguished the breaking out of the Civil War from the pre-war 
controversies about government as forerunners of war. DC, 82. 
7 For Chillingworth and toleration, also see Jordan, The Development of 
Religious Toleration in England, vol. 2: 377-400. 
8 Milton, Complete Prose Works of John Milton, 2, 565. 
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toleration of Catholics. Secondly, while Puritans were intolerant of 
the Episcopal government in the 1630s, required further 
reformation, fought war with the Royalists and acquired political 
power, Anglicans did not share these typical Puritan assumptions. 
   Chillingworth’s principal theoretical device for promoting 
toleration in his main work, The Religion of Protestants, was the 
distinction between fundamental and non-fundamental matters.9 
While Christians disagree about non-fundamental matters, they 
can and do agree about fundamental matters. Chillingworth 
found the cause of religious division and conflict in 
overemphasising the difference among religious parties.10 
Therefore, this distinction, by minimising the significance about 
non-fundamental issues and drawing attention to the agreement 
about fundamental issues, served to ease the division among 
Christians.11 
   There remain, however, differences about non-fundamental 
issues. As for these, Chillingworth exhorted mutual toleration and 
charity.12 He supported this idea mainly in the following two ways. 
In the first place, Chillingworth distinguished civil and religious 
controversies.13 He provided several grounds for this distinction. 
Here two main arguments are given attention. One is that while 
in civil cases the judge has compulsory power, in religious cases 
this coercive power is unfit to convince people of doctrines; it can 
only force people to profess what they do not believe, which makes 
people hypocrites. The other is that in civil controversies people 
only have to show external obedience to the judge, while in 
                                               
9 Some attempts to make this kind of distinction can also be seen in the 
Jacobean era, which in turn can probably be traced back to adiaphorism in 
the Reformation era. Sommerville, Thomas Hobbes: Political Ideas in 
Historical Context, 146; Jordan, The Development of Religious Toleration in 
England, vol. 2: 35-38; Bernard J. Verkamp, The Indifferent Mean: 
Adiaphorism in the English Reformation to 1554  (Athens: Ohio University 
Press, 1977). 
10 Chillingworth, The Works of William Chillingworth, 1: 123; 2: 35, 172. 
11 Ibid., 2: 58. 
12 Ibid., 1: 216, 404; 2: 58. 
13 Ibid., 1: 171-74. 
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religious ones people are required to believe the judge. However, 
then the judge has to be infallible. Both of these two points are 
closely related to the following second case for toleration. 
   In the second place, he rebutted the view that some religious 
authority, especially the Pope, could always give the right answer 
to religious problems or settle controversies without any error. If 
this position were allowed, it would mean that parties opposing 
that authority were in defiance of religious truth. Yet the 
Scriptures did not give any clear answer to questions about non-
fundamental issues.14  Then no one, perhaps apart from the 
apostles, can be infallible about them.15 The lack of certain means 
to attain truth has implications both for toleration and the 
condition of salvation. As for toleration, although the ending of 
religious controversies and the unity of opinion is desirable, there 
is no certain means to attain this goal. Diversity of opinion among 
Christians is inevitable, and the only attainable unity is unity of 
charity towards each other.16 From each actor’s viewpoint, this 
would mean accepting their opponents without compromising 
their own principles. On the social level, it seems that this mutual 
toleration would imply a political society comparable to an ancient 
republic in which “the contest could be carried on according to 
rules and with some sense of shared values and mutual respect,” 
and where “antagonists could respect each other.”17 
   This lack of certainty also has implications for salvation. 
Chillingworth combines his insight that there is no certain way to 
reach truth with the assumption that God does not require for 
salvation anything impossible or unreasonable.18 Therefore, he 
                                               
14 Ibid., 1: 33, 119. 
15 Ibid., 1: 341-43, 54. 
16 Ibid., 1: 215-16, 2: 58-59, 222.  
17 J. G. A. Pocock, Barbarism and Religion, vol. 3 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003), 20-23. Thus, due to some pre-existing conditions in 
early modern Europe, toleration in this sense virtually meant political 
liberty. 
18 Chillingworth, The Works of William Chillingworth, 1: 82, 231-32; 2: 31. 
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concludes, what is necessary for salvation is not to find truth itself 
but rather to endeavour, with honesty and the utmost effort, to 
find truth.19 Even if the best human effort happens to lead people 
into errors, people will be absolved.20 On the other hand, what is 
surely damnable is hypocrisy.21 Therefore, Chillingworth severely 
accused Roman Catholics of imposing their religious doctrines and 
denying liberty of conscience.22 However, this espousal of an 
honest endeavour to find truth did not mean that Chillingworth 
found religious errors irrelevant to salvation. He often said that 
the errors of Catholics were damnable by themselves; they were 
just pardonable because of human frailty such as ignorance, 
general repentance, and confession of fundamental articles of 
faith.23 Thus, Chillingworth defended the division of Protestants 
from Catholics; the plea for toleration did not mean dismissing 
significant divergences among Christian parties.  
   As for fundamental matters, though for Chillingworth the right 
opinion about them was necessary for salvation, he did not specify 
what they were. It is not necessary because severing 
fundamentals from non-fundamentals is so difficult that people 
who attempt this task will not have any certainty.24 Moreover, 
people who believe all things in the Scriptures believe all 
fundamental articles of faith, since all of them are included in the 
Bible.25 This is an implicit faith in Christ or in the Scriptures, 
comparable to the implicit faith in the Roman Church.26 
   Still, he did specify some features of fundamental matters. In 
the first place, they are clearly written in the Scriptures and can 
                                               
19 Ibid., 1: 169, 71-72, 248, 319; 2: 79.  
20 Ibid., 1: 124. The utmost effort to find truth implies following the 
Scriptures, not any private man. This is the meaning of his famous 
understanding of the religion of Protestants as the Bible. Ibid., 2: 409-10. 
21 Ibid., 2: 209-10, 14. 
22 Ibid., 1: 33, 157, 2: 38-39, 194.  
23 Ibid., 1: 124, 319; 2: 88, 220, 68. 
24 Ibid., 1: 88. 
25 Ibid., 1: 88, 368, 79. Orr offers other likely explanations. See Orr, Reason 
and Authority: The Thought of William Chillingworth, 92-94. 
26 Chillingworth, The Works of William Chillingworth, 1: 372. 
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be understood by the simplest people, while non-fundamental 
matters are left ambiguous in the Bible.27 In the second place, all 
of the fundamental articles are included in the creed of the 
apostles.28 Furthermore, Chillingworth sometimes refers to quite 
specific doctrines. The faith in Jesus Christ is included in the 
fundamental articles.29 The difficult one is the doctrine of the 
Trinity. It is certain that Chillingworth did not clearly exclude 
anti-Trinitarians from salvation, but on the other hand he refuted 
this doctrine and did not explicitly include the doctrine of the 
Trinity in non-fundamental matters.30 
 
Ⅱ 
   In Elements of Law and De Cive Hobbes was already engaged 
with the issue of toleration.31 It is certain that Hobbes did not 
defend religious pluralism in these works,32 and that finding in 
human desire for honour the source of religious division, he 
identified the heart of the religious problem as the pluralism of 
scriptural interpretation.33 Nevertheless, his theoretical effort is 
                                               
27 Ibid., 1: 32-33, 124, 233. 
28 Ibid., 2: 46-47. 
29 Ibid., 1: 247-48; 2: 72-73. 
30 Ibid., 2: 64-67. Orr explores Chillingsworth’s view in his other works too. 
See Orr, Reason and Authority: The Thought of William Chillingworth, 98-
99. 
31 Jordan’s massive and long-established work had already treated the 
theme of Hobbes and toleration. Jordan, The Development of Religious 
Toleration in England, vol. 4, 291-320. Yet it was mainly after 1980 that 
modern Hobbes scholarship has become interested in this topic, beginning 
with Ryan’s articles. This thesis suggests firstly distinguishing Hobbes’s 
view on toleration in and before Leviathan as Collins does, and secondly 
clarifying the precise relationship between the argument of Hobbes and 
those of Chillingworth and Taylor. Collins, The Allegiance of Thomas 
Hobbes, 123-24, 29. For Hobbes studies dealing with toleration, also see 
footnotes 67 - 69 in 4.4.2. 
32 In the preface of the second edition of De Cive, Hobbes himself said that 
sectarians who demanded liberty of conscience were opposed to him. (DC, 
84.) Incidentally, it is an interesting but difficult problem to identify who 
were the sectarians mentioned here, since only the learned people closely 
related to Mersenne or Hobbes could read the first edition of this work. 
33 DC, 18:1. Hobbes himself was aware of the general intolerance of his age 
and mentioned it to support his case. “Who is there differing in opinion 
from another, and thinking himself to be in the right, and the other in the 
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concerned with toleration in two respects. In the first place, 
Hobbes handled the demand for liberty of conscience; for this 
demand could be a pretext of sedition or disobedience, as both 
Chillingworth and Knot acknowledged.34 Secondly, the 
adversaries of Hobbes and of tolerationists had common features. 
All of Catholics, Presbyterians and sectarians were opposed to 
religious opinions other than themselves and abhorred 
compromising with the others. From the viewpoint of the 
sovereign, this meant that all of them, even if they did not 
advocate sedition, often allowed passive obedience. However, 
Hobbes strove to contain every form of disobedience.35 Therefore, 
both Hobbes and tolerationists aimed at the coexistence of 
religious parties who shunned compromising with the others.  
   Hobbes developed Chillingworth’s case for toleration in two 
aspects.36 Firstly, while Chillingworth did not specify the 
fundamental articles, Hobbes not only made clear what was 
included in them but also reduced the fundamental creeds to the 
minimum. His fundamental article of faith in Jesus as Christ 
covers almost all Christians, though, interestingly, in The 
Elements of Law he excluded Arianism from the domain of his 
fundamental article of faith.37 Although Hobbes did not espouse 
religious pluralism in The Elements of Law, this fundamental 
article, like that of Chillingworth, had the consequence that it 
reduced the significance of divisions among Christian sects. 
                                                                                                                       
wrong, that would not think it reasonable, if he be of the same opinion that 
the whole state alloweth, that the other should submit his opinion also 
thereunto?” EL, 2:6:13. 
34 Chillingworth, The Works of William Chillingworth, 2: 150, 266-67. 
35 For his denial of the distinction between passive and active disobedience, 
see DC, 14:23. 
36 For Hobbes and Chillingworth, also see Johnson, "Hobbes's Anglican 
Doctrine of Salvation," 112, 20-21; Sommerville, Thomas Hobbes: Political 
Ideas in Historical Context, 147-49. 
37 EL, 2:6:6. In De Cive, it seems Hobbes stopped including in the 
fundamental article the notion of Christ as the son of God or as the 
Godhead, while he continued to refer to a Trinitarian idea in this work. DC, 
17:4, 18:5. 
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Moreover, Hobbes went further than Chillingworth in 
maintaining that controversies unrelated to the fundamental one 
were irrelevant to salvation, because this assertion implicitly 
denied the notion of damnable errors, which even Chillingworth 
retained.38 To that extent, this argument overlaps with the case 
for toleration. 
   Secondly, Hobbes saw a contradiction in Chillingworth’s case for 
toleration and his support for church government. One of the 
difficulties about the plea for toleration was to find how to deal 
with controversies. Chillingworth’s main solution was to 
distinguish civil and religious disputes and to allow people to 
follow their own interpretation of the Bible about religious issues. 
However, after mentioning the type of position Chillingworth 
asserted, that is, the obedience to the Scriptures, Hobbes acutely 
points out, “Why should there be any church government at all 
instituted, if the Scripture itself could do the office of a judge in 
controversies of faith?”39 If Chillingworth’s solution really worked 
well, it would dispense with church government. However, 
whether Catholicism or Anglicanism, Chillingworth always 
supported some kind of church government.  
   In De Cive Hobbes clarified his view about religious 
controversies. In spite of the peculiar nature of religion, religious 
disputes have in common with civil ones that both of them arise 
from human desire for honour and thus are potentially very 
dangerous for the political order.40 Then the authority of the civil 
sovereign ends both types of controversies. Though Chillingworth 
argued that religious as opposed to civil judgement had to be 
believed, Hobbes denied this characterisation of religious 
judgement; apart from the fundamental article of faith, all that 
Christian subjects had to do in response to the authority’s 
                                               
38 EL, 2:6:9. 
39 EL, 2:6:13. 
40 DC, 1:5, 18:14. 
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settlement concerning religious disputes was in relation to 
external obedience, not internal belief.41   
 
Ⅲ  
   Taylor’s case for toleration was one of the most significant ones 
during the Civil War. In relation to previous studies about 
Taylor’s well-known work, Liberty of Prophesying (1647), what 
this thesis suggests here is to identify precisely specific features of 
his defence of toleration among his contemporaries, and in 
particular to explore the possible mutual influence which Taylor 
and Hobbes had on each other concerning toleration.42 
   General features of Taylor’s intellectual effort can be grasped 
from several viewpoints. Like Hobbes, Taylor took into account all 
Christian parties from Catholics to sectarians. Moreover Taylor, 
writing during the Civil War, went further than Hobbes in 
emphasising the pluralism of Christian parties, which Hobbes 
also began to mention in Leviathan as will be seen later. This 
important feature means that Taylor could not construct his 
argument in the form of the refutation of one particular position 
as Chillingworth or Goodwin did. Although both of them 
advocated toleration, their works were at the same time defences 
of their particular positions against other particular Christian 
parties such as Catholics or Presbyterians; they were one of the 
direct participants in the controversies among Christian parties. 
On the other hand, Hobbes and Taylor, taking into consideration 
controversies among pluralistic Christian parties and each of 
                                               
41 EL, 2:6:10; DC, 18:11. 
42 Henry Trevor Hughes, The Piety of Jeremy Taylor  (London: Macmillan, 
1960), 23-31. Jordan mentions other works of Taylor as well. Jordan, The 
Development of Religious Toleration in England, vol.4, 378-409. For an 
interesting stylistic research, see Frank Livingstone Huntley, Jeremy 
Taylor and the Great Rebellion: A Study of His Mind and Temper in 
Controversy  (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1970), 34-55.  
   Though Sommerville regards Taylor as only one of the tolerationists in 
the age, he also discusses the topic of Hobbes and Taylor on toleration. 
Sommerville, Thomas Hobbes: Political Ideas in Historical Context, 153-56. 
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their cases, offered a theory which attempted to appeal to deep 
assumptions common to all of the parties and to change the 
assumptions. In short, their works were markedly theoretical. 
   The theoretical feature of Taylor’s work can also be explained by 
comparing him with Puritan tolerationists in general. Unlike 
Puritans, he tried to include Catholics in the scope of toleration. 
He could not appeal to Protestant causes and ideals such as 
further reformation or the authority of Luther which Puritan 
tolerationists often appealed to. Nor could he use directly his 
contemporary issues like Puritans, which various parties viewed 
in various contradictory ways. Thus, he usually referred only to 
the assumption acceptable to all Christians, to the examples of 
primitive Christianity and fathers quite far from his 
contemporary and controversial world, which led to the 
theoretical vein of his work. 
    In comparison with Puritan defence of toleration, Taylor’s case 
for mutual toleration was also conspicuous in its consistent plea 
for peace. Puritans, including radical tolerationists, were 
intolerant in the sense that they fought readily against the 
Royalists for the sake of their “true” religion. 
   Furthermore, what is to be noted here is that his concern was 
mainly with mutual toleration, rather than with the toleration of 
the magistrate towards minority “heretics.” Here Taylor took over 
Chillingworth’s concern of mutual toleration between Catholics 
and Protestants rather than Hobbes’ solution, despite their 
common assumption of the pluralistic disunion of Christian 
parties and their common aim, peace. Hobbes’s way of achieving 
peace was first of all to divide religious matters into the one 
fundamental article and the other non-fundamental issues and 
then to contain disunion and controversies about non-
fundamental matters by the church government with the civil 
sovereign at the top. However, during the civil war, the 
established church government was demolished, and the right of 
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the civil sovereign faced serious challenges. In this unprecedented 
situation, instead of the authority of the civil sovereign and the 
church government, Taylor advocated rather mutual toleration 
like Chillingworth and offered new theoretical devices to contain 
dissensions about non-fundamentals. In this advocacy, Taylor 
often made new uses of the notion of charity, one of his major 
distinctive characteristics. This reflects Taylor’s consistent 
pursuit of peace in the Civil War and his view on lack of charity as 
the cause of the war.43 
   Finally another significant feature of Taylor’s argument can be 
noted. As will be seen soon, when he constructed his sophisticated 
argument, Taylor absorbed numerous important arguments of 
Chillingworth, Hobbes, and Puritan tolerationists.44 All in all, this 
absorption of his contemporary ideas from various parties, 
together with his broad viewpoint and theoretical vein, made 
Taylor’s work one of the most sophisticated defences of toleration 
which the Civil War saw.  It is no wonder that in Restoration 
England his work “became one of the most frequently cited 
tolerationist works by Anglicans and dissenters alike,” apart from 
the fact that this was a rare defence of toleration by an 
Anglican.45 
   Taylor’s particular achievements lie, generally speaking, in four 
respects. Following Hobbes, Taylor made clear that the 
fundamental article was only one: faith in Jesus as Christ.46 
                                               
43 Jeremy Taylor, The Whole Works of the Right Rev. Jeremy Taylor: 
Episcopacy. Apology for Set Forms. Reverence Due to the Altar. Liberty of 
Prophesying. Confirmation, ed. C.P. Eden and R. Heber, vol. 5 (London: 
Longman, 1853), 367. This work will be referred to as WT, followed by page 
numbers. 
44 To cite one example here, some of Taylor’s arguments are quite similar to 
the central argument of Milton. WT, 350-54, 57-58. 
45 Coffey, "The Toleration Controversy during the English Revolution," 61. 
46 It is remarkable that, to prove this, both of them refer to the same 
biblical passages (John 11:27, 20:31, 1 John 4:2 Acts 8:37, Rom 10:9). (EL, 
2:6:8; DC, 18:5, 9, 10; WT, 369.) But, moreover, there is a good possibility 
that Taylor knew not only The Elements of Law but also De Cive. Taylor 
refers to two topics peculiar to De Cive. One is the aim of the writers of the 
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However, Taylor more explicitly denied deductions from the 
fundamental article the status of the article of faith.47 More 
importantly, however, while Hobbes just demanded obedience to 
the civil sovereign concerning so-called articles of faith other than 
the fundamental one, Taylor began to question the legitimacy of 
articles of faith about non-fundamental issues. He found the 
source of the religious problem in making new articles of 
confession or faith about non-fundamental matters.48 Although 
Chillingworth similarly accused Catholics of making new articles 
of faith, Taylor introduced new viewpoints. In the first place, 
while Chillingworth regarded this creation as tyrannical, as the 
unnecessary augmentation of Christ’s easy yoke, Taylor found it 
inconsistent with charity. Creating new articles of faith implies 
condemning into damnation people, including the fathers, who 
would be saved before.49 Secondly, Taylor extended the scope of 
Chillingworth’s criticism to any article of faith other than the sole 
fundamental one. Then Taylor changed Chillingworth’s implicit 
faith in the Scriptures into the implicit faith in the apostles’ creed, 
and preferred it to “any explication” by which “the church should 
be troubled with questions and uncertain determinations.”50 
   Thus, even such a basic doctrine as the doctrine of the Trinity 
established in the Nicene Council was, for Taylor, though true, 
problematical as an article of faith in so far as it was a restraint 
on the religious liberty retained in the first ages of Christianity. 
Here Taylor markedly went beyond Chillingworth and Hobbes 
before Leviathan. Taylor’s first argument was that it was a 
matter of “niceties” and was not thought to be a matter of faith at 
                                                                                                                       
Gospels, and the other is the fundamental article as the foundation of the 
church. DC, 18:6, 9; WT, 377. 
47 WT, 374. 
48 Ibid., 466-80, 602. 
49 WT, 377; Chillingworth, The Works of William Chillingworth, 1: 405; 2: 
91-92. 
50 WT, 409. 
79 
 
that time.51 It was also possible to determine the question by way 
of exposition of the apostles’ creed, not by the increase of the 
creed.52 Actually, at that time it was pretended to be an 
exposition.53 Taylor himself explicitly left room for salvation for 
anti-Trinitarians.54 After all, they retained the apostles’ creed. 
Finally and most importantly, this example of the Nicene Council, 
regarded as a precedent to follow, later brought about the increase 
in the creeds on thinner grounds, with the result of numerous 
articles of faith in his time.55  
   In the context of the Civil War, this criticism of making new 
creeds meant an attack on the Westminster Assembly and 
Confession, both of which appeared only after Hobbes wrote De 
Cive. The activity of the Westminster Assembly might well have 
given Taylor an occasion to consider the significance of creating 
new articles of faith in general. 
   This attack on the creation of new creeds based on the 
distinction between the minimal fundamental matter and the 
other non-fundamental ones is not seen in Puritan discussion in 
defence of toleration either, and is Taylor’s first marked originality. 
56 
   The second major achievement of Taylor is concerned with his 
scepticism. Before him Chillingworth argued against Roman 
Catholics, and Puritan tolerationists were confronted with 
                                               
51 Ibid., 398-401. 
52 Ibid., 400. 
53 Ibid., 407. 
54 Ibid., 405-6. 
55 Ibid., 402-8. 
56 In turn, Taylor might have influenced Baxter in this respect, see John 
Coffey, "Defining Heresy and Orthodoxy in the Puritan Revolution," in 
Heresy, Literature, and Politics in Early Modern English Culture, ed. David 
Loewenstein and John Marshall (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2006), 126-29.  
   One reason for this assertion about Taylor’s originality is that while this 
claim depends on the minimal fundamental article of faith, in the second 
edition of De Cive Hobbes professed the novel feature and general 
unpopularity of this doctrine. Coffey’s research into Puritan attempts to 
define the fundamental creed during the revolutionary years confirms this. 
Ibid., 113-30; DC, 18:6 anno. 
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mainstream Presbyterians, and both of them refuted the 
(assumed) infallibility of their opponents and pointed out lack of 
certainty in their positions. Taylor mainly took over 
Chillingworth’s version. Lack of certain means to reach truth 
implies unity of opinion is something to be wished for rather than 
to be achieved, and the only attainable unity is that of charity and 
mutual toleration.57 Similarly, in showing that there was always 
limitation or insufficiency of certainty in judging for others, 
Taylor and Chillingworth pointed out internal contradictions in 
all of the sources of authority from tradition, councils, the Pope, 
fathers, to church.58 What Taylor did was to amplify 
Chillingworth’s line of reasoning, and his systematic amplification 
made his point much clearer than Chillingworth’s fragmentary 
version.  
   However, based on this refutation of human infallibility, Taylor 
gave a new twist to his defence of reason. It is true that 
Chillingworth and Goodwin had already developed their own 
versions of vindication for reason, and it is very probable that 
Taylor’s discussion was mainly based on Chillingworth’s 
framework.59 Yet while Chillingworth’s argument was 
fragmentary partly due to his way of argument as the refutation 
of Knott, Taylor, realising this topic as a distinct theme, devoted a 
chapter to this theme. In it, Taylor made a fuller-scale analysis 
and went further than Chillingworth in the following two respects. 
In the first place, while for Chillingworth the authority of the 
Roman Church was the main oppressor of human reason, Taylor, 
aware of the pluralistic disunion of Christian parties, had in view 
several authorities at the same time. While the authority of the 
Roman Church was most suspicious, other authorities had some 
weight. Then, whereas Chillingworth contrasted the insufficient 
                                               
57 WT, 366-67. 
58 Chillingworth, The Works of William Chillingworth, 2: 410. WT, 428-94. 
59 Chillingworth, ibid., 1: 235-43, 2: 410-11. 
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certainty of authorities with the reliability of the Scriptures,60 
Taylor did not necessarily deny authorities. He rather viewed the 
matter as the choice of authorities or human guides. Here he 
grasped the framework, so vital to Leviathan, of the combination 
of teachers or guides and their followers.  
   Based on this framework, Taylor endorsed individual judgement 
about the matter of religion. “For this any man may be better 
trusted for himself than any man can be for another. For in this 
case his own interest is most concerned,”61 and “no man’s 
salvation” is dependent “upon another.”62 Moreover, the 
insufficiency of authorities means that individual judgement 
should limit the extent to which people follow their guides. By 
following the guide “so far as his reason goes along with him,” he 
can use all the guides’ reasons and his own as well.63 Not doing so 
means negligence.64 Taylor here mentions scriptural passages 
often cited with relation to this topic: “Search the scriptures,” “Try 
the spirits,” and so on.65 If people follow whatever the guide says, 
they are often “forced to do violence to” their own 
understanding.66 It might be compared to “a laying up my talent 
in a napkin,” a well-known expression similar versions of which 
can not only be seen in Milton or Goodwin’s works, but also in 
Leviathan.67 Taylor, following Chillingworth, illustrates this by 
the example of Roman Catholics.68 When they study “in the 
pursuit of truth, it is not with a resolution to follow that which 
shall seem truth to them, but to confirm what before they did 
                                               
60 Ibid., 1: 239, 2: 410-11. 
61 WT, 495. 
62 Ibid., 496. 
63 Ibid., 495. 
64 Ibid., 497. 
65 Ibid. Cf. Chillingworth, The Works of William Chillingworth, 1: 239. 
66 WT, 495. 
67 Ibid., 497; Milton, Complete Prose Works of John Milton, 2, 543-44. Lev, 
32: 576. 
68 Chillingworth, The Works of William Chillingworth, 1: 272; 2: 418. 
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believe.”69 What is lacking in this attitude is the desire to test 
their assumed truths and, if necessary, to change the assumed 
truths into new ones. As a result, if there arises something 
contradictory to their articles of faith, “they are to take it for a 
temptation, not for an illumination.”70 The expression, 
“illumination,” reminds us of “new light” which radical Puritans 
often called their doctrines. Though Taylor does not mention the 
Puritan ideal of further reformation, his attack on Roman 
Catholics here seems to reflect the assault by radical 
tolerationists such as Milton and Goodwin on the unwillingness of 
mainstream Presbyterians to advance further reformation and 
absorb new ideas. 
   Another major feature of Taylor’s defence of reason based on his 
idea of choosing the human authorities is that he denies “the 
common prejudice,” the antithesis of reason and authority.71 The 
common feature of this antithesis is confirmed by the fact that 
both Chillingworth and Knott contrasted reason and authority, 
despite their disagreement about the holder of authority.72 
Against this predominant idea, however, Taylor asserts that 
“reason and authority are not things incompetent or repugnant, 
especially when the authority is infallible and supreme, for there 
is no greater reason in the world than to believe such an authority. 
But then we must consider whether every authority that pretends 
to be such, is so indeed.”73 We have already seen in the 
introduction a similar way of the identification of the religious 
problem in Leviathan. “And therefore Deus dixit, ergo hoc verum 
est, is the greatest demonstration in the world for things of this 
nature. But it is not so in human dictates, and yet reason and 
                                               
69 WT, 495. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Ibid., 498. 
72 Chillingworth, The Works of William Chillingworth, 1: 238. 
73 WT, 498. 
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human authority are not enemies.”74 Depending on the situation, 
it is better to follow one of human authorities or one’s own reason. 
“But then the difference is not between reason and authority, but 
between this reason and that, which is greater.”75 In the midst of 
so many different and contradictory opinions, “it concerns every 
wise man to consider which is the best argument, which 
proposition relies upon the truest grounds. and if this were not his 
only way, why do men dispute and urge arguments? why do they 
cite councils and fathers?... If we must judge, then we must use 
our reason; if we must not judge, why do they produce 
evidence?”76 “So that scripture, tradition, councils, and fathers, 
are the evidence in a question, but reason is the judge: that is, we 
being the persons that are to be persuaded, we must see that we 
be persuaded reasonably.”77 The formulation of this general 
principle, the priority of individual judgement over any (human) 
claim of (divine) authority, is considerably important. When 
Hobbes refuted the Catholic claim of the Pope as the interpreter 
of the Scriptures in De Cive, he constructed an argument based on 
this principle.78 Nevertheless, he never clarified it in De Cive as a 
general principle. The implication of this principle for mutual 
toleration is that when people disagree about their opinions, it is 
those who listen to the argument that can judge, and that those 
who produce the argument have to accept the listeners’ judgement 
even if they remain divergent from their “true” opinions. We will 
see a similar version of this remarkable argument in Leviathan, 
but in comparison to Leviathan what should be pointed out is that 
                                               
74 Ibid. 
75 Ibid. 
76 Ibid. 
77 Ibid., 499. 
78 It is “unreasonable of you to demand something which by the very 
grounds of your demand you admit belongs to someone else.” Catholics 
refers to divine authority for the ground of this claim, but “how is it known? 
From holy scriptures; there’s the book, read it. No point, unless I interpret 
it for myself; so interpretation is my right, and that of all other individual 
citizens.” DC, 17:27. Cf. Chillingworth, The Works of William Chillingworth, 
1: 242. 
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it is not clear here what Taylor thought of the divine authority of 
the Scriptures. 
   The third remarkable strategy of Taylor is his detailed analysis 
of the causes of religious errors, and his distinction between 
heresies and innocent errors.79 In the first place, Taylor began his 
argument with an analysis of the uses of “heresy” in the 
Scriptures. While other people of the era used the conception of 
heresy more casually, Taylor, like Hobbes, reconsidered the deep 
assumption of this notion, the Scriptures as the fundamental 
source of Christianity.80 Thereby Taylor gained a new insight into 
heresy. Such heresies as the apostles condemned were not every 
type of error but only errors which directly deny the faith in Jesus 
Christ, or practical errors which lead to immorality.81 As long as 
Christians retain the fundamental creed and lead a good life, they 
cannot be called heretics in the scriptural sense. Thus Taylor 
virtually limited the problem of heresy to that of morality. He 
went so far as to assert that a true belief by itself, without 
morality and charity, was not “a grace or a virtue;” “for then the 
unlearned were certainly in a damnable condition, and all good 
scholars should be saved.”82 This is a very daring remark in view 
of his contemporaries’ emphasis on true religion. 
   Secondly, by limiting heresies to practical impieties, Taylor 
distinguished innocent errors from heresies, which can be seen as 
a response to heresiographies in his age. One of the tactics of 
Gangraena, a famous heresiography, was to report immoral and 
scandalous stories of supposed heretics at that time in order to 
                                               
79 Cf. Jordan, The Development of Religious Toleration in England, vol. 4, 
394-98. 
80 Still, it is true that some Puritans attempted to define heresy. Coffey, 
"Defining Heresy and Orthodoxy in the Puritan Revolution," 114-16, 30-31. 
It would be worthwhile to compare their definitions with Taylor’s. 
81 WT, 378-88. 
82 Ibid., 383. 
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undermine their integrity.83 Yet Taylor severed the prevalent 
association of religious errors with immorality. 
   Taylor rebutted the genre of heresiography in another way too. 
By showing the uncertainty of reports of heretics in the early age 
of Christianity, he undermined the credibility of this kind of 
report in a later age which followed this precedent.84 While some 
Puritans such as Goodwin and Walwyn directly refuted the 
credibility of reports in Gangraena, Taylor’s theoretical approach, 
by undermining the deep assumption, compromised the whole 
genre of the catalogue of heretics. 
   Thirdly, he supported the notion of innocent errors by 
presenting various inculpable causes of error.85 He showed that 
the internal merit of the argument was only a part of the cause of 
persuasion. People are affected by their own different 
understandings, the holiness of principles, the good success of the 
defenders of the argument, education, of impostures of their 
adversaries, and so on. These are “arguments of human 
imperfections, not convictions of a sin.”86 
   Moreover, this distinction between heresies and innocent errors 
led to Taylor’s significant characterisation of erroneous people as 
the object of pity.87 This certainly reflected Taylor’s emphasis on 
charity, but this view was quite unusual in his age. Even 
tolerationists found errors something to be eradicated or the 
object of fight. Milton, while he emphasised the necessity of the 
temptation of vices for the existence of virtues, used the metaphor 
of the fight between truth and errors to make truth shine.88 
Similarly, although Chillingworth distinguished fundamental and 
                                               
83 Edwards, Gangraena, vol. 1: 61-62, 70 74, 125. Also see Walsham, 
Charitable Hatred: Tolerance and Intolerance in England, 1500-1700, 145-
46. 
84 WT, 389-95. 
85 Ibid., 499-510. 
86 Ibid., 499. 
87 Ibid., 386, 409, 503. 
88 Milton, Complete Prose Works of John Milton, 2, 527-28, 61-63. 
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non-fundamental matters, he regarded errors of Catholics as 
pardonable, that is to say, damnable by themselves. Yet for Taylor 
“no simple error is a sin, nor does condemn us before the throne of 
God.”89 
   This section concludes the analysis of Taylor with one of the 
climaxes of defending mutual toleration: his breakdown of 
conditions for toleration of Anabaptists and Catholics, the two 
“most troublesome and most disliked.”90 They themselves were a 
minority in the England of that time, but Taylor’s point was that 
“by an account made of these we may make judgment what may 
be done towards others whose errors are not apprehended of so 
great malignity.”91 The “others” will certainly include chief 
antagonists in the Civil War, Anglicans and most Puritans, and 
thus this defence forms a part of his plea for their mutual 
toleration and for peace. This technique of considering the most 
extreme position to cover at the same time more moderate and 
relevant positions was often used in Leviathan in various ways.92 
   Taylor’s chief way of defence of Anabaptists as the opposition to 
the baptism of infants was to show numerous reasons for this 
opinion.93 Thereby he tried to show that “they have so great 
excuse on their side that their error is not impudent or vincible.”94 
This way of vindication implies that rational accounts of each 
Christian party themselves contribute to toleration. If so, while 
tolerationists might still be a small minority in Restoration 
England,95 the consensus of reasonable religion in this age would 
be a major latent drive for the development of toleration in 
England. 
                                               
89 WT, 514, 604. 
90 Ibid., 540. 
91 Ibid. 
92 Typical cases are Hobbes’s criticism of Bellarmine, and his argument 
about Moses and the apostles. 
93 Ibid., 540-80. 
94 Ibid., 540. 
95 Coffey, Persecution and Toleration in Protestant England, 1558-1689, 166. 
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   As for Catholics, Taylor’s effort to include Catholics within the 
scope of toleration as far as possible was by itself very unusual in 
the England of this age. One of the main difficulties concerning 
toleration of Catholics was that they were said to espouse 
doctrines detrimental to the civil authority or public peace. 
Catholics qua Catholics were, in Protestant countries, regarded as 
seditious. Taylor referred to seditious Catholic doctrines, some of 
which were, though famous, exactly the ones Hobbes refuted in 
Leviathan.96 This was one of the few areas where religious liberty 
was limited to the internal opinion and preaching was to be 
punished.97 Nevertheless, apart from that, Taylor allowed 
Catholics religious liberty. It will be seen later that Hobbes also 
granted some kind of Catholicism in Leviathan. 
 
                                               
96 WT, 594-95. Lev, 15: 226; 42: 920. 
97  WT, 595. 
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4. Leviathan 
4.1. De Cive and New Principles of Christian 
Religion in Leviathan 
 
Ⅰ 
   The task in this part is to identify arguments evident only in 
Leviathan and to consider them in the religious contexts 
examined so far. Generally speaking, the basic religious 
framework and political message does not change from De Cive to 
Leviathan. To take a closer look, however, even in the part in 
which both of them provide similar discussions, subtle changes 
can be seen. Then, to deal with the delicate problem about the 
nature of the similarities and dissimilarities between the two 
works, some preliminary comments will be helpful on his famous 
conclusion about church-state relations in De Cive. In a well-
known section of De Cive, Hobbes divides controversies into two 
kinds: temporal matters and spiritual matters. In temporal 
matters the sovereign decides disputes, but:  
 
To decide questions of faith, i.e. questions about God, which are beyond 
human understanding, one needs God’s blessing (so that we may not 
err, at least on essential questions) and this comes from CHRIST 
himself by laying on of hands. For our eternal salvation we are obliged 
to accept a supernatural doctrine, which because it is supernatural, is 
impossible to understand. It would go against equity if we were left 
alone to err by ourselves on essential matters. Our Saviour promised 
this Infallibility (in matters essential to salvation) to the Apostles until 
the day of judgement, i.e. to the Apostles and to the Pastors who were 
to be consecrated by Apostles in succession by the laying on of hands. 
As a Christian, therefore, the holder of sovereign power in the 
commonwealth is obliged to interpret holy scripture, when it is a 
question about the mysteries of faith, by means of duly ordained 
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Ecclesiastics. And so in Christian commonwealths judgement of 
spiritual and temporal matters belongs to the civil authority.1  
 
Therefore, though the authority of spiritual matters lies in the 
sovereign, the sovereign is obliged to accept the interpretation of 
ordained priests.  
   While some scholars of Hobbes have acknowledged the 
importance of this conclusion, they have at the same time been 
confused because it seems so abrupt and incongruent with 
Hobbes’s general thrust of emphasising the sovereign’s authority.2 
Here, however, what should be made clear is exactly what Hobbes 
meant by the authority of the sovereign to interpret the 
Scriptures in the first place. In the discussion of the kings of the 
Old Testament, Hobbes showed the division of work between the 
sovereign’s appointment of interpreters and the pastors’ actual 
task of interpreting the Bible. “Though Priests might be better 
equipped by nature and training than other men, still Kings are 
perfectly capable of appointing interpreters under themselves. 
Thus, even though Kings may not personally interpret God’s Word, 
the task of interpretation can still depend on their authority.”3 
This type of division of work was what Hobbes had in mind in the 
above conclusion. 
   In addition, several key notions which lay foundations for the 
conclusion can also be found in other parts of De Cive and in that 
sense the conclusion is linked with the general argument of De 
                                               
1 DC, 17:28. 
2 Sommerville argues, “The precept that sovereigns are obliged to interpret 
Scripture by properly ordained clerics does not cohere with the rest of what 
Hobbes says in De Cive.”Sommerville, Thomas Hobbes: Political Ideas in 
Historical Context, 124-27. Similarly, Collins asserts it is a “puzzling 
passage which runs against the broader grain of the work”. Collins, The 
Allegiance of Thomas Hobbes, 66-68. Also Lodi Nauta, "Hobbes on Religion 
and the Church between the Elements of Law and Leviathan: A Dramatic 
Change of Direction?," Journal of the History of Ideas 63, no. 4 (2002): 590-
91. 
3 DC, 16:16. 
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Cive.4 The first and primary one is the distinction between the 
temporal and the spiritual.5 However, this contrast has already 
been seen in the introduction and here the great role it plays in 
De Cive is just pointed out again.  
   Second, Hobbes gives special importance to infallibility and to 
the matter of truth or error in scriptural interpretation 
concerning matters essential to salvation. Hobbes uses this kind 
of idea to deny the sufficiency of merely human power concerning 
spiritual things. “A rule of doctrine which cannot be known by any 
human reasoning but only by divine revelation cannot be but 
divine. For when we admit that someone does not know whether 
some doctrine is true or not, it is impossible to take his verdict on 
this doctrine as the rule.”6 In particular, Hobbes points out the 
possibility of human error.7 This suggests that even the sovereign, 
as long as he or she is a mere human, cannot escape from human 
error in interpreting the Scriptures. To avoid human error, people 
need some divine power. It seems that Hobbes regarded a church 
as a place where such divine power was transmitted.8 This 
hypothesis explains why Hobbes mentions the notion “the 
tradition of a church” and begins to treat the notion of a church 
                                               
4 Sommerville mentions the problem of the consistency about Hobbes’s view 
on infallibility here with the last section of De Cive. (Sommerville, Thomas 
Hobbes: Political Ideas in Historical Context, 125.) However, firstly, since 
the sovereign controls the appointment of interpreters, the conflicts of 
interests between them will not (be likely to) happen. Secondly, it was only 
in Leviathan that Hobbes became fully aware of the clergy’s religious 
dominion and tried to deconstruct it. 
5 It should be noted that this distinction is not clearly drawn in The 
Elements of Law. Nauta’s account of the relationship of Hobbes’s view on 
church-state relations among his three works of political philosophy does 
not address this point. Nauta, "Hobbes on Religion and the Church between 
the Elements of Law and Leviathan: A Dramatic Change of Direction?," 
587-89. 
6 DC, 17:17. 
7 DC, 17:18, 16:16. 
8 To that extent Hobbes seems to have followed Anglicanism in De Cive. For 
a balanced survey of Hobbes and Anglicanism, see J. P. Sommerville, 
"Leviathan and Its Anglican Context," in The Cambridge Companion to 
Hobbes's Leviathan, ed. Patricia Springborg (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007). A further comparison of De Cive and Anglicanism 
on the theme of infallibility would be useful. 
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just after pointing out the problem of human error.9 This also 
explains why Christians in a pagan state must follow “some 
Church of Christians” in spiritual matters.10 
   In relation to the notion of a church as a place where divine 
power was transmitted, thirdly, Hobbes presumes the 
transmittance of some divine power (“God’s blessings”) through 
the ordination and particularly the laying on of hands. This laying 
on of hands is also discussed in Section 24, Chapter 17 of De Cive, 
whose topic is the choice of ecclesiastics,11 a theme closely related 
to the tradition of a church. The main gist of this section is to 
prove that while consecration and laying on of hands is the task of 
the apostles and teachers, the selection of ordinands belongs to 
the church. However, from this section we can also read Hobbes’s 
conception of laying on of hands in De Cive.  
   Let us follow his reasoning more closely. Considering how Paul 
and Barnabas were added to the apostles, Hobbes distinguishes 
the ordination by laying-on of hands and the selection by order of 
the holy spirit. Then, he asks further by what authority the 
allegation of the holy spirit was accepted, quoting Gal. 2.14, “Do 
not believe every spirit, but try the spirits to see if they are from 
God, since many Pseudo-Prophets have gone out into the world,” 
and finds the authority in the church. Conversely, however, this 
argument with the quotation indicates that with the approval of 
the church, the spirit is admitted to come from God. Also, his 
quotation of 1 Tim. 4.14, “Do not neglect the grace of God which is 
in you, which was given to you through prophecy with the laying 
on of hands of the board of presbyters” connects “the grace of 
God”12 with laying on of hands. 
                                               
9 DC, 17:15, 19. 
10 DC, 18: 13.  
11 Cf. Sommerville, Thomas Hobbes: Political Ideas in Historical Context, 
122. 
12 Note that this expression is close to “God’s blessing” (“benediction 
divina”) in Chapter17, Section 28 of De Cive. In addition, Hobbes created 
this expression itself, changing the Vulgate expression “gratia” into “gratia 
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   It seems that here Hobbes accepted the transmittance of some 
divine power through laying on of hands, provided ordinands are 
selected and approved by the church. Of course, the interpretation 
above depends on the conception of “holy spirit”. However, holy 
spirit was acknowledged as a main medium of divine authority in 
De Cive. Discussing the word of God, Hobbes argues that one 
meaning of it is “whatever has been said by men on the orders or 
by the influence of a holy spirit.”13 Hobbes then connects this with 
the divine authority of the Scriptures. “We recognize holy 
scripture as inspired by God, all of it is thereby Word of God” in 
this sense.14 These passages show that Hobbes found the 
authority of the Scriptures in the inspiration from God, and that 
he saw holy spirit as a main means of transmission of divine 
authority in De Cive.  
   Now this thesis will turn to Leviathan and will demonstrate 
little by little how these assumptions in De Cive have changed in 
it. 
 
Ⅱ 
   While in De Cive Hobbes, after discussing the kingdom of God 
by nature, went on directly to the sacred history in the Old 
Testament, in Leviathan he added two chapters before turning to 
the content of the Scriptures. The first of the chapters is not even 
about the Scriptures themselves but about the reconsideration of 
the foundation of Christian religion; though the Bible is still 
regarded as the fundamental text of Christian religion, Hobbes 
now begins to provide much more elaborate arguments about 
supernatural revelation, which in turn is supposed to lay 
foundations for the authority of the Scriptures. In the chapter, 
                                                                                                                       
Dei,” thus making clearer the link with God. 
13 DC, 17:15. 
14 DC, 17:16. 
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Chapter 32, it is possible to discern most clearly the overall 
character of Hobbes’s intellectual pursuits peculiar to Leviathan.  
   Hobbes, still retaining the distinction between the natural and 
the supernatural, begins the chapter with the contrast.15 Then he 
defends the use of reason in dealing with supernatural matters. 
Here Hobbes, like tolerationists, attacks the Catholic doctrine of 
the implicit faith. On the other hand, when it comes to how to 
deal with supernatural things, Hobbes refers to the captivation of 
understanding, of which tolerationists often accused Catholics. 
“When any thing therein written is too hard for our examination, 
wee are bidden to captivate our understanding to the Words, and 
not to labour in sifting out a Philosophicall truth by Logik, of such 
mysteries as are not comprehensible, nor fall under any rule of 
natural science.”16  
   Yet again following that, Hobbes makes an important subtle 
distinction. 
 
But by the Captivity of our Understanding, is not meant a Submission 
of the Intellectual faculty, to the Opinion of any other man; but of the 
Will to Obedience, where obedience is due.... We then Captivate our 
Understanding and Reason, when we forbear contradiction; when we 
so speak, as (by lawfull Authority) we are commanded; and when we 
live accordingly; which in sum, is Trust, and Faith reposed in him that 
speaketh, though the mind be incapable of any Notion at all from the 
Words spoken.17 
 
To grasp the importance of this passage and the new twist Hobbes 
gives here, it is necessary to look back at the conception of faith in 
De Cive. In it Hobbes clarifies the notion of faith by three 
distinctions.18 In the first place, in contrast to the knowledge of a 
proposition, “when the reasons for which we assent to a 
                                               
15 Lev, 32: 576. 
16 Lev, 32: 578. 
17 Ibid. 
18 DC, 18:4.  
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proposition are drawn not from the actual proposition but from 
the person of its proponent, because we judge him to be expert 
enough not to be deceived and we see no reason why he would 
want to deceive us, our assent is called Faith, because it arises 
from reliance on someone else’s knowledge not our own.”19 In 
Leviathan too Hobbes retains this distinction. However, here 
Hobbes specifies the actor to be trusted: a “lawful authority.” As 
was seen in the introduction, in Leviathan Hobbes began to cast 
doubt on the allegation of pretended prophets. Hobbes’s new 
problem was to determine who was to be trusted among 
pretended prophets, and the cited passage points to lawful 
authority as such an actor.  
   The second distinction Hobbes made about faith in De Cive is 
that between faith as an internal assent and profession as an 
external act. On the other hand, here faith is a kind of obedience 
to lawful authority, contradicting the conception of faith in De 
Cive. This new notion of faith as external obedience had critical 
implications for the political conclusion about religious matters in 
Leviathan. It enabled Hobbes to prove that in Christian 
commonwealths it was not necessary for subjects to believe 
internally any articles of faith, even the fundamental article, 
“Jesus is Christ.” What was necessary for salvation was just to 
grant the article, though of course there was no problem about 
believing in the article.20 On the other hand, in De Cive, this 
fundamental article was regarded as a matter of internal faith, 
though every other article usually included in the domain of 
internal faith was transferred into that of obedience.21 In 
accordance with this change, Hobbes extended the scope of his 
                                               
19 Ibid. 
20 Lev, 43: 936. 
21 DC, 18:11, 14. From this viewpoint, Tuck’s argument that in Leviathan 
“faith became exclusively a matter of believing what the civil sovereign 
said,” and not of “believing in the independent validity of the historical 
record of Christianity” appears to miss the point. Tuck, Hobbes: A Very 
Short Introduction, 100. 
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theory from Christian citizens to citizens of all faiths, as his 
mention of Muslims suggests.22 
   One reason for this change is that in Leviathan Hobbes 
elaborated the third distinction concerning faith in De Cive 
between science and faith. While for science definition is vital, for 
faith it is harmful. “Things put forward for belief which are 
beyond human understanding never become clearer by 
explanation, but to the contrary, become more obscure and more 
difficult to believe.”23 In Leviathan Hobbes clarifies its meaning. 
About such things “the mind be incapable of any Notion at all 
from the Words spoken.” If so, however, it will not be possible to 
assent to the proposition. Still, since supernatural things are 
“things put forward for belief which are beyond human 
understanding,” Hobbes retains the expression, “faith.” 
   Another more detailed explanation for the reason why this faith 
cannot be internal and remains external, however, can be found in 
the main argument in Chapter 32, which follows the cited passage. 
This also reveals the full meaning of the subtle distinction and the 
independence of the understanding in relation to faith. Here as 
with “things put forward for belief which are beyond human 
understanding,” Hobbes begins to ask for their grounds. This new 
demand for grounds about matters of faith is parallel to Goodwin’s 
in his justification for the authority of the Bible.24 However, for 
Goodwin the critical examination of religious matters, by judging 
the lawfulness of the king’s command, could become part of the 
argument for the resistance to the Royalists,25 whereas Hobbes 
uses it to contain this kind of religious justifications for war. 
                                               
22 Lev, 42: 786. 
23 DC, 18:4.  
24 Goodwin, The Divine Authority of the Scriptures Asserted, sig. ar, a2r-
a3V. 
25 Anti-Cavalierisme, or, Truth Pleading as Well the Necessity, as the 
Lawfulness of This Present Vvar, for the Suppressing of That Butcherly 
Brood of Cavaliering Incendiaries, Who Are Now Hammering England, to 
Make an Ireland of It: Wherein All the Materiall Objections against the 
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   At first, Hobbes begins with the distinction of two channels of 
the word of God, which is also found in De Cive.26 “When God 
speaketh to man, it must be either immediately; or by mediation 
of another man, to whom he had formerly spoken by himself 
immediately.”27 Yet then, an epistemological argument peculiar to 
Leviathan starts.  
 
How God speaketh to a man immediately, may be understood by those 
well enough, to whom he hath so spoken; but how the same should be 
understood by another, is hard, if not impossible to know. For if a man 
pretend to me, that God hath spoken to him supernaturally, and 
immediately, and I make a doubt of it, I cannot easily perceive what 
argument he can produce, to oblige me to beleeve it.28 
 
It is this doubt about the allegation of supernatural immediate 
revelation that plays a pivotal role in the general religious 
argument of Leviathan. Hobbes’s identification of pretended 
prophets as such in his new articulation in Leviathan of the 
religious problem presupposes this doubt. 
   Hobbes makes the sovereign the exception to this general doubt. 
However, this exception also explains why Hobbes created the 
new concept of faith. 
 
It is true, that if he be my Soveraign, he may oblige me to obedience, so, 
as not by act or word to declare I believe him not; but not to think any 
otherwise then my reason perswades me.29 
   
                                                                                                                       
Lawfulness of This Undertaking, Are Fully Cleered and Answered, and All 
Men That Either Love God, Themselves, or Good Men, Exhorted to 
Contribute All Manner of Assistance Hereunto  (London: Printed by G.B. 
and R.W. for Henry Overton, 1642), 18-22. 
26 This point suggests that although even in The Elements of Law there 
were some epistemological arguments concerning the Scriptures, the 
following argument could only be developed based on the framework first 
put forward in De Cive. EL, 1:11:7-9. 
27 DC, 15:3; Lev, 32: 578. 
28 Lev, 32: 578. 
29 Ibid. 
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So long as the sovereign cannot provide a convincing ground for 
their allegation of supernatural revelation, all they can do is 
concerned only with external obedience. The cited passage clearly 
reflects the subtle distinction about the captivation of 
understanding. This use of reason in his new demand for grounds 
of faith makes Hobbes careful about the limit of the sovereign 
power concerning matters of faith.   
   Thus, this epistemological doubt is a vital feature of Leviathan. 
Nevertheless, this doubt in itself can also be found in Behemoth.30 
What distinguishes Leviathan from even Behemoth is that it 
provides the grounds of this doubt. Hobbes’s point is that things 
commonly regarded as supernatural phenomena can also be 
understood as merely natural. The difficulty with dealing with the 
problem of pretended prophets is that immediate revelation is 
alleged to be supernatural, and thus, it seems, “cannot by natural 
reason be either demonstrated, or confuted.”31 What Hobbes 
suggests here is, instead of finding in the supernatural room for 
the distinction between truth and falsity about the allegation of 
immediate revelation, to contrast the category of the supernatural 
itself with that of the natural, and to attribute truth and falsity 
about prophecy to each of them. To demonstrate this, he makes 
use of the epistemological argument in Part 1 of Leviathan. For 
instance, “To say he [God] hath spoken to him in a Dream, is no 
more than to say he dreamed that God spake to him, which is not 
of force to win belief from any man, that knows dreams are for the 
most part naturall, and may proceed from former thoughts; and 
such dreams as that, from selfe conceit, and foolish arrogance” 
and so on, “by which he thinks he hath merited the favour of 
extraordinary Revelation.”32  
                                               
30 Hobbes, Behemoth, or, the Long Parliament, 174. 
31 Lev, 32: 576. 
32 Lev, 32: 580. 
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   There are two points to note in this argument. Firstly, it is 
certain that the combination of the doubt and of the 
epistemological grounds for the doubt by itself stops people at 
least once from following pretended prophets blindly. At the same 
time, however, this reasoning is different from disproving the 
existence of supernatural phenomena, which for Hobbes was not 
possible in any case. It leaves the possibility of such supernatural 
phenomena as the sovereign alleges, as will be seen later.  
   Another remarkable point about this reasoning is that it 
elucidates, at least partly, the reason why Hobbes wrote anew 
another work of political philosophy. In De Cive the theoretical 
devices Hobbes employed to interpret the Scriptures were mainly 
conceptions in the civil part of his argument such as natural law 
known by mere reason and the establishment of the state through 
contracts. However, it now becomes necessary for Hobbes to make 
more elaborate uses of the epistemological argument about man. 
   In this way Hobbes discredits common types of the allegation of 
revelation. However, the above discussion shows just the 
insufficiency of the case of the speakers of the word of God. It does 
not give any definite answer and leaves the audience of the 
allegation uncertain. The allegation may be true, but is not 
sufficiently convincing. Hobbes emphasises this uncertainty quite 
effectively by illustrating it with two examples of the Old 
Testament, 1 Kings 22 and 1 Kings 13.  
 
Of 400 Prophets, of whome the K. of Israel asked counsel, concerning 
the warre he made against Ramoth Gilead, only Micaiah was a true 
one. The Prophet that was sent to prophesy against the Altar set up by 
Ieroboam, though a true Prophet, and that by two miracles done in his 
presence appeared to be a Prophet sent from God, was yet deceived by 
another old Prophet, that perswaded him as from the mouth of God, to 
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eat and drink with him. If one Prophet deceive another, what certainty 
is there of knowing the will of God, by other way than that of Reason?33  
 
   The first example supports the doubt which natural reason 
indicates by focusing on the slight possibility of meeting teachers 
of the true religious doctrine. Yet at the same time the example 
can be seen as a suitable biblical expression of the religious 
pluralism emerging during the Civil War. The situation Hobbes 
evokes where people have to find only one true prophet among 
several hundreds of pretended prophets might well have echoed 
the puzzlement his English audience must have felt about the 
question of which religious party to follow in the midst of the 
numerous Christian parties which the fragmentation of 
Puritanism brought about.34 
   Similarly the second biblical case illustrates possible deception 
by pretended prophets. However, this example implies more than 
that. Natural reason just shows that for ordinary Christians it is 
quite difficult to reach certainty about the allegation of pretended 
prophets. However, this biblical case shows that even true 
prophets might be deceived. It not only illustrates the dexterity of 
false prophets, but also might suggest a more dangerous 
possibility that even true prophets, being subject to deception, 
might not be trustworthy. This again draws the readers’ attention 
to uncertainty. 
   What are possible implications for this emphasis on uncertainty 
or sceptical attitude? Religious scepticism was not common in his 
age, but not entirely new, and during the Civil War it seems to 
have become more widespread. In particular, some tolerationists 
such as Goodwin and Taylor made frequent uses of sceptical 
arguments. They undermined the certainty of ordinary people in 
the era or more generally Christians living later than the age of 
                                               
33 Lev, 32: 580. 
34 Cf. WT, 355. 
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the apostles. Hobbes, however, went further in that the 
formulation of his doubt could put in perspective Moses and the 
apostles too. Moreover, while tolerationists, supposing the 
authority of the Bible, focused on the uncertainty about the 
interpretation of the Bible, the scope of Hobbes’s doubt can extend 
as far as the authority of the Bible, because the main source of 
biblical authority was supposed to be inspiration. To that extent, 
Hobbes’s radical doubt is reminiscent of that in Henry 
Hammond’s hypothetical doubt, both of which raise the possibility 
of the non-occurrence of the revelation to the apostles or of their 
delusion. 
   In relation to De Cive, though in it Hobbes offered some analysis 
of prophets, the articulation of the central religious problem 
presupposed the end of the age of prophets, and accordingly his 
argument about prophets was short, occupying only one section.35 
On the other hand, the epistemological doubt in Leviathan 
provided Hobbes with a new perspective for a deeper and more 
extended analysis of prophets in the Bible.  
   From the political viewpoint, the new doubt serves to discredit 
the allegation of the enthusiasts. Nevertheless, here the person 
who casts doubt is “I”; the sceptical attitude is still personal and it 
is not clear whether other people will take this attitude. Moreover, 
though natural reason might check the enthusiasts to some extent, 
it does not offer the definite yardstick for distinguishing true and 
false prophets. Seeking such a criterion, Hobbes turns to the Bible.  
 
Ⅲ 
   It is true that in De Cive Hobbes did discuss prophets and how 
to distinguish true and false prophets, and that the biblical 
passages Hobbes cites here in Leviathan are the same as the ones 
cited in De Cive. Nevertheless, they acquire a vital importance for 
                                               
35 DC, 16:11, 18:1. 
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Leviathan because they play an indispensable part in solving the 
new central problem of pretended prophets. Actually, to take a 
closer look at the argument in De Cive, it turns out that he did 
not have in mind the problem of the enthusiasts in this work. In 
the first place, when Hobbes referred to the issue of prophets in 
the later section, he described it as the problem “whether the 
writings of Prophets who arose later should be accepted as God’s 
word.”36 For Hobbes in De Cive the problem was how to interpret 
writings, and the judgement of pretended prophets in his own 
time was outside the scope of his argument. Secondly, in De Cive 
Hobbes assumed that the task of prophets was to predict future 
events. This is, however, only one of the several meanings of 
“prophet” in the Bible, as Hobbes shows in Leviathan.37 In De 
Cive Hobbes did not address the precise issue of judging the 
allegation of direct revelation by pretended prophets. 
   This subtle change in Hobbes’s concern from De Cive to 
Leviathan affects the actual interpretation of the biblical 
passages he cited in his search for the criteria of true and false 
prophets in both De Cive and Leviathan. The passages cited are 
Deut. 13:1-5 and 18:21, 22,38 two criteria are inferred from the 
passages. As for the miracle as one of the criteria inferred from 
Deut. 18, Hobbes’s view does not change much between the two 
works. What changes from De Cive to Leviathan is the 
interpretation of Deut. 13:1-5. The criterion shown here is also 
much more important for Hobbes in Leviathan than the miracle. 
   In De Cive, Hobbes cited it in the Vulgate version quite precisely. 
“Si surrexerit in medio tui Propheta, aut qui somnium vidisse se 
dicat, et praedixerit signum atque portentum, et euenerit quod 
loquutus est, et dixerit tibi eamus, et sequamur Deos alienos et c. 
                                               
36 DC, 16:13. 
37 Lev, 36:658. 
38 The combination of these two passages is not unusual. The notes in the 
French Geneva and the Junius-Tremellius translation also suggest it. 
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Propheta ille, aut factor somniorum interficietur.”39 In relation to 
the expression, “Deos alienos,” Hobbes saw the criterion as faith 
in the God of Abraham. 
   In Leviathan, on the other hand, Hobbes not only extended the 
range of the citation but also diverted from the assumed original 
version, the KJV, in several expressions. 
 
 If a Prophet rise amongst you, or a Dreamer of dreams, and shall 
pretend the doing of a miracle,40 and the miracle come to passe; if he 
say, Let us follow strange Gods, which thou hast not known, thou shalt 
not hearken to him, etc. But that Prophet and Dreamer of dreams shall 
be put to death, because he hath spoken to you to Revolt from the Lord 
your God.41 
 
Compared with De Cive, Hobbes added the parts, “which thou 
hast not known” and “because he hath spoken to you to Revolt 
from the Lord your God.” The most marked change from the KJV 
is from “turn away” to “Revolt.” Some of Hobbes’s reasoning from 
the passage and the general precepts he drew for his English 
audience are based on this specification of the meaning.42 Another 
noticeable alteration is from “other” to “strange.” It is true that 
the changes are not necessarily without ground: the changed 
wording can be seen as the synonym of that in the KJV. However, 
more general expressions in the KJV turn into those to which are 
more likely to be assigned meanings serviceable for Hobbes’s 
                                               
39 DC, 16:11. 
40 The French Genava translates this as “signe ou miracle.” 
41 Lev 32: 582. The KJV version is as follows. “If there arise among you a 
prophets, or a dreamer of dreams, and giveth thee a sign or a wonder, And 
the sign or the wonder come to pass, … Let us go after other gods, which 
thou hast not known, … Thou shalt not hearken unto the words of that 
prophets, or that dreamer of dreams … And that prophets, or that dreamer 
of dreams, shall be put to death; because he hath spoken to turn you away 
from the LORD your God.” I have underlined some noticeable differences of 
wording between the two versions. Though Hobbes often changes some 
expressions in his quotation in Leviathan, this scale of change is rare. 
42 For this, see Fukuoka, State, Church and Liberty: A Comparison between 
Spinoza's and Hobbes's Interpretations of the Old Testament, 427-29. 
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political message in Leviathan. In particular, the altered 
expressions depict the prophets in the citation as if they were 
radical Puritans;43 they fought against the Royalists and espoused 
novel ideas. The criterion Hobbes found in the passage, 
established religion, works in a similar way. For Puritans 
including radical ones destroyed the English religious system at 
that time such as the episcopacy and the Book of Common Prayer.  
   It should also be noted that the passage is one of the most cited 
in the toleration controversy.44 Opponents of toleration made use 
of it to vindicate the sovereign’s duty to oppress sectarians or false 
prophets. It is true that the purpose of Hobbes’s use is different 
from this. He is concerned with “the duty of Christian Subjects 
towards their Soveraigns,” not with the sovereign’s duty.45 
Nevertheless, Hobbes’s use in Leviathan in contrast with De Cive 
is similar to that in the toleration controversy in that both of them 
regarded their problem as that of false prophets, and that both 
applied the passage to their contemporary issues. 
   To return to the issue of the enthusiasts, the two criteria help 
Hobbes to discredit them further. The miracle as the necessary 
condition of the true prophet reduces the credibility of mere 
pretension of the enthusiasts. Hobbes supports this by the 
standard Protestant argument that miracles have already ceased. 
As for the other criterion, established religion, Hobbes changes it 
into the Scriptures in the final part of this chapter. The 
enthusiasts did not deny the Scriptures but rather both alleged 
immediate revelation and provided new interpretations of the 
Scriptures based on the alleged revelation. Here Hobbes limited 
valid arguments to those based on the Scriptures. 
   However, the Scriptures can be interpreted in various ways. To 
hold the enthusiasts in check, Hobbes developed his analysis of 
                                               
43 Cf. Schotte, Die Entmachtung Gottes durch den Leviathan, 165. 
44 Coffey, Persecution and Toleration in Protestant England, 1558-1689, 31-
32. 
45 Lev, 32: 584. 
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prophets in the Bible, explicitly contrasting his biblical 
interpretation with that based on “Enthusiasme, or supernatural 
Inspiration.”46 This new interpretive analysis will be examined in 
the next chapter. 
 
                                               
46 Lev, 32: 584. 
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4.2. Philological and Epistemological Refutation of 
the Enthusiasts: Chapter 36 
 
Ⅰ 
   Hobbes’s full answer to the enthusiasts in Leviathan can be 
seen in Chapter 36, and the argument there roughly corresponds 
to a key notion in De Cive, faith in the God of Abraham. Although 
this conception played several important parts in De Cive, it 
disappeared completely in Leviathan. This change can be seen as 
a result of Hobbes’s effort to remove ambiguous elements in the 
idea of faith in the God of Abraham. Another more important 
factor to note, however, is that this notion of faith in the God of 
Abraham was ineffective for solving the problem of pretended 
prophets in Leviathan. 
   This notion is ambiguous in two points. The first unclear 
element lies in its relation to divine positive law. In The Elements 
of Law, divine positive law was not treated because divine law 
and natural law were completely equated.1 In De Cive Hobbes 
argued on the one hand that divine positive laws concerned divine 
worship, which would include faith in Abraham.2 On the other 
hand, he also claimed that they were particular to the 
commonwealth of Israel,3 but faith in Abraham affected not only 
the Hebrews but also Christians.4 However, the abandonment of 
the notion of faith in Abraham’s God and the new epistemological 
argument in Leviathan specified the notion of divine positive law 
as applicable to the state of any positive religion.5 
   Second, it is not clear whether the faith is internal or external. 
On the one hand, Hobbes argued that Abraham wanted his 
followers to worship the God who had addressed him as such, and 
                                               
1 EL, 2:10:7. 
2 DC, 14:4. 
3 Ibid. 
4 DC, 18:11. 
5 Lev, 26: 442, 44, 46, 48. 
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Hobbes called this “worship of religion and faith”, thus connecting 
this faith to worship.6 Similarly, idolatry, the deviation from this 
faith, was depicted as worshipping God in a different way from 
the one instituted by Abraham.7 Also, in the very argument about 
the Hebrews’ faith in Moses, Hobbes identified the faith in 
Abraham as the worship of the God of Abraham.8 However, 
worship was an external act.9 On the other hand, in other 
passages Hobbes contrasted internal faith with profession, 
external obedience.10 In the argument on the faith in Christ too, 
which obviously is internal faith, Hobbes included in it faith about 
the Old Testament.11 The reason why Hobbes used the expression 
the “worship of faith” in De Cive despite this ambiguity was 
probably that the worship comprehended supernatural elements; 
Hobbes explained this worship as the “worship which God, not 
reason, had revealed to him [Abraham], supernaturally.”12 Yet 
Hobbes linked supernatural elements with faith in De Cive, 
where the connection appears most obviously in the expression 
“things put forward for belief which are beyond human 
understanding.”13 This image of belief was closely related to his 
contrast in the same section between faith as dependent upon 
“someone else’s reputation” and opinion as based on “our own 
reason.”14 Seeing in the same section Hobbes distinguishing 
between internal faith and profession as external obedience, the 
belief in the quotation would surely signify internal faith. In 
Leviathan, on the other hand, thanks to the new notion of faith as 
obedience to the civil sovereign as shown in the previous section, 
Hobbes made it clear that all people can do is to obey what the 
                                               
6 DC, 16:4. 
7 DC, 16:7. 
8 DC, 16:11. 
9 DC, 15:9. 
10 DC, 18:4. 
11 DC, 18:11. 
12 DC, 16:4. 
13 DC, 18:4. 
14 Ibid. 
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sovereign presents as things supernatural, though they are put 
forward for belief. 
   Apart from the above ambiguities, however, another vital factor 
for the disappearance of the notion of faith in Abraham’s God in 
Leviathan was that the idea was not sufficiently articulate to deal 
with the new problem in Leviathan of pretended prophets. First, 
while this concept focuses on worship of God based on the fact 
that Abraham “wanted his followers to worship the one who had 
so addressed him as God,”15 what radical Puritans encouraged 
was rebellion, a matter far beyond worship of God. Second, in the 
faith in Abraham’s God what Abraham saw or heard in visions or 
dreams is simply regarded as supernatural. Similarly, this idea 
presupposes Abraham’s faith, which lies in “not doubting that the 
one whose voice and promises he [Abraham] had heard was 
God.”16 However, what pretended prophets during the 1640s made 
use of or abused were these notions assumed in De Cive. For these 
reasons, it was necessary for Hobbes to revise in Leviathan his 
argument related to faith in Abraham’s God.17  
   The revised version is his general analysis of contacts of 
prophets with God in the Scriptures under the topic, “the manner 
how God hath spoken to the Prophets,” in Chapter 36.18 Hobbes’s 
countermeasure against the enthusiasts in Chapter 32 was the 
combination of doubts cast upon them and the presentation of 
naturalistic interpretations of alleged supernatural phenomena. 
Nevertheless, Hobbes excluded from his analysis biblical prophets, 
some of them certainly being true and not just pretended ones. 
His point was that revelation through the Scriptures was not 
immediate “but by mediation of the Prophets, or of the Apostles, 
                                               
15 DC, 16:4. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Curley interprets this matter differently, saying, “the thrust and intent of 
Leviathan is to undermine the God of revelation, the God of Abraham, 
Isaac and Jacob.” Curley, "'I Durst Not Write So Boldly': How to Read 
Hobbes’s Theological-Political Treatise," 572. 
18 Lev, 36: 662. 
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or of the Church, in such manner as he speaks to all other 
Christian men.”19 It was exactly this mediation to which Hobbes 
paid attention in Chapter 36.20 This focus on revelation itself was 
not completely exceptional in his age, as shows Henry Hammond’s 
analysis of how the apostles received immediate revelation. Still, 
while Hammond turned to revelation to search for certainty in his 
reply to radical scepticism, Hobbes’s aim was to discredit and 
isolate the enthusiasts by encouraging scepticism.  For this 
purpose Hobbes developed far more sophisticated interpretive 
devices than Hammond. 
 
 
Ⅱ 
   Hobbes begins the discussion by dealing with the passage in the 
Psalm, which seems to signify the nature of God.21 Hobbes had 
already treated this passage in The Elements of Law,22 and kept 
denying the interpretation in his works of political philosophy. 
However, based on his theoretical development in De Cive, where 
he excluded the possibility of attributing human organs to God,23 
in Leviathan Hobbes sharpened the question; human organs or 
sense-perception based on them cannot be attributed to God, but 
it might still be possible to attribute to God sense-perception or 
other uses of human organs independent of them, even though it 
is not possible for human beings to understand how God does so.  
   Though the conclusion derived from interpreting the passage is 
the same among the three works, in Leviathan Hobbes goes 
further, saying, “Therefore we are to interpret Gods speaking to 
men immediately, for that way (whatsoever it be), by which God 
                                               
19 Lev, 32: 580. 
20 This thesis suggests paying attention to differences between Chapter 32 
and 36. Cf. Hoekstra, "Disarming the Prophets: Thomas Hobbes and 
Predictive Power," 138-39. 
21 Lev, 36: 662. 
22 EL, 1:11:3. 
23 DC, 15:14. 
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makes them understand his will.”24 The point is that prophets qua 
human beings do understand God’s will in whatever way. Just as 
in Chapter 37 Hobbes examines miracles by focusing on human 
perception, so in the following interpretation of the Bible, Hobbes 
investigates immediate revelation by paying attention to human 
perception, and not to the nature of God or to the world beyond or 
independent of the human perception. Hobbes’s understanding of 
the passage in the Psalm prepares for his following interpretation 
of the Scriptures in this direction. 
   Hobbes searches for signs indicating the manners of revelation 
from the beginning of the Scriptures, and then finds in the 
contacts of Abraham and other prophets with God several signs 
and makes inferences from them. Here some of the scriptural 
passages Hobbes cites overlap with those in the discussion about 
the God of Abraham in De Cive. Then, how did Hobbes’s 
interpretation develop between the two works?25 
   One feature of Leviathan is Hobbes’s lax attitude toward verbal 
expressions in the Scriptures and his readiness to alter them.26 It 
is related to his deeper understanding in Leviathan of the nature 
and language of the Scriptures. The Scriptures are not written as 
a treatise of science and their language is not free from 
ambiguity.27 This means not only that key words in the Scriptures 
like “spirit” might include several meanings in them,28 but also 
                                               
24 Lev, 36: 662. 
25 Martinich and Schotte discuss Hobbes’s treatment of immediate 
revelation. Martinich, The Two Gods of Leviathan: Thomas Hobbes on 
Religion and Politics, 227-28; Schotte, Die Entmachtung Gottes durch den 
Leviathan, 164-68. As for Hobbes’s use of the Bible in Chapter 36, the only 
known work to discuss this issue in detail is the following: Fukuoka, State, 
Church and Liberty: A Comparison between Spinoza's and Hobbes's 
Interpretations of the Old Testament. This thesis adds to these works a 
comparative viewpoint between De Cive and Leviathan. 
26 Cf. Ibid., 278-79.   
27 Lev, 8: 120; 33: 602. 
28 This made possible the new analysis in Chapter 34. Hobbes’s realized 
that the Bible includes not only proper uses of the word, but also 
metaphorical ones. (Lev, 34: 610.) In the former parts of Leviathan, Hobbes 
placed emphasis on the importance of proper use of the word in science, 
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that several verbal expressions might signify virtually the same 
thing from a scientific point of view. 
   To give concrete examples of this change, when Hobbes cited 
scriptures in De Cive, he followed much more closely the Vulgate. 
Thus on the one hand, in the citation in the discussion about 
God’s revelation to Abraham in De Cive, despite some minor 
deviations from the Vulgate based on the consideration of 
substantial content, the range and degree of the change is quite 
limited. Hobbes changes two expressions, from the expression 
“tres viri” (Gen. 18:2) to “sub specie triumvirorum caelestium”, 
and also, probably from “sopor irruit super Abram… Dictum est 
ad eum” (Gen. 15:12-13) to “per somnium.”29 On the other hand, 
in Leviathan, Hobbes’s attention pierces more easily through 
verbal expressions into such substantial content as can be 
captured by the epistemology in Part 1 of Leviathan. To take an 
illuminating example, when Hobbes in Leviathan interpreted the 
same passage in Gen. 18:2 as cited in De Cive, which says, “And 
he lift up his eyes and looked, and lo, three men stood by him,” he 
changed the expression into “by an apparition of three angels.”30 
Certainly, the understanding of “men” as angels was not 
unusual.31 Still, the combination of the notion of angels with that 
                                                                                                                       
stressing the necessity of correcting the definitions carelessly done by 
previous writers, and dismissing the metaphorical use of the word. (Lev, 4: 
50, 56, 62; 5: 70.) When Hobbes analysed the Scriptures in De Cive, all the 
key concepts he used derived from the words he made proper use of. 
However in Chapter 34 of Leviathan, thanks to metaphorical and vulgar 
uses of the word, Hobbes could provide himself with a catalogue of many 
more meanings of the word, “spirit,” which enabled him to show intelligible 
meanings of “the spirit of God.” What should be emphasized here is that 
just because Hobbes held materialistic metaphysics it does not necessarily 
follow or imply that he could provide such interpretations as found in 
Leviathan. 
29 DC, 16:4. 
30 Lev, 36: 662, 64. Even when Hobbes mentioned explicitly “the word of the 
text”, he did not necessarily follow the verbal expression of the text closely, 
changing from “And he [Jacob] dreamed, and behold a ladder” (Gen. 28:12) 
to “Iacob dreamed that he saw a ladder” (Lev, 36: 664.) (I follow the biblical 
reference corrected by Malcolm.) 
31 The annotations for the passage in the French Geneva Bible and in the 
Junius-Tremellius translation refer to Heb. 13:2, which says in the words of 
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of apparition points clearly to the possibility that the “men” or 
“angels” are not substances but something only in human 
perception. In order that this appearance of the concept of angels 
may not be abrupt or unnatural, Hobbes went so far as to add 
extra explanation to the vision in the citation just before, even 
though vision itself was something into which he tried to reduce 
all mediums of prophecy. Hobbes says, “In a Vision; that is to say, 
somewhat, as a sign of Gods presence, appeared as Gods 
Messenger, to speak to him.”32 
   As can be seen in this example, another characteristic in 
Hobbes’s treatment of the passages of the Scriptures here is his 
focus on human perception, and his tendency to interpret the 
events of the cited passages as happening only in human 
perception. Thus, referring to a passage about revelation to Moses, 
“And the angel of the Lord appeared unto him in a flame of fire 
out of the midst of a bush: and he looked, and, behold, the bush 
burned with fire, and the bush was not consumed” (Exod. 3:2), 
Hobbes interpreted this manner of revelation as “the apparition of 
a flame of fire out of the midst of a bush.”33 In this case, the 
expression “looked” in the Bible suggests that the flame can be 
interpreted as an occurrence in human perception as was done by 
Hobbes. However, seeing the event was not expressed in the 
conjunctive mood, it also seems possible that the flame actually 
rose independently of the perception of Moses. Then, it can be said 
                                                                                                                       
the KJV, “Be not forgetful to entertain strangers: for thereby some have 
entertained angels unawares.” Also, the note of the Bishops’ Bible explains 
that the “men” are angels even though they are outwardly men.  
32 Lev, 36: 662. The aim in the explanation here seems to me rather to 
prepare for interpreting the revelation in the next cited passage as the 
appearance of angels than, as Fukuoka suggests, to give some explanation 
to identifiable phenomena found in revelation, if not as completely 
identifiable or clearly explainable as ones in natural science. Fukuoka, 
State, Church and Liberty: A Comparison between Spinoza's and Hobbes's 
Interpretations of the Old Testament, 279. 
   Another possible significance of this paraphrase is to show clearly the 
connection between supernatural and immediate revelation and the vision 
here, which phenomenon itself can be understood as completely natural.  
33 Lev, 36: 664. 
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that Hobbes limited and determined the meaning of the biblical 
passage. Similarly, to take a more explicit example, from the 
passage “And the Lord appeared unto him the same night” (Gen. 
26:24), Hobbes captured the word “night,” and then transformed it 
into “in his sleep,” and further into “by dream.”34 
   In this way, Hobbes limits the medium of revelation to the 
sphere of human perception. While verbal expressions in the 
Scriptures are various, ranging from “appeared (Gen. 12:7), “in a 
vision” (Gen. 15:1), “appear… three men” (Gen. 18:1-2), “in a 
dream” (Gen. 20:3), “two angels” (Gen. 19:1), “the angel of God” 
(Gen. 21:17), “the angel of the Lord called… out of heaven” (Gen. 
22:11), “night” (Gen. 26:24), “dreamed” (Gen. 28:12), “the angels of 
God” (Gen. 32:1), to “the angel of the LORD appeared unto him in 
a flame out of the midst of a bush” (Exod. 3:2), Hobbes extracts 
from all of these varied expressions only two types of mediums of 
revelation: vision and dream. Compared with the discussion of 
Abraham’s God in De Cive, this reduction of mediums of 
revelation is characteristic of Leviathan. It is true that in this way 
Hobbes tries to reduce the phenomena of revelation to “something 
like a kernel which natural science can capture”, and that Hobbes 
plans to demystify these phenomena of supernatural revelation 
and to limit drastically the sphere of things supernatural later.35 
Still, it should also be noted that until the actual demystification 
Hobbes seems to intend to avoid revealing his intention, 
refraining from terms of mechanical science. Even the notion of 
angels here requires only his definition of angels as “a Messenger 
of God… especially by a Dream or Vision,” and not the 
demystification in his following explanation.36 At this stage 
Hobbes’s main aim lies rather in avoiding such interpretations 
                                               
34 Ibid. 
35 Fukuoka, State, Church and Liberty: A Comparison between Spinoza's 
and Hobbes's Interpretations of the Old Testament, 287-88. 
36 Lev, 34: 622. 
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implying that there exist some substantial mediums independent 
of human perception in supernatural revelation. 
   In this tendency of Hobbes to reduce mediums of supernatural 
revelation to dreams or visions, the passage of Num. 12:6-8,37 
which helped in De Cive to demonstrate Moses’ special status 
among prophets,38 becomes rather an obstacle. For one thing, the 
passage points to a way of supernatural revelation different from 
visions or dreams. For another, though Hobbes has already denied 
the idea that “God hath voice and language,” the passage seems to 
suggest that “God himself in express words declareth” that he 
speaks “to his servant Moses, in such manner as a man speaketh 
to his friend.”39 Nevertheless, by citing another passage in the 
New Testament which suggests the mediation of Moses’ revelation 
as an angel, Hobbes brings Num. 12:6-8 back into his general 
scheme.40 Though Hobbes continues to cite other passages in the 
Scriptures, they are concerned only with general ways of 
revelation, and not with the peculiar revelation to Moses; they do 
not support strongly Hobbes’s position on Num. 12:6-8. On the 
other hand, however, these passages do suggest that Hobbes’s 
reduction of general ways of revelation to visions and dreams has 
some scriptural support. 
   In spite of Hobbes’s interpretive efforts so far, the reduction still 
does not draw a clear distinction between Hobbes’s attitude here 
and that in Chapter 32 or the one which the notion of Abraham’s 
God in De Cive assumes. However, immediately after Hobbes 
sums up mediations of revelation in the Scriptures as dreams and 
                                               
37 In Leviathan, Hobbes cites at the same time Exod. 33:11. (Lev, 36: 664.) 
The corresponding words themselves between this and Num. 12:6-8 might 
have attracted Hobbes’s attention, but also the annotations for Num. 12:6-8 
in the Geneva Bible, and the Bishops’ Bible and the Junius-Tremellius 
translation point to it. 
38 DC, 16:11. 
39 Lev, 36: 662, 64. The note for Exod. 33:11 in the Junius-Tremellius 
translation also discusses the nature of God based on the passage. 
40 Fukuoka, State, Church and Liberty: A Comparison between Spinoza's 
and Hobbes's Interpretations of the Old Testament, 282-87. 
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visions, he soon steps further beyond the awareness of the 
authors of the Scriptures and at the same time shows a markedly 
different attitude from De Cive, by elucidating these two 
mediations with terms of mechanical science in Part Ⅰ of 
Leviathan: “that is to say, from the imaginations which they had 
in their sleep, or in an Extasie: which imaginations in every true 
Prophet were supernaturall; but in false Prophets were either 
naturall, or feigned.”41 Compared with De Cive, here Hobbes 
specifies and limits the sphere of the supernatural. The dreams or 
visions are imaginations and to that extent natural phenomena, 
even in the case of immediate and supernatural revelation.42 
Accordingly, the distinction between natural and supernatural 
revelation turns out to be much subtler than in De Cive. Then 
what is the practical and political implication of this argument? 
This question will be answered in the concluding part of this 
chapter. 
 
Ⅲ 
   Hobbes continues to deal with spirit, and also reduces it to 
dreams or visions.43 Then he turns to another but closely related 
important topic: the manner of revelation to sovereign prophets 
and to subordinate prophets, a distinction peculiar to Leviathan.  
   Here Hobbes refers again to Num. 12:6-8. There are, however, 
two problems in his use. Firstly, only a few pages after denying 
the special revelation to Moses suggested in this passage, Hobbes 
cites the same passage for the contrary purpose in demonstrating 
that the manner of revelation to sovereign prophets “is not 
manifest.”44 This time Hobbes presents the passage as 
contradictory to the view that God revealed to Moses in Mount 
                                               
41 Lev, 36: 666. 
42 Lev, 36: 674. 
43 Lev, 36: 666. 
44 Lev, 36: 668. 
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Sinai through visions or dreams.45 This use of Num. 12:6-8 
involves another problem. Hobbes applies this discussion not only 
to Moses, but also to later sovereign prophets such as the high 
priests.46 However, seeing that the argument above depends on 
the distinction between Moses and the other prophets, it cannot 
be applied to the high priests, who are, after all, not Moses. 
Hobbes’s rushed impetus to put all sovereign prophets together47 
probably made it difficult for him to realize this problem. In the 
Latin version of Leviathan, however, Hobbes coped with both of 
the problems. He deleted the argument based on Num. 12:6-8, 
and instead inserted the one about revelation to the high 
priests.48 
   After that, Hobbes suggests that revelation to subordinate 
prophets is a natural process, as distinct from that to sovereign 
prophets.49 One of the political implications of the contrast 
between sovereign prophets and subordinate prophets consists in 
denying the allegation of immediate revelation by the enthusiasts. 
Another is to undermine greatly the presumed infallibility of 
teachers of the church in the political conclusion in De Cive.50 
Finally Hobbes deals with lots as a means of revelation and ends 
his interpretative investigation. However, what does Hobbes aim 
at with this expanded interpretation of the Scriptures? To 
understand the political significance of his discussion, it is 
necessary to compare the conclusion in Chapter 36 with De Cive, 
and then with that in Chapter 32 of Leviathan.51 
 
                                               
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Fukuoka, State, Church and Liberty: A Comparison between Spinoza's 
and Hobbes's Interpretations of the Old Testament, 307-8. 
48 Lev, 36: 669. 
49 Lev, 36: 670. 
50 DC, 17:28. 
51 Though this thesis completely agrees with Hoekstra’s general thesis that 
Hobbes’s overall countermeasure against the enthusiasts was to isolate 
them, this kind of more specific inquiry remains to be done. See Hoekstra, 
"Disarming the Prophets: Thomas Hobbes and Predictive Power," 132-34. 
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Ⅳ 
   The conclusion in Chapter 36 has a structure of argument 
parallel to that in Chapter 37,52 and together they constitute a 
sub-conclusion of the religious argumentation in Leviathan. The 
key element here is the use of natural reason, or a critical and 
sceptical attitude toward pretended prophets, as every subject’s 
duty, 53 which is distinctive of the religious argument in Leviathan. 
It is true that this duty has in common with the law of nature 
that both of them form civil duties, something subjects are obliged 
to do in commonwealths, and that they are related to natural 
reason. However, while the law of nature is contrasted with 
natural passions of human beings, this duty is set against both 
intentional deception led by human desire for dominion and 
people’s aptitude “to give too hasty beleefe” to pretended 
prophets.54 Moreover, whereas the laws of nature are conclusions 
of reason and suggest actions, the duty to make use of reason 
                                               
52 Lev, 37: 694, 96. 
53 Lev, 36: 674, 76, 78. That Hobbes regards this duty as every one’s seems 
to be linked with the issue of the intended readership of Leviathan. More 
precisely, this duty would be one major reason why Hobbes extended his 
readership from The Elements of Law to Leviathan. As is well-known, 
though The Elements of Law was only distributed and the first edition of 
De Cive was to be read by only a small number of intellectuals, Hobbes for 
the first time presented the second edition of De Cive to the general public. 
In the added preface, he urged readers not to believe in those who 
expressed rebellious opinions in the name of God and to report their names. 
(DC, 83.) The duty in Leviathan can be seen an extension of this 
encouragement in the preface of De Cive, and it is a parallel to the change 
of the language of his political theory from Latin to English. For this topic, 
also see Hobbes, Leviathan, 51-61. 
   In relation to this, it might also be worth noting that it was for the sake of 
readers, Hobbes said, that he published the second edition. (DC, 83.) 
Certainly, it is difficult to understand the publication as an act aiming at 
his own benefit: even if his book might have given him honour, which 
possibility he himself mentioned, he was fully aware that his book would 
displease a number of readers and make numerous enemies, a great 
detriment to his individual benefit. Ibid. 
54 Lev, 37: 694. The cited argument in itself refers to pretended miracles, 
and not to pretended prophets. A little later on the same page, nevertheless, 
Hobbes puts together both of them, saying, “before wee give credit to a 
pretended Miracle, or Prophet.” Based on this and the similarity of 
structures of argumentation in the concluding part of Chapters 36 and 37, 
it would not be amiss to make use of the remark in Chapter 37 to 
understand Chapter 36. 
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concerns opinions as the presupposition of actions; people have to 
examine whether the sedition which pretended prophets stir up in 
the name of God is really what God commands, before they follow 
them and join a rebellion, or reject them. 
   More specifically, in Leviathan, although Hobbes showed some 
critical attitude also in Chapter 32, the critical attitude as a civil 
duty in Chapter 36 has several new elements, which help to 
explain the significance of Hobbes’s extended interpretation of the 
Bible in Chapter 36. Generally speaking, while in Chapter 32 
Hobbes’s sceptical attitude provides ad hoc room for the use of 
natural reason, in Chapter 36 Hobbes presents a fuller foundation 
for it. The first point to cover is the simplification of the kinds of 
revelation. While in the discussion of faith in Abraham’s God in 
De Cive and in Chapter 32 of Leviathan, several kinds of 
mediations of revelation, such as dreams, visions, voices, and 
inspirations, were distinguished, through the investigation of 
revelation in the Scriptures all these distinctions turn out to be 
superficial. Instead, the distinction Hobbes draws here is between 
completely natural revelation, and one with some supernatural 
elements. 
 This new distinction is connected with the grasp of two natural 
phenomena common to all prophecy, imaginations or lots, based 
on the examination of all patterns of revelation in the Scriptures. 
This exhaustiveness of Hobbes’s examination is the next point to 
make. The counter-argument in Chapter 32, on the one hand, 
presented only the possibility of naturalistic interpretations of 
each of the alleged supernatural phenomena. On the other hand, 
the scriptural interpretation in Chapter 36 places in perspective 
true and false prophets, and examines all kinds of revelation. The 
conclusion in Chapter 36 is concerned with “all Prophecy.”55 
                                               
55 Lev, 36: 676. 
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   In this way the new distinction of kinds of revelation together 
with that of one common natural basis for all prophecy prepares 
room for the use of natural reason concerning the allegation of all 
kinds of prophecy and thereby for the adoption of a sceptical 
attitude to pretended prophets. Actually, here Hobbes includes in 
the scope of his theory pretended prophets themselves:56 he hoped 
that the enthusiasts themselves, and not only the listeners to 
them, would take a sceptical attitude to their own assumed 
revelation.57 
   Another implication of the amplified interpretation of the 
Scriptures for the use of natural reason is the distinction between 
supreme and subordinate prophets. To distinguish true from false 
prophets, there needs some kind of criterion, and in both Chapters 
32 and 36 the criteria are found in the Scriptures. However, in 
Chapter 32 the criterion by which to distinguish them was 
concluded to be the Bible,58 which still needs interpreting. In the 
conclusions of Chapters 36 and 37, on the other hand, by deriving 
the notion of the sovereign prophet from the interpretation of the 
Scriptures, Hobbes specifies one human judge. As a result, Hobbes 
could attain the unity of external actions concerning prophets or 
miracles. This means that in the external domain people can 
acquire “certainty” which natural reason alone cannot attain.59 
   In addition to the expanded interpretation of the Scriptures, in 
the concluding part too Hobbes vindicated further the critical 
attitude by the new way of the use of the scriptural criteria 
discussed also in Chapter 32. It is true that just as in Chapter 36, 
so in Chapter 32,  just before explaining the criteria shown in the 
Scriptures, the importance of the use of reason is shown by 
referring to the possibility of human deception and to a large 
                                               
56 Lev, 36: 680. 
57 Cf. Hammond, To the Right Honourable, the Lord Fairfax, 2. 
58 Lev, 32: 584. 
59 Lev, 32: 580. 
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number of pseudo-prophets in the Scriptures.60 However, the 
argument in Chapter 32 on the one hand presupposes the use of 
natural reason and a sceptical attitude, which clarifies the 
uncertainty about alleged supernatural revelation and requires 
the scriptural support. The conclusion in Chapter 36, on the other 
hand, presupposes the criteria in the Scriptures, which now show 
that a sceptical attitude to pretended prophets has scriptural 
support. In particular, the existence of the criteria ensures that 
this scepticism is available to all people.61 With the new 
discussion based on the command of God in the Scriptures, the 
conclusion in Chapter 36 goes so far as to show the use of natural 
reason as everyman’s duty.62 
                                               
60 For the latter point, Hobbes in Chapter 36 cites Jer. 14:14, which says in 
the wording of the KJV, “The prophets prophecy lies in my name: I sent 
them not, neither have I commanded them, neither spake unto them: they 
prophecy unto you a false vision and divination, and a thing of nought, and 
the deceit of their heart.” Hobbes’s own wording of the last part of this 
section, which is clearly dependent upon the KJV, is as follows: “they 
prophecy to you a false Vision, a thing of naught; and the deceit of their 
heart.” (Lev, 36: 676.) It appears that with the omission of the underlined 
part Hobbes identifies “a false Vision” with “a thing of naught,” and thus 
suggests that alleged visions are likely to be false revelation, and not 
something to be esteemed. 
   The note attached to this section in the Bishops Bible points to Jeremiah 
23, the chapter that Hobbes quotes next. 
   Apart from the scriptural criteria, another new factor in Chapter 36 
which Hobbes mentions to encourage scepticism is his sociological insight, 
unique and vital to Leviathan, into following pretended prophets. Hobbes 
points out that dominion, which pretended prophets acquire over their 
followers, is what human beings naturally desire. While in Chapter 32 
Hobbes just refers to the possibility of deception, here he shows the motive 
behind deception and its universal nature. This encouragement of 
scepticism based on the focus on the advantage successful pretenders of the 
word of God acquire can be seen as a modified version of his “cui bono” 
critique of clerical authorities based on false religious doctrines in Chapter 
47. The scepticism is effectual for the abuse of the word of God not only by 
the enthusiasts but also by the clergy. 
61 Lev, 36: 674, 66. 
62 Hobbes cites the word of Jeremiah as the command of God. “Thus saith 
the Lord of Hosts, hearken not unto the words of the Prophets, that 
prophecy to you. They make you vain, they speak a Vision of their own 
heart, and not out of the mouth of the Lord.” (Jer. 23:16; Lev, 36: 676.) It is 
probably this command of God that ensures the obligatory character of the 
sceptical attitude. 
   Curley remarks, “A prudent person will be skeptical of any claims to 
direct communication with God.” Curley, "'I Durst Not Write So Boldly': 
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   The feature and significance of the conclusion in Chapter 36 will 
become clearer if it is also compared with a somewhat similar 
argument about the use of natural reason in judging prophets in 
De Cive.63 In De Cive the function of natural reason is to interpret 
and clarify the criteria for judging prophets so that the criteria 
can be applied to concrete situations. In Leviathan, on the other 
hand, thanks to Hobbes’s detailed interpretation of the Bible the 
chief criteria turn out to be the judgement of sovereign prophets, 
and here no further interpretation is necessary. The task of 
natural reason is rather to take a sceptical attitude toward 
pretended prophets and to be aware that the claim of 
supernatural revelation has to be checked by the criteria in the 
Bible. Also it is only in Leviathan that Hobbes not only practices 
the scepticism or the use of reason himself in his reasoning but 
also encourages the readers to assume this kind of sceptical 
attitude. 
   In this way, in Chapter 36 the Scriptures not only offer such 
criteria as natural reason cannot provide, but also vindicate the 
use of natural reason. Thus Hobbes shows that the Scriptures and 
natural reason complement each other for the sake of quashing 
the rebellion based on the divine word of pretended prophets.64 
                                                                                                                       
How to Read Hobbes’s Theological-Political Treatise," 533, 35. However, 
firstly, the sceptical attitude is a matter of duty, and not a matter of 
prudence. Secondly, this duty concerns not only “prudent” people, but every 
citizen. 
63 DC, 16:11. 
64 Curley’s question about which of the two, reason or revelation, gives 
priority to the other, and his answer that Hobbes’s solution “seems to 
involve a vicious circle”, seem to miss this alternative. Curley, "'I Durst Not 
Write So Boldly': How to Read Hobbes’s Theological-Political Treatise," 535. 
   Collins mentions Hobbes’s “profound scepticism” “of revealed knowledge,” 
which, he says, is “incompatible with Christianity.” Collins, The Allegiance 
of Thomas Hobbes, 30. However, for Hobbes, “profound scepticism” is a tool 
vital for dealing with the political threat of the enthusiasts. For this, also 
see Hoekstra, "Disarming the Prophets: Thomas Hobbes and Predictive 
Power," 133-34. 
   Fukuoka argues that on the surface Hobbes maintained the vulgar notion 
of the agreement of reason and the Scriptures, and that he wanted to share 
his scepticism based on natural reason towards the Scriptures only with a 
part of readers by letting them read between the lines. Fukuoka, State, 
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   Here it can be seen that Hobbes completely turns upside down 
the negative opinion on the use of natural reason about 
supernatural matters, which he referred to in all of his three 
works of political philosophy. As has been seen in the introduction, 
from The Elements of Law to Leviathan Hobbes referred to some 
people who abandoned or attacked natural reason, which probably 
indicated radical Puritans.65 At the beginning of Chapter 32 of 
Leviathan, he made it clear that things supernatural in the 
Scriptures were a main obstacle for rational understanding of 
them and a factor which might lead some people to abandon 
natural reason.66 In the conclusion in Chapter 36, however, the 
use of natural reason to deal with alleged supernatural revelation 
becomes not just a matter to be defended or encouraged but 
rather everyman’s duty based on the command of God in the 
Scriptures, the opposite of what radical Puritans thought.67 
                                                                                                                       
Church and Liberty: A Comparison between Spinoza's and Hobbes's 
Interpretations of the Old Testament, 281, 88, 405-6, 63. However, Hobbes 
did encourage every reader to adopt a sceptical attitude, if not to the 
Scriptures but to pretended prophets in his age. As for Hobbes’s 
understanding of the relationship between reason and the Scriptures, it 
will be appropriate here to remind ourselves of the subtle distinction 
between supernatural matters (above reason) and irrational matters 
(contrary to reason). (Lev, 32: 576.) Hobbes tried to exclude irrational 
matters from his interpretation of the Scriptures to render the Scripture 
not detrimental to but helpful for the natural reason to solve the problem of 
pretended prophets. Thereby Hobbes placed the Scriptures on his side of 
natural reason, at the same time attacking his enemies for introducing 
irrational elements in their interpretations of the Scriptures. Lev, 44: 956, 
58. 
65 DC, 12:6; Lev, 29: 504. 
66 Lev, 32: 576. 
67 It is in this very sense, and not just in the sense that Hobbes refuted 
many errors as Johnston shows, that Hobbes can be seen as a contributor 
to the Enlightenment. Johnston, The Rhetoric of Leviathan: Thomas 
Hobbes and the Politics of Cultural Transformation, 92-218. 
   It interesting to note that two major works dealing with the critique of 
enthusiasm are concerned with the origin of the Enlightenment. Michael 
Heyd, Be Sober and Reasonable: The Critique of Enthusiasm in the 
Seventeenth and Early Eighteenth Centuries  (New York: E.J. Brill, 1995); 
Frederick C. Beiser, The Sovereignty of Reason: The Defense of Rationality 
in the Early English Enlightenment  (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1996). (Beiser mentions Hobbes, though Hobbes’s handling of 
enthusiasm is much more sophisticated than Beiser suggests. Ibid., 207-9.) 
The critique of enthusiasm, including Hobbes’s in Leviathan, can be seen as 
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Ⅴ 
   In Leviathan there are many arguments which deal with the 
problem of pretended prophets to some extent. Then, in 
comparison with other chapters in the religious part of Leviathan, 
what is the role specific to the conclusion in Chapter 36 as a 
response to this problem? It has already been noted the similar 
structures of the conclusion in Chapters 36 and 37, and now this 
thesis will clarify a subtle difference between them concerning the 
relationship between internal thought and external obedience. 
One of the characteristics of the duty of natural reason in Chapter 
37, compared with the argument in the former two parts of 
Leviathan, is to open a way for a distinction between two kinds of 
reason, public and private, and thus for the possible disagreement 
between internal thought and external obedience. This contrasts 
with the situation of citizens in the civil parts proper in Hobbes’s 
theory, where external action and internal thought of citizens are 
in harmony. As opposed to the state of nature, in the 
commonwealth, with the aid of the sword of the sovereign, the 
laws of nature, or actions which natural reason suggests to 
citizens, acquire a great support of human passion, fear of 
punishment.68 As a result, citizens are supposed to regard actions 
contradictory to natural law, especially to justice, as an obvious 
detriment to their own good.69  Thus true opinions about civil 
matters establish foundations for the external duty of citizens.70 
On the other hand, in the concluding part of Chapter 37, Hobbes 
mentions the possibility of the clash between internal belief and 
                                                                                                                       
one of the origins of the Enlightenment. For Hobbes and the Enlightenment, 
also see footnote 45 in the introduction, the last part of 3.3.4., and the 
conclusion in this thesis. 
68 Lev, 18: 254. In De Cive, one of Hobbes’s contrasts of the commonwealth 
with the state of nature was that between the empire of reason and 
passions. DC, 10:1. 
69 DC, 6:4. 
70 DC, 6:13. 
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external obedience.71 This variance can occur because both of 
them might be based on natural reason, with internal thought 
depending on private reason and external obedience on public 
reason. Another reason for this disagreement is that private 
reason cannot reach one definite answer concerning the 
judgement of pretended miracles except for the obedience to the 
public reason. In this sense, Hobbes’s search for certainty in 
Chapter 32 concerns only external obedience; private reason still 
leaves people internally uncertain, as Hobbes’s expression, 
“beleeve, or not beleeve,” suggests.72  
   However, in Chapter 36 Hobbes does not mention this 
possibility of the dissension of internal belief and external 
obedience, in spite of its considerably close structural parallel 
with Chapter 37. This is probably due to the difference between 
the nature of pretended prophets and that of pretended miracles. 
Miracles are, after all, just one of the two criteria for judging 
pretended prophets. Even if people believe in pretended miracles 
internally, the other condition still remains to be met. People will 
obey the sovereign if the teaching of pretended prophets 
performing “miracles” are contradictory to that of the sovereign. 
On the other hand, if people believe internally in pretended 
prophets, seeing that the command of God has priority to that of 
the sovereign, it necessarily follows that they will obey the 
pretended prophets rather than the sovereign, destructive to the 
commonwealth and peace. 
   Due to this peculiar character of internal belief in matters of 
pretended prophets, the concluding part of Chapter 36 plays a 
unique political and practical role in the general structure of 
demonstration about Christian religion in Leviathan. In Chapter 
42 the main political conclusion about church-state relations, the 
right of the civil sovereign to determine religious matters and the 
                                               
71 Lev, 37: 696. 
72 Ibid. 
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corresponding duty of the subjects to obey the sovereign, concerns 
only external obedience of the subjects, and not their internal 
thought or belief.73 However, there is one area in which this 
separation is not effectual, where internal belief leads directly to 
external action: belief in pretended prophets. 
   This pitfall in the political conclusion of Chapter 42 is also left 
in the counter-argument to the authority of the pretension of 
private inspiration or revelation in the discussion about the 
foundation of the authority of the Bible in Chapter 33. Hobbes 
remarks there that people without supernatural revelation are 
not obliged to regard as the law of God what private pretended 
prophets allege.74 This lack of obligation, however, does not 
prevent people from believing voluntarily and obeying what 
private pretended prophets tell them to do as God’s command.75 
Similarly, the efficacy of the counter-argument in Chapter 32 
presupposes a sceptical attitude to pretended prophets. Hobbes, or 
“I” might “make doubt of” what they said and ask them the 
“argument” they “produce, to oblige me to beleeve it,” but it does 
not guarantee that other people will adopt a similar attitude to 
them.76 
   Therefore, the duty to adopt a critical and sceptical attitude to 
pretended prophets (or miracles) as specified in Chapters 36 and 
37 is the only measure which could stop people from believing 
blindly in pretended prophets. Furthermore, the duty of the use of 
natural reason finally requires people to turn to the judgement of 
the sovereign prophet as the definitive criterion for judging the 
truth of pretended prophets. This combination of the critical 
attitude and the judgement of the sovereign prophet as the 
                                               
73 Lev, 42: 782, 84, 864. 
74 Lev, 33: 604, 6. 
75 Hoekstra does not capture the specific and distinctive character of the 
conclusions in Chapter 36 and 37, ignoring the subtle difference between 
the conclusion in Chapter 36 and 33. Hoekstra, "Disarming the Prophets: 
Thomas Hobbes and Predictive Power," 133. 
76 Lev, 32: 578. 
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definitive criterion would completely exclude the possibility that 
people would join the rebellion against the civil sovereign which 
radical Puritans incited. In this way, the conclusion in both of the 
chapters constitutes a politically vital and peculiar role in 
Hobbes’s general argument on Christian religion in Leviathan. 
While for Seth Ward and Edward Leigh the threat of the 
enthusiasts was a matter of faith, for Hobbes it was primarily a 
political problem. Thus, whereas the former’s reply to the 
enthusiasts was to construct their arguments for the authority of 
the Bible, Hobbes’s solution was the duty of scepticism. This duty 
was quite unusual in his age. As Henry Hammond exemplifies, 
most people looked upon scepticism negatively as a threat to faith. 
Though some tolerationists encouraged scepticism, Hobbes went 
so far as to elevate it to every citizen’s duty.77  
   Finally, it may be valuable to note the new significance which 
the authority of the Scriptures as the word of God assumed in 
Leviathan for solving the new problem of pretended prophets. The 
authority of the Scriptures might, by itself, undermine the human 
authority of the sovereign and could be a great factor for the 
destruction of commonwealths. In De Cive, the problem of 
Christian religion for Hobbes was the diversity of the 
interpretation of the Bible as the word of God.78 Accordingly, 
Hobbes solved this problem by the unification of the 
interpretation of the Scriptures through the sovereign, with little 
regard to the authority of the Scriptures. Here, the authority of 
the Bible involves no positive or only potentially dangerous 
political implications. However, as for the problem of pretended 
prophets in Leviathan, which problem in itself was not 
                                               
77 While Tuck placed Hobbes’s religious ideas in his earlier works in the 
trends of fideism as a response to scepticism, especially English fideism 
represented by Chillingworth, this thesis places the scepticism peculiar to 
Leviathan in the religious context of the revolutionary years. Tuck, Hobbes: 
A Very Short Introduction, 91-97. 
78 DC, 18:1. 
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necessarily related to the Scriptures, the authority of the 
Scriptures assumed yet another political connotation. When 
natural reason made every examination but still could not provide 
the definite answer to the distinction between true and false 
prophets, it was the criteria in the Scriptures as an authoritative 
text to be followed that complemented and completed the task of 
natural reason. These criteria were not directly based on natural 
reason itself: the reason why people were obliged to make use of 
the criteria was based on the nature of the text as an 
authoritative text, though the authority might ultimately be 
dependent upon natural reason. In this sense, it can be said that 
the authority of the Scriptures gained a new significance and 
became an integral part complementary to natural reason for 
solving the political problem of distinguishing between true and 
false prophets central to Leviathan. Yet how is the authority of 
the Bible grounded in Leviathan and what is its distinctive 
feature? These questions will be considered in the next chapter. 
 
127 
 
4.3. The Foundation of Biblical Authority in 
Leviathan 
 
   Before discussing Levithan, it would be useful to take a brief 
look at what his earlier works say about biblical authority.1 The 
Elements of Law, as opposed to De Cive, includes some 
substantial argument about the authority of the Scriptures in its 
epistemological part. The gist of Hobbes’s argument is that the 
chief foundation of biblical authority, inspiration, is subject to a 
critical examination, but that the criterion of the examination in 
turn depends on the Scriptures.2 “It remaineth, that the 
knowledge we have that the Scriptures are the word of God, is 
only faith.”3 This faith consists in trust in “the holy men of God’s 
church succeeding one another from the time of those that saw 
the wondrous works of God Almighty in the flesh.”4 This process 
of the succession is through hearing and teaching, that is to say, a 
“natural” process.5 Though this epistemological discussion 
concerning religion is largely independent of the latter political 
part, Hobbes infers from this a political conclusion: as long as the 
fundamental article of faith, Jesus being Christ, is intact, the 
churchman’s judgement and interpretation of the Scriptures in 
the case of controversies or doubt is safer to trust in than “his own, 
whether reasoning, or spirit; that is to say his own opinion.”6 
   In contrast with this epistemological treatment of the authority 
of the Bible in The Elements of Law, that of De Cive is succinct 
and merely traditional. It just acknowledges the Bible as the word 
                                               
1 A simpler but useful version of this type of comparison about biblical 
authority and other topics can be seen in Leo Strauss, The Political 
Philosophy of Hobbes: Its Basis and Its Genesis  (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1963), 71-78. 
2 EL, 1:11:7-8. 
3 EL, 1:11:8. 
4 EL, 1:11:9. 
5 Ibid. 
6 EL, 1:11:10. 
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of God based on inspiration, and does not analyse further.7 Still, 
De Cive develops an important stepping stone to Leviathan in its 
discussion of the three ways of transmitting the word of God: 
natural reason, immediate revelation and the voice of prophets.8 
Corresponding to this distinction, the kingdom of God is divided 
into two types, one based on natural reason and the other on voice 
of prophets. Both in De Cive and Leviathan, Hobbes regards the 
kingdom of God in the Scriptures as the latter type and analyses 
it accordingly. In De Cive, however, there remains room for 
further clarification when it comes to the authority of the Bible. 
Its basis, inspiration, would fall into the category of immediate 
revelation. However, according to Hobbes, by revelation God “has 
said different things to different men,” while the Scriptures hold 
more or less a definite content despite its possible various 
interpretations.9 This discrepancy would mean that Hobbes in De 
Cive did not consider the precise relationship between this 
rational and general scheme and biblical authority. On the other 
hand, in Leviathan Hobbes started his argument about Christian 
religion not with the content of the Bible but with immediate 
revelation, cast new epistemological doubt on immediate 
revelation, and showed the difficulty of identifying immediate 
revelation as such by natural reason only. Basically from this 
viewpoint Hobbes in Leviathan analysed the foundation of the 
authority of the Bible, but his analysis consisted of several layers 
of argument. The foundation of the authority of Moses, among 
others, serves as a nodal point connecting Hobbes’s 
epistemological refutation of the enthusiasts discussed in the 
previous chapter with his arguments underlying the authority of 
the Bible. This thesis then first of all will turn to this topic. 
    
                                               
7 DC, 17:15-16. 
8 DC, 15:3-4. 
9 DC, 15:3. 
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4.3.1. The Foundation of Moses’ Authority: Chapter 40 
 
   It has been seen that Seth Ward, in his division of the 
Scriptures into the doctrinal and historical parts, showed some 
sceptical attitude towards Moses as a prophet. Moses, so far as he 
depended on his doctrine for his status as a prophet, was just a 
pretender of divine doctrines. Hobbes in Leviathan, developing his 
argument about Moses in De Cive, radicalized this type of 
sceptical attitude far beyond Ward and offered a completely new 
and revolutionary foundation for the authority of Moses. He set 
this pivotal question in the time just after the renewal of the 
contract at Mount Sinai. 
 
By this constitution, a Kingdome is acquired to God. A) But seeing 
Moses had no authority to govern the Israelites, as a successor to the 
right of Abraham, because he could not claim it by inheritance; B) it 
appeareth not as yet, that the people were obliged to take him for Gods 
Lieutenant, longer than they beleeved that God spake unto him. C) 
And therefore his authority (notwithstanding the Covenant they made 
with God) depended yet merely upon the opinion they had of his 
Sanctity, and of the reality of his Conferences with God, and the verity 
of his Miracles; D) which opinion coming to change, they were no more 
obliged to take any thing for the law of God, which he propounded to 
them in Gods name. E) We are therefore to consider, what other ground 
there was, of their obligation to obey them. F) For it cannot be the 
commandment of God that could oblige them; because God spake not to 
them immediately, but by the mediation of Moses himself. And our 
Sabviour saith to himself, If I bear witnesse of my self, my witnesse is 
not true;10 much less if Moses bear witnesse of himselfe, (especially in a 
claim of Kingly power over Gods people) ought his testimony to be 
received. G) His authority therefore, as the authority of all other 
                                               
10 The commentaries in the Beza and the French Geneva translations and 
the Geneva Bible connect this passage with a seemingly contradictory 
passage in John. 8:14 and try to reconcile them. From this viewpoint, 
Hobbes’s citation here might look casual or careless. Or he might have 
omitted this kind of discussion deliberately in view of the great role the 
cited passage plays in his general reasoning. 
130 
 
Princes, must be grounded on the Consent of the People, and their 
Promise to obey him. H) And so it was: For the people (Exod. 20. 18.) … 
said unto Moses, speak thou with us, and we will hear, but let not God 
speak with us lest we die. Here was their promise of obedience; and by 
this it was they obliged themselves to obey whatsoever he should 
deliver unto them for the Commandment of God.11 
 
First of all, it is useful to confirm the relationship between this 
argument peculiar to Leviathan and the contract with God seen 
also in De Cive. The expressions “not as yet” in B) and 
“notwithstanding the Covenant they made with God” in C) 
suggest that Hobbes was fully conscious that the foundation of 
Moses was established only after the renewal of the contract 
between God and people, and also that there was a time lag 
between the people’s acceptance of God’ proposal in Exod. 19:8 
found in De Cive or God’s command to Moses in Exod. 19:5 in 
Chapter 35 of Leviathan on the one hand and the people’s promise 
to obey Moses in Exod. 20:18, 19 discussed in H) on the other.12 In 
this sense, the expressions indicate Hobbes’s own awareness in 
Leviathan that the contract with God was not a sufficient 
condition for establishing the kingdom of God, and that yet 
another foundation for the kingdom of God concerning the prophet 
mediating the people and God was necessary. This was because 
the argument in De Cive that the obligatory power of the divine 
law derived from the people’s contract with God turned out to be 
insufficient. In view of the structure of De Cive, where the 
consideration of divine law comes immediately after that of 
                                               
11 Lev, 40: 740. For the comparison of Hobbes’s and Spinoza’s treatment of 
this topic, see Fukuoka, State, Church and Liberty: A Comparison between 
Spinoza's and Hobbes's Interpretations of the Old Testament, 212-16, 322-
26, 419-22.  
   Malcolm regarded the concluding parts of G) and H) as an example of the 
“truly radical cutting edge” of the argument peculiar to Leviathan. Hobbes, 
Leviathan, 41. Our interest is on what made possible the “cutting edge,” 
and its political significance.  
12 DC, 16:8; Lev, 35: 636. 
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contracts with God,13 it could be said that the foundation of divine 
law was the contract with God, and that the obligative power of 
divine law was based solely on the contract.14 In F), on the other 
hand, Hobbes provides new perspectives and denies that the 
Hebrew people were obliged to the commandment of God even 
after the contract was concluded.  
   One major ground for the denial is a modified version of the 
epistemological doubt found in the previous Chapter 32, which 
doubt also corresponds with the duty of the use of natural reason 
in the concluding part of Chapter 36. In contrast to Chapter 32, 
however, here Hobbes cannot assume that the Hebrew people had 
a critical attitude, and probably for this reason he appeals to 
Christ, God, for vindicating the same duty of the critical and 
sceptical attitude as shown in Chapter 36. Still again, while in 
Chapter 36 Hobbes cited the word of God through the mouth of 
Jeremiah, here Hobbes invokes Christ; the explanation would be 
that only the word of Christ carries higher authority than that of 
Moses. 
   Another factor for this denial of the obligative power of God’s 
commandment, complementary to the duty of the use of natural 
reason, is the validating condition of law. Discussing divine 
positive law in Chapter 26 of Leviathan, Hobbes says, “It is of the 
essence of the Law, that he who is to be obliged, be assured of the 
Authority of him that declareth it, which we cannot naturally 
take notice to be from God.”15 As long as Moses’ testimony was 
denied and his authority had not yet been founded, the condition 
                                               
13 DC, 16:3-5, 8, 10; 17:7-8. 
14 “Other divine laws derive their obligation solely from the agreement 
which was made later with the people itself because they were given by 
God specifically as King of the Israelites.” (DC, 16:10.) Also, when Hobbes 
said, “The laws which CHRIST summarizes... are precisely the laws to 
which all who recognize the God of Abraham are bound,” certainly natural 
laws in them are obligatory eternally, but as for “all the laws of divine 
worship due by the old agreement,” there seemed to be no other source of 
obligation than the old contract (or the new contract discussed in the 
preceding section). DC, 17:7, 8. 
15 Lev, 26: 444. 
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of the public announcement of laws was not met; therefore, even 
after the contract the commandment of God did not oblige Hebrew 
people. It can be seen here clearly that the kind of epistemological 
doubt in Leviathan, together with the consideration of the 
validating condition of laws, rendered the contract with God 
insufficient for the obligation of divine law, as opposed to De Cive, 
and forced Hobbes to search for another foundation. 
   So far the significance of the part F) in relation to De Cive has 
been examined. Now, in the whole reasoning here, this part, 
together with A)-D), play destructive functions which deny 
hereditary right, faith in Moses and the commandment of God as 
the foundation of Moses’ authority. As for the part A) and 
hereditary right, there is no need to comment on it. It is Hobbes’s 
denial of the faith in Moses as the foundation of his authority that 
needs a close examination in comparison with De Cive. The 
section in De Cive to which the parts B) - D) to a certain extent 
correspond is Section 11 in Chapter 16 and handles the reasons 
why Hebrew people believed Moses to be a true prophet. Similarly 
to De Cive, the argument in B) - D) does not deny the fact the 
Hebrew people believed in Moses; what it denies is this faith as 
the foundation of his authority, owing to the changeable nature of 
faith. In order to understand this new view on faith as mutable 
and thus as inadequate for the foundation of authority, it is useful 
to recall how in Leviathan Hobbes treated the three foundational 
factors in De Cive for Hebrew people’s faith in Moses: miracles, 
faith in the God of Abraham, and Moses’ special status or 
unproblematic qualification as a true prophet based on Num. 12:8. 
From the viewpoint of Leviathan, all of the factors in De Cive 
were involved in supernatural phenomena. However, what 
Chapters 36 and 37 showed was that the specification of a 
phenomenon as supernatural was not, by itself, evident and 
needed attestation by natural reason. Nonetheless, as Chapter 32 
clearly illustrated, natural reason without the scriptural criterion 
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leaves people only under uncertainty, and here in the case of the 
foundation of Moses’ authority, the scriptural criterion, the 
judgement of the sovereign prophet, is not available. In this sense, 
Hebrew people’s faith in or opinion about the supernatural 
revelation to Moses was, as long as it was lacking in the 
confirmation of natural reason, uncertain and subject to change. 
   Hobbes connects the changeable character of faith or opinion in 
D) with the denial of them as the basis of Moses’ foundation in E). 
The background of the connection in Hobbes’s general scheme can 
be seen by paying attention to the function of contracts in relation 
to the construction of the state. One reason why Hobbes utilized 
the notion of contract in establishing civil society was that he saw 
mere gatherings without contracts as fragile because their 
formation relies on mere coincidence among individuals in their 
changeable conceptions of good and evil, which in turn depend on 
the human faculty of the affection.16 By comparison, alliances 
including civil societies are formed through covenants, namely, 
mutual exchanges of future rights based on the human faculty of 
the reason, and thus are more solid, because the right once 
transferred will not go back to the transferor unless any 
reasonable suspicion or fear arises.17 Thus, Hobbes’s exclusion of 
faith subject to change from the foundation of law is in accordance 
with his general theory of civil society. 
   After all these sceptical and negative arguments, Hobbes offers 
a positive foundation for the authority of Moses: the obedience of 
the Hebrews. This means that even the recognition of Moses, the 
most authoritative prophet, as a true prophet derives ultimately 
not from some divine grace but from his status as a civil sovereign, 
far beyond the expectations of Ward. Now, as suggested before, 
the implications of this new argument for the overall 
interpretation of the Bible in Leviathan are far-reaching. Each of 
                                               
16 DC, 3:31, 12:11; Lev, 22: 370. 
17 DC, 2:1, 9, 11. 
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them will be discussed in due course. This thesis will continue at 
this point by returning to the authority of the Bible in Leviathan. 
 
4.3.2.   Hobbes’s External Analysis in Chapter 33 
 
   In the investigation of contexts of Leviathan this thesis has seen 
two major approaches to biblical authority during the Civil War. 
One relies mainly on the content of the Scriptures, and the other 
on the reliability of the apostle’s account as a matter of fact. 
Compared with these and Chillingworth’s approach, that of 
Chapter 33 in Leviathan possesses two major distinctive 
characteristics. Firstly, it offers mathematical or demonstrative 
certainty which Chillingworth, Ward and Hammond found 
impossible to acquire and unreasonable to demand. In this respect, 
Hobbes’s position bears some resemblance to that of Catholics;18 
Hobbes provided the kind of certainty Knott demanded repeatedly 
and which he accused Protestants to be lacking. Hobbes and 
Catholics are also similar in turning to an external actor in the 
quest for certainty. On the other hand, Hobbes was quite different 
from Goodwin here. Though Goodwin offered various kinds of 
evidence, the content or doctrine peculiar to the Bible and 
Christian religion as internal evidence and events related to 
Christianity as external evidence, from Hobbes’s viewpoint 
Goodwin’s grounds would seem to be lacking in the certainty he 
sought. 
   This provision of mathematical certainty was not just an 
advantage of Hobbes’s argument but also something vital for him, 
complementary to his emphasis on the duty of a sceptical attitude 
towards pretended prophets. Let us remember that in the biblical 
example Hobbes mentioned in Chapter 32, only one of 400 
pretended prophets was true, that trusted prophets acquire de 
                                               
18 Malcolm, "Hobbes, Ezra, and the Bible: The History of a Subversive 
Idea," 417. 
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facto dominion over their followers, and that human beings 
naturally desire dominion. These grounds for his advocacy of 
radical scepticism in turn suggest the insufficiency of moral 
certainty. While Hammond theorised the unreasonableness of 
radically sceptical attitudes in matters of faith, Hobbes found 
them essential for discrediting and isolating the enthusiasts.19 
Hobbes demanded both radical scepticism and the kind of 
certainty which would withstand such scepticism. Here it should 
also be noted that this sceptical argument deals a serious blow to 
the factual approach. When Ward and Hammond examined the 
integrity of the apostles, one of the main factors for their 
credibility was a complete lack of gain they could obtain by telling 
lies. Yet Hobbes’s unique insight into pretenders of divine 
doctrines, by bringing light to the dominion they could acquire 
over their followers, would undermine the integrity of any such 
pretenders, including the apostles.20 
   The second feature is Hobbes’s concentration on the medium of 
revelation, especially of immediate revelation and his peculiar 
insight into its nature. This can be viewed from three perspectives. 
Firstly, it can be located in the controversy between Catholics and 
Protestants. Disputants of this controversy had already examined 
extensively the relative merits of translations and the Bible in the 
original languages, thus bringing light to uncertainties involved 
in the human transmission of the Scriptures. Goodwin in 
particular, probably based on the knowledge derived from this 
long-standing controversy, pointed out sharply that some 
elements of human hands like scribes inevitably had slipped into 
the Scriptures, including those in the original languages, in the 
process of the transmission of the Bible. What Hobbes added to it 
                                               
19 While this chapter is concerned with biblical authority, Mortimer 
examines the relationship between Hammond and Hobbes on 
ecclesiological questions. Mortimer, Reason and Religion in the English 
Revolution: The Challenge of Socinianism, 128-36. 
20 Lev, 47: 1114. 
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was not the uncertainty or difficulty as to human transmission 
from prophets or authors of the Scriptures, but the difficulty 
concerning immediate revelation which prophets and scriptural 
authors are supposed to have received. 
   Secondly, this concentration on immediate revelation 
characterises the kind of demonstration or information to which 
Hobbes paid attention. While Goodwin and Leigh picked up 
various kinds of arguments, from the viewpoint of Hobbes, 
arguments truly relevant to biblical authority would be much 
more limited than they thought. The pertinent information would 
mainly concern prophets or the equivalent to them. On the 
contrary, the spread of Christian religion after the age of apostles, 
for example, would be irrelevant. In this sense, Hobbes’s approach 
is similar to that of those who viewed the problem as factual and 
focused on apostles and their revelations or miracles. Hammond 
in particular paid special attention to divine testimonies. What 
Hobbes added to them was to extend the range of investigation 
from the apostles in the New Testament to the prophets in the Old 
Testament, covering all types of biblical revelation.  
   Thirdly, however, this factual approach would also bear serious 
problems from the standpoint of Leviathan. Apart from the 
limited moral certainty the factual approach can provide at best, 
the problem intrinsic to this approach lies in settling the matter of 
fact concerning supernatural phenomena. This can be seen most 
clearly in the different discussions of miracles between Ward or 
Hammond and Hobbes. Certainly the former group considered the 
possibility of pseudo-miracles as impostures. However, for them 
the miracles of the apostles were beyond doubt. Thus, miracles 
were an important part of their replies to scepticism. Yet for 
Hobbes the situation was completely different. Miracles, far from 
being helpful for dealing with scepticism, were something to be 
judged with deep scepticism due to the possibility of impostures 
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and their various forms.21 Moreover, the identification of miracles 
as such entails fundamental theoretical difficulties because of 
their supernatural character. Even direct eye-witnesses of 
pretended miracles cannot reach certainty in their 
identification.22 Furthermore, when it comes to the miracles of the 
apostles or prophets in the Scriptures, they cannot be seen 
directly, but are known only by the mediation of the report of the 
Scriptures.23 
   Now, this thesis will turn from these general remarks to specific 
points. Chapter 33 in Leviathan deals with topics which were 
usually thought to be related to the authority of the Bible. In this 
sense, though each of the topics Hobbes chose are not directly 
interrelated, it can be said that the main theme of this chapter is, 
broadly speaking, the authority of the Bible. One of the 
characteristics of Hobbes’s attitude in this regard is his relative 
lack of interest in human transmission. Though Hobbes took into 
consideration the possibility of the falsification of the Scriptures 
by the clergy, he briefly dismissed it.24 Nor did he consider other 
possible errors or falsifications, for example, by scribes. What he 
was interested in was the people in the position of pretended 
prophets, who in this case are the human authors of the 
Scriptures. In his investigation of the antiquity of the Scriptures, 
Hobbes tried to collect information on this. The antiquity of the 
Scriptures was also dealt with by Leigh or Goodwin in their 
defences of biblical authority. In relation to them, the significance 
of Hobbes’s argument lies in undermining some previous 
foundations for biblical authority.25 In particular, his famous 
argument about Mosaic authorship made completely ineffectual 
                                               
21 Lev, 37: 690, 92. 
22 Lev, 37: 694, 96. 
23 Cf. Lev, 37: 696. 
24 Lev, 33: 600, 2. 
25 For Hobbes and Goodwin on biblical authority, also see Coffey, John 
Goodwin and the Puritan Revolution: Religion and Intellectual Change in 
Seventeenth-Century England, 155. 
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some of Goodwin’s arguments, which proves the authority of the 
Bible by assumed Mosaic authorship. Now, let us confirm the 
precise nature of Hobbes’s originality on this topic.26  
   Firstly, before investigating the Mosaic authority seriously 
Hobbes confirms that the name of the book does not necessarily 
indicate the author.27 One of Hobbes’s grounds for undermining 
the Mosaic authority, the problematical character of the last 
chapter of Deuteronomy, was shared also by Leigh.28 However, in 
comparison with Leigh, or à Lapide, an influential writer on this 
topic, Hobbes viewed the range of interposition by later writers as 
wider, by pointing out several other passages which describe 
events after the death of Moses.29 Still, while Leigh saw the 
interposition only in the last chapter, à Lapide regarded the 
Pentateuch as the mixture of Moses’ writing with many other 
interpositions by later authors. This general theory as to the 
construction of the text is quite similar to Hobbes’s version. 
Nevertheless, firstly, Hobbes indicates the places written by later 
writers were not just interpositions but rather the main part of 
                                               
26 Curley discusses this theme in Curley, "'I Durst Not Write So Boldly': 
How to Read Hobbes’s Theological-Political Treatise," 556-71; "Hobbes and 
the Cause of Religious Toleration," in The Cambridge Companion to 
Hobbes's Leviathan, ed. Patricia Springborg (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007), 317-19. Also Bernier’s research is useful for 
understanding the relationship between Hobbes and other leading people 
in 17th century who questioned the Mosaic authorship. (Jean Bernier, La 
critique du Pentateuque de Hobbes à Calmet  (Paris: Honoré Champion, 
2010).) However, to understand the assumption of Hobbes, Maclom’s article 
remains the most valuable. (Malcolm, "Hobbes, Ezra, and the Bible: The 
History of a Subversive Idea.") What this thesis aims to clarify further than 
Malcolm is the precise relationship between ”his [Hobbes’s] particular 
arguments about the biblical text itself” and “the whole surrounding 
structure of argument” such as his epistemological analysis in Leviathan, 
with a comparative perspective of Leviathan and his earlier works. Ibid., 
428.  
27 Lev, 33: 590. 
28 Leigh, A Treatise of Divinity, 47. 
29 For à Lapide’s argument, I consulted Malcolm’s explanation. See Malcolm, 
"Hobbes, Ezra, and the Bible: The History of a Subversive Idea," 409-10. 
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the Pentateuch. Secondly, Hobbes excluded beforehand à Lapide’s 
general explanatory principle of Moses’ prophecy.30 
   In addition to antiquity, Hobbes also discussed the scope of the 
Scriptures. While Leigh or Goodwin also discussed these topics, 
the distinctive feature of Hobbes in comparison with them was his 
neglect of these discussions as a positive piece of evidence for 
biblical authority. As can be seen from the remark, “it is not the 
writer, but the authority of the Church, that maketh a Book 
Canonicall,” Hobbes was aware that grounds suitable as the 
foundation for biblical authority were limited.31 
   Similarly Hobbes paid careful attention to identifying the 
precise issue of biblical authority. 
 
It is a question much disputed between the divers sects of Christian 
Religion, From whence the Scriptures derive their Authority; which 
question is also propounded sometimes in other terms, as, How wee 
know them to be the Word of God, or Why we beleeve them to be so: 
And the difficulty of solving it, ariseth chiefly from the impropernesse 
of the words wherein the question itself is couched. For it is believed on 
all hands, that the first and originall Author of them is God; and 
consequently the question disputed, is not that. Again, it is manifest, 
that none can know they are Gods Word, (though all true Christians 
beleeve it,) but those to whom God himself hath revealed it 
supernaturally; and therefore the question is not rightly moved, of our 
Knowledge of it. Lastly, when the question is propounded of our 
Beleefe; because some are moved to beleeve for one, and others for 
other reasons, there can be rendered no one generall answer for them 
all. The question truly stated is, By what Authority they are made 
Law.32 
 
In relation to The Elements of Law, both admitted that viewing 
the Scriptures as the word of God was not in the sphere of 
                                               
30 Ibid., 410. 
31 Lev, 33: 602. 
32 Lev, 33: 604. 
140 
 
knowledge but of belief, despite their different reasons. Still, 
while The Elements was satisfied with this conclusion and then 
turned to the object of the belief, here Hobbes dares to ask the 
grounds of the belief, though he does not reach a satisfactory 
positive conclusion. This is similar to the epistemological doubt in 
Chapter 32, and this demand for grounds of articles of faith is 
characteristic of Leviathan, parallel to Goodwin or Ward. However, 
thanks to the three divisions of the ways of transmitting the 
divine word since De Cive, in Leviathan Hobbes looked more 
pointedly at the problem than, for example, Goodwin. While 
Goodwin (and Edward Leigh) distinguished the Scriptures as the 
word of God from other writings deriving from mere human 
beings, this analytical distinction becomes ineffectual when it 
comes to pretended prophets or human authors of the Scriptures. 
Though they are human beings, their word, spoken or written, is 
supposed to be the word of God. The word of prophets is both 
human and divine, and this ambivalence is the core of the 
problem from the viewpoint of Leviathan. Though Ward 
consciously paid attention to the testimony in a similar way, only 
Hobbes’s theoretical framework can explain the ground of the 
choice. 
   The lack of internal certainty or of knowledge in this argument 
is identical to Chapter 32, but in opposition to it Hobbes here 
transferred the sphere of the problem from the internal to the 
external, and found certainty in the external domain: he viewed 
the authority of the Scriptures as a matter of law. Then he took up 
the standard arguments of both Catholics and Protestants, the 
Catholic Church and the spirit as the foundation of the authority 
of the Bible, but he also mentioned the civil sovereign.33 These 
two aspects, the focus on the external as the result of internal 
                                               
33 Lev, 33: 604, 6. For a good overview of the relationship among Hobbes, 
Catholics and Protestants on this topic, see Sommerville, Thomas Hobbes: 
Political Ideas in Historical Context, 108-10. Hobbes’s view on biblical 
authority is more complicated than suggested, though. 
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uncertainty inherent in the matters of faith, and the connection 
between biblical authority with the civil sovereign and law, are 
obvious features of Leviathan. While the other people discussed in 
this thesis saw this problem mainly as that of faith, or at the 
widest of morals, Hobbes viewed this as a political problem.34 On 
the other hand, there was an aspect where the direction of 
Hobbes’s new intellectual move in Leviathan was parallel to 
Goodwin, Ward, or Hammond: the notion of the civil sovereign, as 
opposed to those of the spirit or the church, did not depend on the 
conceptual system of Christian religion, and could gain currency 
for non-Christians.  
   Among the three possibilities of the civil sovereign, the Catholic 
Church, and the spirit, what Hobbes rejected in the first place 
was the standard Protestant argument of inspiration. On the one 
hand this indicates clearly a departure from the position of De 
Cive, where the authority of the Scriptures was dependent on 
inspiration.35 On the other hand this denial of spirits as the main 
foundation for biblical authority was also seen in his 
contemporaries like Leigh, or more markedly in Ward. The reason 
for this denial too can be safely said to be almost the same for all 
the three: the emergence of the enthusiasts who depended only on 
spirits. 
   As a result, in this denial of the inspiration theory, Hobbes’s 
view is congruent with that of many Catholics.36 Moreover, 
Hobbes assumes the standard Catholic position that the 
Scriptures cannot by themselves demonstrate themselves, and 
that some external actor is necessary for the basis of biblical 
authority. Actually, the dispute between the two alternatives, the 
                                               
34 Another sign for this is that the title of Part 3 of Leviathan is “OF A 
CHRISTIAN COMMONWEALTH [italics mine];” it was not Christian 
religion, as could be directly inferred from the title of the third part of De 
Cive: religion.  
35 DC, 17:15, 16. 
36 Sommerville, Thomas Hobbes: Political Ideas in Historical Context, 108; 
Chillingworth, The Works of William Chillingworth, 1: 148.  
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Catholic Church and the civil sovereign, was not settled in this 
chapter.37 To do so, Hobbes turned to the internal argument of the 
Scriptures.38 To that extent, it was certainly necessary for Hobbes 
in Leviathan to develop the long and multi-layered interpretation 
of the Scriptures.  
 
4.3.3.  Hobbes’s Internal Analysis in Chapters 39 and 42 
 
   The philological analysis of the word “church” in Chapter 39, 
though being almost the same as that in De Cive in their 
limitation of the jurally meaningful church to the national church, 
acquires a new meaning in relation to the final judgement 
between the civil sovereign and the Catholic Church.39 It excludes 
the universal Catholic Church as the basis of biblical authority in 
every Christian country. Thus, the only possibility left is the civil 
sovereign. Nevertheless, thus far there was no argument which 
demonstrated this. This task was carried out in Chapter 42 in 
relation to the discussion of canon, and in a similar way to, and 
based on, the argument about the authority of Moses in Chapter 
40. Yet that argument should be understood in comparison with 
De Cive. 
   Though De Cive does not treat the canon squarely, there are 
some relevant sections. Discussing the time when Deuteronomy 
was rediscovered, Hobbes mentions “the authority to admit books 
as God’s Word.”40 Also, he argues that “it is not clear when the 
                                               
37 According to Malcolm, the congruence between Catholics and Hobbes was 
contingent. Malcolm, "Hobbes, Ezra, and the Bible: The History of a 
Subversive Idea," 424. So far as Hobbes and Catholics had common 
adversaries, however, their similarity can be said to be, to some extent, 
genuine. It would be more precise to say that precisely due to the similarity, 
what Hobbes aimed to settle next emerged, the competitive relationship 
between the civil sovereign and the Catholic Church about the foundation 
of biblical authority. 
38 Lev, 33: 606, 8. This combination of internal and external arguments can 
be said to have some similarities to Goodwin’s argumentation. 
39 DC, 17:19-22; Lev, 39: 730, 32, 34. 
40 DC, 16:16. 
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rest of the books of the Old Testament were first received into the 
canon,” canon being writings recognized as the word of God.41 In 
the parts about the New Testament, Hobbes looks at canon from 
different perspectives. Firstly, Hobbes uses canon not only as to 
Christian religion but also as with sciences. The canon of 
Christian religion is a “rule of Christian doctrine by which 
controversies of religion are to be settled.”42 The canons of 
sciences such as politics or history unrelated to “Mysteries of faith” 
are the true teaching of sciences.43 In addition, Hobbes connects 
the canon with the interpreter. “For scriptures to become a canon,” 
“they must have an interpreter,” because “the mind can only be 
governed by the scriptures if they are understood.”44 These views 
of canon as a rule to settle controversies or as divine truth are not 
unusual, also seen in the works of Hobbes’s contemporaries.45 
   In Leviathan, Hobbes’s redefined canon with his new analytical 
perspective. 
 
There be two senses, wherein a Writing may be said to be Canonicall; 
for Canon, signifieth a Rule; and a Rule is a Precept, by which a man is 
guided, and directed in any action whatsoever. Such Precepts, though 
given by a Teacher to his Disciple, or a Councellor to his friend, without 
power to Compell him to observe them, are nevertheless Canons; 
because they are rules: But when they are given by one, whom he that 
receiveth them is bound to obey, then are those Canons, not onely 
Rules, but Laws: The question therefore here, is of the Power to make 
the Scriptures (which are the Rules of Christian Faith) Laws.46 
 
                                               
41 DC, 16:12. 
42 DC, 17:18. 
43 DC, 17:16. 
44 DC, 17:17. 
45 Chillingworth, The Works of William Chillingworth, 129-39, 77; Leigh, A 
Treatise of Divinity, 87-88. These people usually mention canon in the 
question of which books of the Bible should be received as canon. 
46 Lev, 42: 812. 
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   There are several features in this definition of canon. Firstly, 
while in relation to sciences Hobbes in De Cive grasped canon 
from the viewpoint of the truth of the teaching, this view has 
disappeared here. In connection with this, whereas Hobbes here 
limits the use of the canon to the rule directly related to human 
action, canons as to sciences in De Cive were probably not always 
concerned with human action. Nor does he mention the 
interpreter as in De Cive. Finally and most importantly, Hobbes 
makes a new distinction in terms of law or compulsory power. 
   These changes are related to Hobbes’s treatment of 
supernatural matters and biblical authority in Leviathan. What 
Chapters 32 and 33 made clear was a lack of internal certainty, or 
impossibility of reaching the definite truth, concerning 
supernatural revelation in general. Therefore, it would not be 
appropriate to compare canons in Christian religion to the true 
and certain teaching of sciences. Then in Chapter 33, as a result 
of the internal uncertainty, Hobbes transferred the sphere of the 
problem from the internal to the external and law. Here Hobbes 
similarly considers the Scriptures as canon in terms of law. 
Obeying the Bible as law means to speak as commanded and live 
according to the law, the Bible, without contradicting it.47 This 
amounts to admitting the Scriptures as true so far as external 
action is concerned, and to that extent, this new definition of 
canon is still implicitly connected with the notion of truth. Also, to 
the extent that biblical authority is concerned only with the 
external, interpreters helping people to understand the Scriptures 
are not always necessary. In fact, the notion of the supernatural 
in Leviathan was something people could not have conceptions 
about, and to that extent, incomprehensible.48 What Hobbes 
attached importance to in Leviathan for the religious canon were 
                                               
47 Lev, 32: 578. 
48 Ibid. 
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not interpreters who help people understanding it in their mind 
but actors who make people behave according to the canon. 
   Based on this refinement of the conception of canon, Hobbes also 
began to see as problematic the reception as canon not only of the 
rediscovered books in the age of the Kings but also of the Ten 
Commandments and Deuteronomy in the age of Moses, while in 
De Cive he did not question the status of Deuteronomy as the 
word of God.49 The reasoning supporting the Ten Commandments 
and Deuteronomy as the written word of God is almost the same 
as that about the foundation of Moses’ authority: the difficulty or 
impossibility of meeting the condition of the obligation of the law, 
public announcement, in the case of the positive law of God, 
except for the promise of the obedience to the prophets 
beforehand.50 Thus Hobbes viewed Moses and his successors as 
the basis of biblical authority. Then, Hobbes reminded us of the 
conclusion of the discussion about the authority of Moses that 
Moses and his successors were civil sovereigns.51 This suggests 
that although the structures of the two demonstrations were 
similar, it was necessary for Hobbes to show in advance that 
Moses and the like were civil sovereigns. In this way Hobbes at 
last based the obligatory power of the written word of God on the 
civil sovereign.  
   This new basis of the obligatory written word of God on the civil 
sovereign, in turn, has several implications. Firstly, it will enable 
Hobbes later to connect the age of Moses with his own age 
chronologically without interruption. Secondly and much more 
importantly, this new argument leads to the change from De Cive 
in Hobbes’s political conclusion about the right to interpret the 
Scriptures. When Hobbes divided natural and supernatural 
                                               
49 Lev, 42: 812. 
50 Lev, 42: 814, 16, 18. Fukuoka, State, Church and Liberty: A Comparison 
between Spinoza's and Hobbes's Interpretations of the Old Testament, 223-
31. 
51 Lev, 42: 814. 
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matters in De Cive, he understood supernatural phenomena or 
doctrines as those which “can be known” “only by divine 
revelation.”52 Therefore, the “knowledge” or the acknowledgement 
of the truth of supernatural phenomena in the Bible depended on 
its nature as the word of God, without regard to the civil 
sovereign. In Leviathan, however, only the civil sovereign could 
oblige the subjects to grant the Scriptures as the word of God. 
Hence, it is no wonder that Leviathan concluded that it was the 
civil sovereign who had the right to interpret the Scriptures 
including supernatural phenomena in them. Closely related to 
this change of the political conclusion is another new treatment 
by Hobbes of “supernatural” matters in De Cive, his eschatological 
discussion in Chapter 38. This aspect will be explored further in 
the next section. 
 
4.3.4.  Natural Reason, Authorisation and the “Divine” 
Authority of the Scriptures: Some Implications for 
Hobbes’s Eschatology in Chapter 38 
 
   Although Hobbes’s eschatology in Leviathan has been known as 
one of his most idiosyncratic Christian doctrines, it has not been 
realized that this eschatology treats matters regarded as 
“supernatural” or spiritual and thus beyond the sphere of 
philosophy in De Cive.53 However, what should be asked next is 
what made this change possible. It is certain that this 
eschatological investigation is similar to the analysis of 
supernatural revelation through angels and spirits in Chapters 
34-36 in the diminution from De Cive of the sphere of the 
supernatural. Yet the nature of the investigation of the afterlife in 
                                               
52 DC, 17:17. 
53 DC, 17:13. See also DC, 17:28. 
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Chapter 38 is obviously different from that in earlier chapters, 
and thus a different explanation is necessary.54 
   One explanation of things spiritual in De Cive is that they 
“mean things which have their foundation in the authority and 
office of Christ and could not be known if Christ had not taught 
them.”55 When Hobbes contrasted two ways of teaching natural 
laws, he made a similar and suggestive contrast between 
knowledge based on natural reason and one based on divine 
authority.56 To give an answer to our question here, in Leviathan 
this distinct contrast between natural reason and divine authority 
suffered a dramatic change, which offered Hobbes theoretical 
foundations for his eschatological argument. 
   The authority and office of Christ is part of Christian doctrine, 
but as Hobbes suggests in Chapter 43, the foundation or “most 
ordinary immediate cause” of the belief in Christian doctrine 
comes down to the divine authority of the Scriptures.57 This point 
needs some amplification in relation to his earlier works. While in 
The Elements of Law biblical authority relied on the faith in the 
church, in De Cive the fundamental article of faith was dealt with 
differently from Hobbes’s other works. Although people today 
learn this article from teachers, “it does not follow that they are 
relying on teachers or on a Church for that article; rather they are 
relying on Jesus himself. For that Article came before the 
Christian Church, even if all the rest came later. And the Church 
is founded on the Article, not the other way around.”58 Here Jesus 
                                               
54 See also 4.2. in this thesis, esp. note 28. 
55 DC, 17:14. 
56 One way was to teach them “as theorems, through natural reason, 
deducing natural right and natural laws from human principles and human 
contracts.” (DC, 17:13.) The other was to teach them as “laws, by divine 
authority, revealing such-and-such is the will of God; this form of teaching 
is only appropriate to one to whom God’s will is supernaturally known, i.e. 
to Christ.” Ibid. 
57 Lev, 43: 934. 
58 DC, 18:9. This position is not incompatible with The Elements of Law. 
After all, when following the churchmen’s judgement was recommended in 
it, the fundamental article of faith was excluded from this category. EL, 
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Christ is looked upon as the logical and chronological antecedent 
of the church. However, in Leviathan this exceptional position of 
the fundamental article of faith disappeared. This change was 
probably connected with that epistemological doubt, special to 
Leviathan, of pretended prophets or people in the position of 
prophets like the apostles, which made it substantially impossible 
for ordinary people to trace back beyond prophets or the apostles 
to God or Christ. While true prophets or the apostles believed in 
God or Christ, other people depended on the apostles or biblical 
authority for their belief in Christian doctrines, including the 
fundamental article.59 
   To return to the main argument, the authority of the Bible as 
the basis of faith in Christian doctrine in turn proves to depend on 
the civil sovereign in Leviathan. Now, while in De Cive Hobbes 
referred to the authority of the civil sovereign several times, he 
did not connect it with the divine authority of Christ, nor clarified 
how it came about. The notion of authorisation peculiar to 
Leviathan supplies the explanation as to the birth of the authority 
of the civil sovereign, thus in the end destroying the dichotomy 
between authority and natural reason in De Cive.60 
                                                                                                                       
1:11:10. 
59 Lev, 43: 932, 34. 
60 The authorisation or representation theory has been well-known as one 
of the distinctive characteristics of Leviathan. Skinner places this new 
feature in the civil controversy during the Civil War. Quentin Skinner, 
"Hobbes on Representation," European Journal of Philosophy 13, no. 2 
(2005); "Hobbes on Persons, Authors and Representatives," in The 
Cambridge Companion to Hobbes's Leviathan, ed. Patricia Springborg 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). Malcolm takes a similar 
view. Hobbes, Leviathan, 15-17, 19-20, 23. 
   As for the implication of the representation theory in Chapter 16 for 
religious matters, Vieira discusses the doctrine of the Trinity. (For Hobbes 
in the controversy over the Trinity during the Civil War, see Mortimer, 
Reason and Religion in the English Revolution: The Challenge of 
Socinianism, 149-74, esp. 55-57.) From our perspective, the question to be 
asked is why Hobbes developed the representation theory for the first time 
in Leviathan. In relation to this question, what should be added to our 
main text is that the representation theory is quite suitable for analysing in 
a wider perspective the problem of pretended prophets peculiar to 
Leviathan, because prophets, true or false, say in the name of God. Lev, 16: 
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   What Hobbes did with the authorisation theory in Leviathan 
was to divert the usage in De Cive of the authority of sovereign 
power to creating and explaining the authority of the civil 
sovereign itself. In the civil part of De Cive, Hobbes used this 
concept when he supposed a country where the civil sovereign was 
content to “appoint magistrates and public ministers, i.e. to have 
authority without executive power.”61 In this case, authority 
concerned the ground of ministers’ claim to execute and 
administer public affairs in place of the sovereign. Hobbes also 
referred to this type of the state in the distinction between the 
right and the exercise of sovereign power. The sovereigns, 
retaining their right, can exercise their power through counsellors 
and advisors they appoint.62 In this parallel case, the authority in 
the former example is seen as right as opposed to the exercise of 
right. In Leviathan, thanks to the authorisation theory, this 
authority of the civil sovereign turned out to arise from 
individuals in the state of nature through the contract between 
individuals.63 This contract was a matter of natural reason, a 
special type of contract specified in natural law. This means that 
the authority of civil sovereign, and more importantly the divine 
authority of Christ based on it, became something with its 
rational grounds, and thus within the sphere of natural reason. It 
was this that was the theoretical background for the eschatology 
in Chapter 38 of Leviathan, a supernatural matter in De Cive.  
   Finally, this chapter concludes by pointing out another profound 
significance of this change. Authority, especially divine authority, 
signified usually some external principle which required people to 
obey it without showing the ground of obedience. Leigh’s use of 
                                                                                                                       
248; Mónica Alexandra Brito Vieira, The Elements of Representation in 
Hobbes: Aesthetics, Theatre, Law, and Theology in the Construction of 
Hobbes’s Theory of the State  (Cambridge: University of Cambridge, 2005), 
209-33.  
61 DC, 10:15. 
62 DC, 13:1. 
63 Lev, 16: 244; 17: 260. 
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authority provides a good example. The Bible “speaks not as men; 
it simply affirmes all things without proofe; other authors use 
many arguments to confirme the truth of what they say…. He 
who speaketh in the Bible is of that authority, that his bare word 
ought to be believed without any proofe.”64 Even in the case of 
Chillingworth, a person well-known for advocating the use of 
reason in religious matters, the authority of universal tradition as 
one of the foundations for biblical authority could look like 
something which defied further explanation; he put forward this 
authority as an alternative to the authority of the Catholic 
Church when Knott presented authority, as opposed to reason, as 
something to be followed.65 De Cive, as has just been seen in this 
section, also retained this concept of authority in its use of divine 
authority. Taylor was probably the first person to challenge this 
dichotomy, but he did not treat the authority of the Bible. 
However, if our interpretation is valid, in Leviathan for the first 
time, authority, including divine authority and biblical authority, 
lost its external nature with lack of grounds of obedience, turning 
into an internal principle characterised by rational grounds of 
obedience in each person, while still maintaining its obligatory 
and imperative character.66 Here it is possible to see one of the 
                                               
64 Leigh, A Treatise of Divinity, 14. In relation to this, Leigh accuses 
rationalism of Socinianism. This indicates that one of the main causes of 
Socinianism’s notoriety is concerned with its relation to divine authority. 
65 Chillingworth, The Works of William Chillingworth, 1: 238. For the 
opposition between reason and authority, also see Trevor-Roper, "The Great 
Tew Circle," 200, 29-30. 
   Again, Hammond asserts that as for supernatural things human reason 
can only confirm that they come “to me from authority, that I have no 
reason to suspect, but, on the contrary, concurrence of all reasons to be 
persuaded by it.” Here also authority is regarded as something which defies 
reason. Hammond, The Miscellaneous Theological Works, 33. 
66 Hobbes’s treatment of biblical authority is worth contrasting with 
Spinoza. For the limitation of the sphere of authority within the Scriptures 
set by Spinoza as opposed to Hobbes, who saw biblical authority as a whole, 
see Fukuoka, State, Church and Liberty: A Comparison between Spinoza's 
and Hobbes's Interpretations of the Old Testament, 401-35. Nevertheless, 
we do not agree with her suggestion that Hobbes took sides with the 
dichotomy between demonstration by reason and blind obedience. (Ibid., 
424.) For this comparative theme, see also Curley, "'I Durst Not Write So 
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chief and specific contributions of Leviathan to the development of 
reasonable Christianity in England, or more broadly to the 
Enlightenment.67 
 
                                                                                                                       
Boldly': How to Read Hobbes’s Theological-Political Treatise," 556-71. 
67 For the Restoration consensus on the value of reasonable religion, and 
rational defences of religion in the period, see John Spurr, "'Rational 
Religion' in Restoration England," Journal of the History of Ideas 49, no. 4 
(1988). It seems more fruitful to discuss the relationship between Hobbes 
and reasonable religion or Christianity than between Hobbes and 
secularisation. 
   This can be seen as one of the crucial stepping stones of Beiser’s story of 
how reason came to have priority over other proposed rules of faith or 
criteria of religious knowledge, - tradition, the Scriptures, and inspiration, - 
until in the age of Enlightenment reason had complete jurisdiction over 
faith. Beiser, The Sovereignty of Reason: The Defense of Rationality in the 
Early English Enlightenment. 
   In the ancient world, the notion of divine authority was dealt with as 
early as the period of Homer; Homeric gods with their bodies were 
pluralistic. It might be said that, so far as divine authority was concerned, 
only at the stage of Leviathan did the modern world catch up with that of 
Homer in the ancient world. 
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4.4. Practical Conclusions about Religious Liberty 
and Authority in Leviathan                       
 
4.4.1. Hobbes’s Defence of Both Private Minimal Liberty 
and Public Authority (Even “in Error”) 
 
   One of the characteristics of Leviathan is that Hobbes began to 
uphold the liberty of conscience in one way or another. In The 
Elements of Law Hobbes already knew the claim for liberty of 
conscience and dealt with it mainly with his theory of the minimal 
fundamental article of faith.1 Yet neither in The Elements of Law 
nor in De Cive did Hobbes defend it from the viewpoint of private 
citizens. He viewed this issue from the perspective of the 
sovereign. “No human law is intended to oblige the conscience of a 
man, but the actions only,” and laws obliging the conscience, if any, 
“would be of no effect.”2 Hobbes also paid attention to the possible 
disruptive effect of this claim, removing the danger in the 
assertion that “whatsoever a man does against his Conscience, is 
Sinne,” one of the typical arguments of tolerationists.3 When 
Hobbes considered this issue from the standpoint of private 
citizens, he transformed the problem of liberty of conscience into 
the condition of salvation.4 The fundamental article of faith as 
belief in Jesus Christ was Hobbes’s main answer to “the scruple of 
conscience that may arise concerning obedience to human laws” in 
The Elements of Law.5  
                                               
1 See 3.2. in this thesis. 
2 EL, 2:6:3. 
3 EL, 2:6:12; DC, 12:2; Lev, 29: 502. In Leviathan, Hobbes regarded this 
opinion itself as seditious, while in his earlier works he was softer on this 
idea, only refuting its particular version. He also changed the way of 
refutation in Leviathan, appealing to the possibility of errors of conscience, 
a typical topic in the toleration controversy.  
4 EL, 2:6:2-5. 
5 EL, 2:6:12. 
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   More fundamentally, however, he was sceptical of the sincerity 
of the demand for liberty of conscience. 
 
The truth is apparent, by continual experience, that men seek not only 
liberty of conscience, but of their actions; nor that only, but a farther 
liberty of persuading others to their opinions; nor that only for every 
man desireth, that the sovereign authority should admit no other 
opinions to be maintained but such as he himself holdeth.6  
 
This view on the allegation of liberty of conscience can be seen as 
a parallel version of his opinion that people demanding liberty are 
in fact desiring dominion in the name of liberty.7 When Hobbes 
said this, he had in mind Presbyterians as one of the proponents,8 
and certainly this view explains well what Presbyterians did and 
aimed at in the 1640s.9 However, it does not account for the plea 
of tolerationists, both Independents and sectaries, for the 
coexistence of contradictory and opposing opinions among 
Puritans. Though the leaders of the Parliamentary army, powerful 
patrons of Independency, held political power in the three 
kingdoms, and the conservative Independents such as John Owen 
became the new establishment in the 1650s, they did not impose 
their own religious doctrines on other orthodox Puritans, and the 
penalty for not attending the established Church was repealed in 
1650.10 This new phenomenon probably pressed Hobbes to give a 
                                               
6 EL, 2:6:13. 
7 DC, 10:8. 
8 EL, 2:6:13. 
9 See a parallel example, in On Liberty written by Mill, of progressive 
thinkers “who preferred endeavouring to alter the feelings of mankind on 
the particular points on which they were themselves heretical, rather than 
make common cause in defence of freedom, with heretics generally.” John 
Stuart Mill, On Liberty and Other Essays, ed. John Gray (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008), 11. (Of course, progressive thinkers did not have 
recourse to the use of violence, as opposed to the Presbyterians in the Civil 
War.) Following that, Mill mentions the only exception, the case for freedom 
of conscience. Ibid., 11-12. 
10 Coffey, "The Toleration Controversy during the English Revolution," 48-
52. 
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second thought to the problem of liberty of conscience in 
Leviathan. 
   In Leviathan, although Hobbes was as earnest about defending 
the right of the civil sovereign as in his former works, he began to 
emphasise that private citizens retained the minimal internal 
liberty of conscience even when they obeyed the civil sovereign, 
and to uphold its value.11 In many cases this was related to 
Hobbes’s new endorsement of the use of natural reason as the 
principal measure to prevent domination on the pretext of the 
word of God. 
   One such example is located near the end of his discussion of 
miracles. Although citizens have to obey the judgement of the civil 
sovereign about the truth of pretended miracles and to confess so, 
“a private man has alwaies the liberty, (because thought is free,) 
to beleeve, or not beleeve in his heart, those acts that have been 
given out for Miracles, according as he shall see …, and conjecture, 
whether they be Miracles, or Lies.”12 Thus Hobbes makes it clear 
that taking a critical attitude and exercising their individual 
judgement internally is still allowed. The balance between the 
duty of individual judgement and of obedience came to the fore for 
the first time in Leviathan, due to Hobbes’s new encouragement of 
the use of natural reason. 
   This private internal liberty of exercising individual judgement 
and reason is also implicitly supported by Hobbes’s epistemology. 
“Sense, Memory, Understanding, Reason and Opinion are not in 
our power to change; but alwaies, and necessarily such, as the 
things we see, hear, and consider suggest unto us.”13 This 
assertion is based on the sophisticated epistemology in Part 1 of 
Leviathan. Although The Elements of Law already included a 
                                               
11 For a similar insistence, see Collins, The Allegiance of Thomas Hobbes, 
123-4.  
12 Lev, 37: 696. 
13 “And therefore [they] are not effects of our Will, but our Will of them.” 
Lev, 32: 578. 
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sufficiently refined epistemology,14 this explicit remark was again 
unique to Leviathan. Now, the impossibility of changing our 
opinions was often claimed by tolerationists, but at the same time 
it was denied by some opponents of toleration like William 
Prynne.15 In this controversy, Hobbes’s philosophy offered refined 
theoretical foundations for one of the cases for toleration.  
   The most remarkable argument Hobbes developed for the first 
time in Leviathan to maintain the balance between private 
minimal liberty and public authority concerns the so-called liberty 
of Naaman. It attempts to resolve the difficult problem of how 
Christian citizens should obey heathen kings. One of the 
characteristics of Leviathan is that Hobbes developed greatly the 
discussion about the relationship between Christians and 
heathens or non-Christians. However at first sight, this feature is 
bizarre, because the heathens in Hobbes’s age were of little 
political consequence. The religious war or controversies were 
mainly conducted among Christians, not between Christians and 
heathens.  
   One effective way to find the political significance in the new 
arguments is to read them in the light of the toleration 
controversy. For the parties concerned, toleration usually means 
toleration of false religion, or abstaining from doing violence to 
people who embrace false religion or heretical opinions. Here the 
                                               
14 EL, 1:12:5, 6. 
15 William Prynne, The Sword of Christian Magistracy Supported: Or a Full 
Vindication of Christian Kings and Magistrates Authority under the 
Gospell, to Punish Idolatry, Apostacy, Heresie, Blasphemy, and Obstinate 
Schism, with Pecuniary, Corporall, and in Some Cases with Banishment, 
and Capitall Punishments. Wherein This Their Jurisdiction Is Cleared, 
Asserted, by Arguments, Proofs, from the Old and New Testament; by the 
Laws, and Practise of Godly Christian Emperors, Kings, States, 
Magistrates; the Common and Statute Laws of England; the Consent of the 
Best Ancient and Modern Authors of All Sorts; and the Most Materiall 
Objections to the Contrary, Made by Donatists, Anabaptists, Independents, 
and Mr William Dell in His Late Fast-Sermon, Fully Answered and Refuted.  
(London: Printed by John Macock for John Bellamie, 1647), 106.  
   For this dispute in the Restoration period, see Goldie, "The Theory of 
Religious Intolerance in Restoration England." 
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attitude towards the heathen can be a chief touchstone, because 
in this case two major cases for toleration are not available. One 
is to point out the possibility of misjudgement of false opinions. 
This tactic often used by tolerationists like Goodwin is 
inappropriate here; after all, there is no doubt that heathens’ 
beliefs are false for Christians. The other major argument for 
toleration is the distinction between fundamental and non-
fundamental matters. This distinction meant that errors about 
non-fundamental issues are not so significant nor concerned with 
the salvation of people in error. However, again as with heathens 
the appeal for toleration based on this distinction is unavailable. 
Therefore, the discussion about how to deal with heathens can be 
seen as an effective yardstick of toleration, or otherwise it is 
difficult to find here any political significance for the England in 
the Civil War. 
   In the case of the liberty of Naaman, Hobbes’s concern with 
toleration is more obvious; he entitles the section “What 
Christians may do to avoid persecution.”16 He begins this section 
by supposing the hypothetical case where the sovereigns did their 
best to force their Christian subjects to deny true religion, 
commanding the verbal denial of Jesus Christ. Hobbes’s position 
was that subjects had to obey the command and confess what they 
believed to be false in their heart.  
   This position looks like a natural consequence of Hobbes’s 
Erastianism. Certainly part of his reasoning in it, or at least its 
similar versions, can also be found in The Elements of Law or De 
Cive.17 In his earlier works, however, it is doubtful, to say the 
least, whether Hobbes held this opinion. In The Elements of Law, 
Hobbes remarks that “the actions we are forbidden to obey them 
in, are only such as imply a denial of that faith which is necessary 
                                               
16 Lev, 42: 784. 
17 EL, 2:6:3; DC, 12:2. 
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to our salvation.”18 Although this assertion is meant to persuade 
people to obey Christian doctrines established by the sovereign 
apart from the only fundamental article of faith, this assertion 
does suggest that Christians are forbidden to do anything which 
may imply denying the fundament article, which is contradictory 
to the position in Leviathan. Yet it should also be noted about this 
remark that Hobbes did not discuss the case of heathen kings in 
The Elements of Law, though he mentioned the case of both 
Christian and heathen kings.19 In De Cive Hobbes dealt with this 
pitfall in his brief discussion about the case of Christians under 
heathen kings in the second last section.20 Here again, however, 
Hobbes assumes there are some cases where Christians cannot 
obey the command of heathen kings. Christians are obliged to 
follow “some Church of Christians” concerning supernatural 
matters. Although it is not clear whether Hobbes took into 
consideration the fundamental article of faith in making the 
distinction between temporal and spiritual matters, this article of 
faith would surely be a spiritual matter, and not a temporal one. 
It follows then that in De Cive too, Hobbes held a position 
different from that in Leviathan. It is true that in De Cive Hobbes 
began to distinguish internal faith from external profession as he 
did in Leviathan.21 Nevertheless, this distinction was used for 
justifying the duty of external obedience or profession about non-
fundamental matters, and the case about non-fundamental 
matters was separated from the fundamental article, which was 
not about obedience but about faith.22 
   Thus, the position in Leviathan is not so obvious even in view of 
Hobbes’s Erastianism. What Hobbes clarified in Leviathan was 
that the duty of external obedience or profession was concerned 
                                               
18 EL, 2:6:5. 
19 EL, 2:6:4. 
20 DC, 18:13. 
21 DC, 18:4; Lev, 42: 784. 
22 DC, 18:6. 
158 
 
not only with non-fundamental matters but also with the 
fundamental article of faith. This subtle change is related to his 
new attention to the possible case of Muslims in Christian states, 
as will be shown soon.  
   Now, this new attention, and the other new argument about 
Naaman, can be grasped in specific political contexts, that is to 
say, in relation to Hobbes’s increasing concern with the people’s 
demand for truth, which is presented in the conclusion of 
Leviathan.23 The remark in the conclusion in turn can be 
associated with the activity of Puritans. They fought for the sake 
of true religion, finding intolerable Laud’s attempt to impose on 
them “false” religion. Hobbes replies to this type of concern with 
the duty to preserve religious truth by citing 2 Kings 5:17-19.24 
Naaman says,  
 
Thy servant will henceforth offer neither burnt offering, nor sacrifice 
unto other Gods but unto the Lord. In this thing the Lord pardon thy 
servant, that when my Master goeth into the house of Rimmon to 
worthip there, and he leaneth on my hand; and I bow my selfe in the 
house of Rimmon; when I bow my selfe in the house of Rimmon, the 
Lord pardon they servant in this thing. This the Prophet approved, and 
bid him Goe in peace. Here Naaman beleeved in his heart; but by 
bowing before the Idol Rimmon, he denyed the true God in effect, as 
much as if he had done it with his lips.25 
 
Hobbes’s interpretation in the first place clarifies the heart of the 
matter by characterising Rimmon and the Lord in the text as “the 
Idol Rimmon” and “the true God.” Then Hobbes transforms 
bowing into the general formulation of the denial of the true God. 
This generalisation enables Hobbes to apply the general theme to 
                                               
23 Lev, conclusion: 1139. 
24 Not only Hobbes but also other defenders of conformity in the age often 
referred to this example of Naaman. Walsham, Charitable Hatred: 
Tolerance and Intolerance in England, 1500-1700, 200. 
25 Lev, 42: 784. 
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any other cases, here the denial by profession.26 In this way 
Hobbes vindicated the liberty to deny the true God externally in 
obeying the civil sovereign.27 One of the features of this liberty of 
Naaman in Leviathan is its focus on religious truth, because in 
Hobbes’s earlier works the fundamental article of faith was 
always grasped in relation to salvation. Also, this argument is not 
concerned with the efficacy of the command of the sovereign as in 
his earlier works but with the right of Christian citizens.  
   After supporting the liberty of Naaman by rational grounds and 
by scriptural citation, Hobbes concludes this topic with another 
remarkable argument which again reveals his increasing concern 
with religious truth as an issue by itself. 
 
If any man shall accuse this doctrine, as repugnant to true, and 
unfeigned Christianity; I ask him, in case there should be a subject in 
any Christian Common-wealth, that should be inwardly in his heart of 
the Mahometan Religion, whether if his Soveraign command him to 
bee present at the divine service of the Christian Church, and that on 
pain of death, he think that Mahometan obliged in conscience to suffer 
death for that cause, rather than to obey that command of his lawfull 
Prince. If he say, he ought rather to suffer death, then he authorizeth 
all private men, to disobey their Princes, in maintenance of their 
Religion, true, or false: if he say, he ought to bee obedient, then he 
alloweth to himself, that which hee denyeth to another,28 contrary to 
the words of our Saviour… and contrary to the Law of Nature.29 
 
                                               
26 Similarly in his preceding reasoning Hobbes saw profession with the 
tongues as an example of external obedience. Ibid. 
27 It seems that the liberty of Naaman is more concerned with the liberty to 
deny true religion externally than with the minimal internal liberty, which 
Fukuoka suggests. Fukuoka, State, Church and Liberty: A Comparison 
between Spinoza's and Hobbes's Interpretations of the Old Testament, 442-
44. 
28 That is to say, to suffer death or to disobey the civil sovereign for “true” 
religion. This expression gives a clue to what type of people Hobbes had in 
mind. In the English context, they would with little doubt signify non-
conformist Puritans.  
29 Lev, 42: 786. 
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   This striking argument deserves detailed commentary. First of 
all, this reasoning nullifies the notion of war for true religion. Just 
as for Muslims Christian religion was a false religion, so for 
Puritans the Anglican Church during the 1630s or later was a 
false religion. Puritans fought against the Royalists precisely 
because the truth of religion was so vital for them. However, if to 
fight or “disobey” for what is really a false religion but is thought 
to be a true one is allowed or authorised based on Hobbes’s 
reasoning, this will also threaten the maintenance of true religion, 
which Puritans cherished. Moreover, the hypothetical situation in 
this argument is reminiscent of the difficult situation in which 
Puritans were placed due to the Laudian crackdown during the 
1630s and wavered between conformity and disobedience. What 
Hobbes’s argument reveals is that the nonconformist mentality of 
Puritans in this period cannot be distinguished from the 
maintenance of false religions. 
   Second, this discussion reveals the direction of the intellectual 
development from De Cive to Leviathan: Hobbes’s deeper 
consideration of Christianity as a positive religion. The cited 
argument can be interpreted as a case where Hobbes considers 
the relationship between Christianity and other positive religions; 
Islam, the only powerful religion other than Christianity known 
at the time, can be seen as an example of a positive religion other 
than Christianity. This new concern is parallel to the 
consideration of the authority of the Scriptures. It is 
characteristic of Leviathan to examine the foundations of 
Christianity as a positive religion. 
   Third, if Islam as such is paid attention to and not seen as an 
example of positive religion, the way Hobbes mentions it has an 
implication in relation to the common notion about it. Generally 
speaking, English people of the era viewed Muslims as ferocious 
enemies of Christianity, eager to attack and destroy pure and 
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uncorrupted Christianity or Protestantism, similar to Catholics.30  
Yet Hobbes’s argument reveals that if any Muslim were to live in 
England, it would be Christians themselves that imposed their 
religion on Muslims.  
   Fourth and finally, tolerationists often accused hypocrisy which 
resulted from enforced conformity and appealed to the value of 
honesty. Against this background, Hobbes’s argument implies that 
unless toleration is extended to the heathen, this case for 
toleration is self-contradictory. If this accusation of hypocrisy is to 
be consistent, then the separation of state and church, and the 
complete abolition of religion as law will be necessary. 
   As for hypocrisy, Hobbes himself had his own notion of 
hypocritical Christians. After arguing that professed Christians 
are not liable to excommunication, Hobbes refers to the situation 
where their hypocrisy comes to light. It “will appear in his 
manners,” when their “behaviour bee contrary to the law of his 
Soveraign, which is the rule of Manners and which Christ and his 
Apostles have commanded us to be subject to.”31 This remark 
implies that Puritan tolerationists who often denounced hypocrisy 
were, for Hobbes, themselves hypocrites and no more than 
professed Christians. 
   The mention of “to suffer death” in the previous citation 
connects the topic about the liberty of Naaman with the next one, 
martyrdom. The ordinary image of martyrdom was to suffer from 
persecution and in some cases die for the truth of religion. 
Therefore martyrdom was one of the topics related to toleration, 
which was also one of the topics Hobbes extended greatly in 
Leviathan. In De Cive, Hobbes mentioned martyrdom only briefly 
                                               
30 N. I. Matar, Islam in Britain, 1558-1685  (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998), 154-59. 
31 Lev, 42: 804. 
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in the conclusion about how to obey the heathen king. 32 He 
presented martyrdom as an alternative to resistance for the 
Christians who could not obey the heathen king, a help for peace. 
On the other hand, in Leviathan Hobbes paid attention to the 
honour martyrdom gave to those who died as a result of their 
disobedience.33 Thus martyrdom had possibly dangerous 
implications. The honourable notion of martyrdom could be a 
discouragement to obeying the command of the civil sovereign for 
the sake of true religion.34 In the context of the Civil War, John 
Goodwin, for example, in his famous justification for the 
Parliamentarian cause, broadened the notion of martyrdom so 
that the Parliamentarians fighting against the Royalists could be 
included in the category of martyrs.35 Even before the war, 
Puritans who were punished under the Laudian regime were 
viewed as martyrs and attracted people’s sympathy.36 
   Thus Hobbes’s aim in giving a fresh analysis of martyrdom was 
to make martyrdom as irrelevant to the contemporary English 
context as possible.37 Here what should be paid attention to is not 
what a martyr was for Hobbes but what it was not. After limiting 
the martyr to those who died for the fundamental article, Hobbes 
notes, “To die for every tenet that serveth the ambition, or profit 
of the Clergy, is not required; nor is it the Death of the Witnesse, 
                                               
32 DC, 18:13. 
33 Lev, 42; 788. 
34 As Gregory points out, generally speaking, martyrdom had the effect of 
amplifying pre-existing dissonance and stimulating antagonism among 
Christian parties. Brad S. Gregory, Salvation at Stake: Christian 
Martyrdom in Early Modern Europe  (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 2004), 7. 
35 Goodwin, Anti-Cavalierisme, 34-36. 
36 Coffey, Persecution and Toleration in Protestant England, 1558-1689, 129. 
This understanding was influenced by Foxe’s Acts and Monuments, one of 
the most influential works in the early modern England. For the reception 
of this work, see John N. King, Foxe's Book of Martyrs and Early Modern 
Print Culture  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 267-315. 
37 At the same time, the scope of Hobbes’s argument can extend to early 
modern Europe as a whole. For a valuable study of martyrdom in cross-
confessional context, see Gregory, Salvation at Stake: Christian Martyrdom 
in Early Modern Europe. 
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but the Testimony it self that makes the Martyr.”38  This suggests 
Hobbes’s dim view of so-called articles of faith other than the 
fundamental one of faith in Jesus Christ, and is in accordance 
with his defence of mutual toleration, which will be discussed in 
the next section. Hobbes specifies martyrs in another way too. As 
a corollary to the above limitation, Hobbes also characterises 
martyrs as those who try to convert the infidels. Christ “sent not 
all that beleeved: And he sent them to unbeleevers; I send you 
(saith he) as sheep amongst wolves; not as sheep to other sheep.”39 
This remark makes martyrdom almost completely irrelevant to 
the English context in Hobbes’s time. This notion of martyrdom 
was perhaps implicit in De Cive, where Hobbes mentioned it only 
in relation to Christians under heathen kings,40 but it should also 
be noted that in it he did not explicitly deny the relevance of 
martyrdom among Christians.  
   These discussions of the liberty of Naaman and martyrdom 
prepare for the new conclusion in Leviathan about the duty of 
Christian citizens under heathen kings, or about toleration of the 
“erroneous” sovereign.41 In De Cive, Christian citizens were 
obliged to obey the command of the church about spiritual 
matters and to disobey heathen kings in some cases.42 However, 
in Leviathan, apart from the abolition of the distinction between 
the spiritual and temporal, the liberty of Naaman enabled Hobbes 
to give Christian citizens under heathen kings the liberty to deny 
Christ externally in obeying the command of heathen kings.43 
Therefore, Christians could choose to live peacefully in the 
                                               
38 Lev, 42: 788. 
39 Ibid. Hobbes refers to Matt. 10:16 or Luke 10:3. The note in the Geneva 
Bible says, “Not revenging wrong, much lesse doing wrong.” The note in the 
Beza translation interprets in a similar way. Hobbes does not read in it a 
general command but pays more attention to the specific context of the 
word of Christ. 
40 DC, 18:13. 
41 For this change, also see Sommerville, Thomas Hobbes: Political Ideas in 
Historical Context, 125-26. 
42 DC, 18:13. 
43 Lev, 43: 954. 
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country of any false religion. Also, the new discussion of 
martyrdom limited the case to the fundamental article of faith. 
Apart from this article, Christian citizens did not need to put 
their lives in danger for the sake of the honour of the martyr. 
   Hobbes expresses the same opinion in challenging Bellarmine’s 
opposite idea that “it is not lawfull for Christians to tolerate an 
Infidel, or Haereticall King, in case he endeavour to draw them to 
his Haeresie, or Infidelity.”44 As is often pointed out, by refuting 
the most extreme Catholic position like this Hobbes at the same 
time dealt with Puritan justifications of war.45 
   Before turning to the Christian sovereign, the significance of the 
conversion of the civil sovereign should be examined. This was not 
only a topic specific to Leviathan, but also one of the controversial 
points in the toleration controversy. John Goodwin, in his 
refutation of the sovereign power over religion, denied that the 
heathen sovereign acquired new power over Christian religion 
due to the conversion.46 On the other hand, in Leviathan Hobbes 
asserted that the converted sovereign made the Bible law.47 The 
conversion of the sovereign meant increasing laws about religion. 
   This theory also enabled Hobbes to apply the Israel model to the 
civil sovereign in his age.48 In the toleration controversy, 
tolerationists often argued that the model of ancient Israel was 
abolished or radically modified in the advent of Christ, and thus 
that it could not be applied to Christian magistrates.49 However, 
                                               
44 Lev, 42: 920. 
45 Here Hobbes also declares that the only judge of heresy is the civil 
sovereign. (Ibid.) For a fuller analysis of the meaning of the word “heresy” 
in Leviathan in relation to toleration, see Jeffrey R. Collins, "Thomas 
Hobbes, Heresy, and the Theological Project of Leviathan," Hobbes Studies 
26, no. 1 (2013): 8-12. 
46 Goodwin, Hagiomastix, 118-19. 
47 Lev, 42: 820, 22, 28. 
48 Cf. Nelson’s valuable survey of the use of the model of the Hebrew 
republic by Erastians. Nelson, The Hebrew Republic: Jewish Sources and 
the Transformation of European Political Thought, 88-128. 
49 Coffey, Persecution and Toleration in Protestant England, 1558-1689, 62-
63. 
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for Hobbes, the model of Moses was vital in his vindication for the 
sovereign power over religion. In all of the three works of political 
philosophy Hobbes referred to Moses to prove the union of civil 
law and divine law, and the civil sovereign as the interpreter of 
the Scriptures.50 In Leviathan especially, he compared directly 
Moses to civil sovereigns. 
 
We may conclude, that whosoever in a Christian Common-wealth 
holdeth the place of Moses, is the sole Messenger of God, and 
Interpreter of his Commandments. And according to hereunto, no man 
ought in the interpretation of the Scripture to proceed further then the 
bounds which are set by their severall Soveraigns. For the Scriptures 
since God now speaketh in them, are the Mount Sinai; the bounds 
whereof are the Laws of them that represent Gods Person on Earth. To 
look upon them, and therein to behold the wondrous works of God, and 
learn to fear him is allowed; but to interpret them; that is, to pry into 
what God saith to him who he appointeth to govern under him, and 
make themselves Judges whether he govern as God commandeth him, 
or not, is to transgress the bounds God hath set us, and to gaze upon 
God irreverently.51 
 
This analogy is based on the one hand, on the status of Moses as 
the civil sovereign, and on the other, on the civil sovereign as the 
foundation of biblical authority, both of them specific to Leviathan. 
Furthermore, although the civil sovereign as the interpreter of the 
Bible is common to all of the three works, here Hobbes gives a 
new twist. As opposed to De Cive, Hobbes sets the bounds or area 
of the unitary scriptural interpretation controlled by the sovereign. 
To look at this from the opposite point of view, the new notion of 
the bounds would suggest that the sovereign is only concerned 
with preserving the sphere within the bounds, and allows each 
subject to make their own interpretation of the Scriptures outside 
                                               
50 EL, 2:6:2, 2:7:2-5; DC, 16:13. 
51 Lev, 40: 744, 46. 
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the bounds. Thus this argument, it can be said, prepares for 
Christian liberty later.  
   This new twist reflects different biblical citations being 
employed in De Cive and Leviathan. The notion of the “bounds” 
here derives from Exod. 19:12, 21, cited for denying the authority 
of the private people and congregation. “Thou shalt set bounds to 
the people round about, and say, Take heed to your selves that you 
goe not up into the mount, or touch the border of it; whosoever 
toucheth the Mount shall surely be put to death.” “Goe down, 
charge the people, lest they break through unto the Lord to gaze.” 
In De Cive, on the other hand, Hobbes cited a near passage, Exod. 
19:24-25, which though similarly containing a prohibitive threat 
to the people, does not include the notion of the bounds. The 
wording in the KJV version is as follows. “Let not the priests and 
the people break through to come up unto the LORD, lest he 
break forth upon him. So Moses went down unto the people, and 
spake unto them.”52 
                                               
52 Hobbes’s original sentence, which follows quite accurately the Vulgate, is 
as follows: “Sacerdotes autem et populous ne transeant terminos, nec 
ascendant ad Dominum, ne forte interficiat illos, descenditque Moses ad 
populum et omnia narravit eis.” DC, 16:13. 
   Another change of biblical citation reflecting new concerns in Leviathan is 
about the denial of Aaron’s authority in favour of Moses’. While in De Cive 
Hobbes turned solely to Num. 12 and especially to Moses’ special status as 
a prophet based on Num. 12:6-8, in Leviathan Hobbes placed much less 
emphasis on the story in Num. 12, omitting the citation of Num. 12:6-8.  
This change was probably due to Hobbes’s denial in Chapter 36 of 
Leviathan of the special character of revelation to Moses in Num. 12:6-8. 
Still, Hobbes maintained Moses’ special status among the other people in 
his age, not to say among the sovereign prophets, by inserting another 
major argument for the justification of Moses’s priority to Aaron, based on 
Exod. 24:1-2: “And God said unto Moses, Come up unto the Lord, thou, and 
Aaron, Nadab and Abihu, and seventy of the Elders of Israel. And Moses 
alone shall come neer the Lord, but they shall not come nigh, neither shall 
the people goe up with him.” (Lev, 42: 742.) What Hobbes paid attention to 
here was not ways of supernatural revelation but physical proximity to God. 
Though some people were allowed the same physical proximity to God as 
Moses in Exod. 24:9, yet among them Hobbes still maintained Moses’ 
unique status as the mediator between God and the people; he pointed out 
that only Moses conveyed the commandment of God to Hebrew people, and 
contrasted Moses with other people who were allowed to, at the most, “see 
God and live.” (Ibid.) When he interpreted the meaning of “did eat and 
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   The story of Moses was also important for checking the 
enthusiasts. In Leviathan, as has been seen, Hobbes presented 
Moses as the supreme prophet receiving supernatural revelation 
as opposed to subordinate prophets receiving their authority from 
Moses. The position of Moses as the supreme prophet, together 
with the analogy of Moses to the Christian sovereign, enabled 
Hobbes to draw the famous new political conclusion about church-
state relations in Leviathan. 
 
All Pastors, except the Supreme, execute their charges in the Right, 
that is by the Authority of the Civill Soveraign, that is Iure Civili. But 
the King, and every other Soveraign, executeth his Office of Supreme 
Pastor, by immediate Authority from God, that is to say, in Gods Right, 
or Iure Divino.53 
 
This conclusion has some implications for toleration. Firstly, it 
suggests that the authority of ecclesiastics derives solely from the 
civil sovereign, and from no other sources. Thus it is closely 
related to Hobbes’s endorsement of mutual toleration in the next 
section. 
   Secondly, it helps to explain Hobbes’s more conciliatory attitude 
towards Catholicism in one important point in Leviathan. 
Generally speaking, the toleration of the Catholic sovereign is the 
touchstone of the toleration of the error of the Christian sovereign. 
                                                                                                                       
drink” in Exod. 24:11 as “did live,” he followed the same path as the 
margins of the Junius-Tremellius translation and of the French Geneva. 
53 Lev, 42: 854. It is well-established that this constitutes a departure from 
Hobbes’s conclusion about church-state relations in De Cive, which this 
thesis has interpreted in the beginning of 3.1. See, for example, 
Sommerville, Thomas Hobbes: Political Ideas in Historical Context, 120-22; 
Tuck, Philosophy and Government, 1572-1651, 317-19, 32-33; "The Civil 
Religion of Thomas Hobbes," 124-28. 
   Nevertheless, it should also be noted that for common citizens and their 
duties, the situation would be the same in both works, as Hobbes seems to 
have suggested later. Thomas Hobbes, The English Works of Thomas 
Hobbes of Malmesbury, ed. W. Molesworth, vol. 5 (London: John Bohn, 
1841), 269. Cf. Jackson, Hobbes, Bramhall and the Politics of Liberty and 
Necessity: A Quarrel of the Civil Wars and Interregnum, 213-14. 
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What Puritans loathed in particular was Roman Catholicism. One 
of the main reasons why they were opposed to the Laudian church 
was its similarity to Roman Catholicism. Even among 
tolerationists, toleration of Catholics was a difficult matter. 
Milton, a famous tolerationist, excluded Catholics from his scope 
of toleration for their idolatry.54 On the other hand, it has been 
seen that Chillingworth opened a way for mutual toleration 
between Catholics and Protestants, and that Taylor developed the 
first sophisticated argument about the conditions necessary for 
toleration of Catholics. 
   From this viewpoint, what is interesting about Leviathan is that 
although Hobbes fiercely attacked numerous Catholic doctrines in 
Leviathan, still, as Malcolm rightly points out, in one important 
respect Hobbes became more conciliatory to Roman Catholicism in 
Leviathan than in De Cive.55 In Leviathan Hobbes admitted that 
as long as the sovereign’s supreme power over religion was 
acknowledged, the sovereign could delegate the authority to 
appoint religious teachers to a stranger, explicitly referring to “the 
Pope.”56 On the other hand, in De Cive he excluded all such 
possibilities, denying that the sovereign could cede the authority 
of interpreting the Scriptures to an external authority, that is to 
say, to the Pope.57  
   In De Cive the sovereign was obliged to interpret supernatural 
matters in the Scriptures “by means of duly ordained Ecclesiastics” 
due to “God’s blessing” they receive “by the laying on of hands.”58 
This would imply that the abuse of the Bible by ecclesiastics, if 
any, would be quite dangerous and beyond the control of the 
sovereign. On the other hand, the new conclusion in Leviathan 
                                               
54 Another known example is John Locke. John Locke, A Letter concerning 
Toleration, ed. Mario Montuori (The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1963), 72-73, 88-93. 
55 Hobbes, Leviathan, 42-43. This thesis explores the precise nature of this 
change and the reasons behind it. 
56 Lev, 42: 854. 
57 DC, 17:27. 
58 DC, 17:28. 
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suggests that the civil sovereign, the sole person to claim divine 
right, could change or oppose the interpretation of the 
ecclesiastics. This will alleviate potential harms of Catholic 
teachings. 
   However, this striking change in Hobbes’s attitude toward 
Catholic kings needs further detailed examination. When Hobbes 
denied Catholicism in De Cive, he offered two main reasons for 
this. One is that those who have the authority of interpreting the 
Bible will determine what is necessary to acquire salvation and 
avoid damnation, and that Christians who believe and obey the 
doctrine of the external authority are not proper citizens but the 
subjects of the foreign authority. The other is that foreigners are 
by nature enemies and that it is absurd that the sovereign 
“should commit to an enemy the governance of its citizens’ 
consciences.”59 In spite of these negative factors, why did Hobbes 
change his mind? 
   The first and most important political factor was that the 
rebellion directed by Puritans led Hobbes to identify more 
precisely the heart of the religious problem in his era, because it 
was Puritans and not Catholics that attacked the right of the civil 
sovereign during the Civil War. The first reason for opposing 
Catholicism in De Cive was not unique to Catholics, but rather 
applicable to any ecclesiastics or teachers of the word of God 
including Puritans. The precise contrast was not between internal 
and external authority, but between pretenders of divine 
authority and the civil sovereign. What Hobbes was cautious of in 
delegating the authority to appoint religious teachers in 
Leviathan was the “Ambition” and “Ignorance” of appointed 
teachers. These two faults are universal issues, though foreigners 
might be more susceptible to the defects. It is true that Roman 
Catholic teachers generally preached most dangerous religious 
                                               
59 Ibid. 
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doctrines, but Puritans also shared the defects to a certain extent. 
Thus, the factor of foreignness became insignificant enough in 
Leviathan to admit that the sovereign could delegate some 
religious authority to the Pope. 
   The second political factor was that one of the Puritan 
complaints against the king was that he came too close to 
Catholicism or that he or the circle among him was covert 
Catholics. The new theory in Leviathan can deal with this 
grievance. 
   Developments in in Hobbes’s theory also help to explain the 
change in Hobbes’s attitude toward Catholic kings.  One relevant 
change between the two works was that while in De Cive Hobbes 
viewed foreigners as enemies by their nature, in Leviathan he 
acknowledged that foreigners could avoid being enemies by their 
covenant with the sovereign.60 Therefore, in the scheme of 
Leviathan the Pope and Catholic kings would not be enemies. 
   Moreover, the authorisation theory in Leviathan enabled 
Hobbes to explain the delegation of authority. Although in De Cive 
he already had in mind the delegation of exercise of sovereign 
right in civil matters,61 he used it only in the civil part. On the 
other hand, when in the religious parts he mentioned religious 
authority, the notion was independent of arguments concerning 
authority in the civil part. Only in Leviathan did he connect 
religious authority to authority in civil matters with the 
authorisation theory. 
   Finally, in his discussion about toleration of Catholicism, Taylor 
distinguished politically dangerous errors from innocuous errors 
or doctrines in Catholicism, and showed different attitudes 
towards different types of Catholic errors. In a similar vein, 
Hobbes might have hoped to allow Catholicism as long as it was 
innocuous. As for potential harm of Catholicism to the public 
                                               
60 Lev, 28: 494. 
61 DC, 13:1. 
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peace, precisely because Hobbes thoroughly and emphatically 
refuted politically harmful Catholic doctrines in Leviathan, he 
might have thought as long as his teaching was predominant, it 
would nullify or at least alleviate perilous political implications of 
Catholic doctrines even if they were taught. 
    Finally, Hobbes’ conclusion about the Christian sovereign also 
reveals his increased concern with the toleration of the civil 
sovereign in error. Here, as in the conclusion about heathen kings, 
Hobbes bestows further consideration to the possible error of the 
sovereign. In The Elements of Law Hobbes limited the article of 
faith to the only fundamental one, faith in Jesus Christ, but in it 
he also included “all such as be evidently inferred from thence.”62  
Then, in the main text of De Cive, Hobbes ceased mentioning the 
status of the inference. In the annotation added in the second 
edition, he clarified his new position, saying that without the 
deduction people can be saved.63 In Leviathan, Hobbes examined 
the disobedience due to the erroneous deduction, another possible 
version of Puritan justification of war for the sake of true religion. 
Erroneous deductions from the fundamental article were a theme 
Taylor had already deliberated. Here Hobbes asks who can be the 
judge of the “error,” and, significantly, denies even apostles as the 
competent judge.  
 
Did not one of the two, St. Peter, or St. Paul erre in a superstructure, 
when St. Paul withstood St. Peter to his face?64 
 
While Taylor pointed out the internal contradiction of fathers or 
councils to deny their infallibility, Hobbes more radically applies 
                                               
62 EL, 2:6:6. 
63 DC, 18:6 ann. 
64 Lev, 43: 952. Hobbes here refers to the story in Gal. 2:11-14. “When Peter 
was come to Antioch, I withstood him to the face, because he was to be 
blamed…. I said unto Peter… If thou, being a Jew, livest after the manner 
of Gentiles, and not as do the Jews, why compellst thou the Gentiles to live 
as do the Jews?” What Hobbes pays attention to in this episode is the 
confrontation between the apostles. 
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this argument to the apostles. The radical implication of this 
casual remark on the internal contradiction and plurality of the 
apostles emerges when turning back to Chillingworth’s remark 
about the apostles. As a part of the refutation of Knott’s position, 
Chillingworth inferred from his thesis and presented as the 
unacceptable or absurd result the idea that “the apostles were 
fountains of contradictious doctrines”, or that “the apostles had 
been teachers of falsehood.”65 Yet it is exactly what Hobbes 
implies here. Another implication of the remark is that this 
undermines the assumption Hobbes had in De Cive concerning 
the status of teachers of the church as the interpreters of 
supernatural matters in the Bible, for their status was supposed 
to be derived from the apostles’ infallibility.66 This plurality of the 
apostles also underlies Hobbes’s defence of Christian liberty, 
which will be discussed in the next section. 
 
4.4.2. Mutual Toleration and the Ideal of Christian Liberty 
    
   So far Hobbes’s discussion about religious liberty was subject to 
his preoccupation with the maintenance of the civil sovereign. 
However, in so far as public peace remains intact, the argument 
found only in Leviathan points to religious liberty or toleration, 
both mutual toleration among Christians and toleration by the 
sovereign. The climax of this defence of religious liberty is his 
endorsement of Independency in Chapter 47, and this argument 
has drawn the attention of many Hobbes scholars.67 In relation to 
                                               
65 Chillingworth, The Works of William Chillingworth, 1: 354. Also see WT, 
376-77, 446, 527. 
66 DC, 17:27. 
67 Curiously Ryan’s earlier articles on Hobbes and toleration do not refer to 
the passage. Alan Ryan, "Hobbes, Toleration, and the Inner Life," in The 
Nature of Political Theory, ed. David Miller and Larry Siedentop (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1983); "A More Tolerant Hobbes?," in Justifying 
Toleration: Conceptual and Historical Perspectives, ed. Susan Mendus 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988). It was mainly Tuck that 
popularised this endorsement. For example, see Richard Tuck, "Hobbes and 
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Hobbes studies, what this thesis suggests is to pay closer 
attention to other arguments for toleration in, and unique to, 
Leviathan,68 and then to establish more precisely the relationship 
between this striking discussion and other parts of, and specific to, 
Leviathan. Furthermore, while this endorsement of Independency 
was often associated with the rise of the Independent party 
during the Civil War,69 this study examines it in the related but 
slightly different context of the toleration controversy.70 
   In the preceding section, reading the discussion about 
Christians and heathens in the light of the toleration controversy 
was suggested, and the case of heathen kings and Christian 
citizens was considered. In this section Hobbes’s argument about 
the relationship between the apostles and Jews or pagans will be 
read as his case for mutual toleration. Here the example not of 
ordinary Christians but of the apostles makes it all the more 
                                                                                                                       
Locke on Toleration," in Thomas Hobbes and Political Theory, ed. Mary G. 
Dietz (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1990). For more recent works, 
see Collins, The Allegiance of Thomas Hobbes, 123-30; Curley, "Hobbes and 
the Cause of Religious Toleration; Arash Abizadeh, "Publicity, Privacy, and 
Religious Toleration in Hobbes's Leviathan," Modern Intellectual History 
10, no. 02 (2013). 
68 Though he does not identify the distinctive feature of Leviathan 
concerning toleration, Sommerville’s valuable work also picks up a wide 
range of Hobbes’s discussion in favour of toleration and compares Hobbes 
with other English supporters of toleration. (Sommerville, Thomas Hobbes: 
Political Ideas in Historical Context, 149-56.) Our observation on Hobbes’s 
position in the toleration controversy is supported by Sommerville’s 
following overview: “He [Hobbes] did indeed reject some of the arguments 
for toleration put forward by radical puritans, but he accepted much of the 
liberal Anglican case mounted by men like Falkland and Taylor.” Ibid., 150. 
69 Sommerville, "Hobbes and Independency; Collins, The Allegiance of 
Thomas Hobbes, 131-58; "Thomas Hobbes and the Blackloist Conspiracy of 
1649," The Historical Journal 45, no. 2 (2002). 
70 The topic of Hobbes and toleration in the Restoration period is beyond 
the scope of this thesis. For this, see "Thomas Hobbes, Heresy, and the 
Theological Project of Leviathan; Tuck, "Hobbes and Locke on Toleration; 
Justin Champion, "An Historical Narration Concerning Heresie: Thomas 
Hobbes, Thomas Barlow, and the Restoration Debate over 'Heresy'," in 
Heresy, Literature, and Politics in Early Modern English Culture, ed. David 
Loewenstein and John Marshall (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2006); "'Private Is in Secret Free': Hobbes and Locke on the Limits of 
Toleration, Atheism and Heterodoxy," in Les fondements philosophiques de 
la tolérance, ed. Yves Charles Zarka, Franck Lessay, and John Rogers 
(Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 2002).  
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suitable because the apostles were thought to be infallible and 
teachers of the true doctrine, as has just been seen.71 For Hobbes 
too, the apostles, as opposed to people in the later ages, enjoyed a 
special status, having direct access to Christ.72 
   Now there is a good possibility of Taylor’s influence on Hobbes’s 
defence of mutual toleration in Leviathan. The first point to make 
is Hobbes’s opposition to making new articles of faith. “All such 
places as command avoiding such disputes, are written for a 
Lesson to Pastors, (such as Timothy and Titus were) not to make 
new Articles of Faith, by determining every small controversie, 
which oblige men to a needless burthen of Conscience, or provoke 
them to break the union of the Church.”73 This attack on creating 
new articles of faith is one of the main features of Taylor, and 
even Hobbes’s grounds for it are reminiscent of Taylor.74  
   Hobbes’s further related case for mutual toleration is concerned 
with the interpreters of the Scriptures before the civil sovereign 
became a Christian.75 For his conclusion that each person is an 
interpreter to oneself means that they can disagree with other 
people’s interpretations or their religious opinions, which amounts 
to mutual toleration. Not only this conclusion but also Hobbes’s 
main argument for it is again exactly the same as that which 
Taylor asserted in his defence of reason against authority. 
“Generally in all cases of the world, hee that pretendeth any 
                                               
71 It is certain that, as Burgess asserts, Hobbes did not use sceptical 
argument for toleration, but this is rather because he put forward stronger 
cases for toleration. Glenn Burgess, "Thomas Hobbes: Religious Toleration 
or Religious Indifference?," in Difference and Dissent: Theories of 
Toleration in Medieval and Early Modern Europe, ed. Cary J. Nederman 
and John Christian Laursen (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1996), 153-54. 
72 Lev, 43: 932. Apart from the political significance, this argument had a 
theoretical meaning too. In Leviathan even the status of Moses as a true 
prophet was dependent on his position as the civil sovereign. Since both 
Moses and the apostles were the epitome of truth, the discussions about 
both of them showed what people with or without sovereign power could do 
towards others, however true their religious teaching might be. Therefore 
together they explored all of the theoretical possibilities.  
73 Lev, 42: 802. 
74 WT, 603. 
75 Lev, 42: 808, 10, 12. 
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proofe, maketh Judge of his proofe him to whom he addresseth his 
speech.”76 However, Hobbes constructs his argument in the form 
of the interpretation of the Scriptures and tests this reasoning in 
the case of the “divine authority” of the apostles. Thus the 
scriptural passage Hobbes cites here is unusual in the toleration 
controversy, paying attention to Paul’s attempt to convert the 
Jews at Thessalonica. “As his manner was, went in unto them, 
and three Sabbath dayes reasoned with them out of the 
Scriptures, Opening and alledging, that Christ must needs have 
suffered and risen again from the dead; and that this Iesus whom 
he preached was the77 Christ.” (Acts. 17:2, 3.) As a result of his 
preaching, some of them believed, while others not.78 (Acts. 17:4, 
5.)79 Therefore, Hobbes concludes, the interpreters of the 
Scriptures and the judges of Paul’s reasoning were the Jewish 
audience. The crux of his reasoning is the exclusion of the 
possibility of Paul as an interpreter to others. 
 
If S. Paul, what needed he to quote any places to prove his doctrine? It 
had been enough to have said, I find it so in Scripture, that is to say, in 
your Laws, of which I am Interpreter, as sent by Christ.80  
 
Here by paying attention to what was not told by Paul, Hobbes 
demonstrates that Paul himself admitted the general principle.  
   When Hobbes tries to show that even after the conversion the 
situation remains the same, he takes a similar way of reasoning.81 
This time Hobbes cites a passage often cited in the defence of 
individual judgement, John. 5:39: 
                                               
76 Lev, 42: 808. 
77 Hobbes continues to use the indirect narration, changing from “I 
preached unto you is” in the KJV into “he preached was the.” 
78 Ibid. 
79 The main story in Acts. 17:5 is rather about the unpersuaded Jews’ 
attack on the apostles, but Hobbes focuses on the success or failure of Paul’s 
persuasion. 
80 Ibid. 
81 Lev, 42: 810. 
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Search the Scriptures; for in them yee thinke to have eternall life, and 
they are they that testifie of me.82 If hee [Christ] had not meant they 
should Interpret them, hee would not have bidden them take thence 
the proof of his being the Christ: he would either have Interpreted 
them himselfe, or referred them to the Interpretation of the Priests.83 
 
Again by integrating the general principle shown by Taylor into 
the scriptural interpretation, Hobbes provides scriptural support 
for this principle. 
   Or rather this interpretation, together with the preceding one, 
strengthens the principle by showing that even the apostles and 
Christ, preachers of the true doctrine and the legitimate holders 
of divine authority, granted their audience the right to disagree 
with their preaching. Thus it seems that Hobbes makes religious 
“truth” a relative concept in so far as the sovereign power is not 
concerned. Coffey remarks that in the seventeenth century “there 
was a growing tendency to drop the objective ‘truth’ component” of 
concepts concerning toleration such as “persecution,” “conscience,” 
and “martyrdom.”84 This case for mutual toleration can be placed 
in this tide.  
   Moreover this interpretation illustrates how the general 
principle can be applied to concrete situations. In particular, it 
shows what those who demand the exception to the principle 
would have to say to the audience. By suggesting the unlikeliness 
of this kind of remark, it shows why it is a general rule.  
   The above discussions have political implications for mutual 
toleration. Firstly, while Taylor limited the scope of toleration to 
Christians, Hobbes extended the scope of toleration to the 
heathen by applying the principle mentioned above to the 
                                               
82 This passage is connected with the corresponding one in Acts. 17:11 by 
the Geneva and Bishops Bibles. Hobbes’s attention to Acts. 17 in the 
preceding argument might come from this connection. 
83 Lev, 42: 810. 
84 Coffey, "Defining Heresy and Orthodoxy in the Puritan Revolution," 130. 
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relationship between Christians and heathens. Secondly, even 
opponents of toleration of false religion or heretical opinions 
admitted that they had to try to persuade them before having 
recourse to violence. Also they often cited the Scriptures to 
support their opposition to toleration. However, Hobbes’s 
argument suggests that this effort to persuade by itself implies 
granting the audience or “heretics” the liberty to disagree with 
their opinions. Therefore, the way the opponents of toleration 
bring forward their argument denies their own position. Mutual 
toleration is the only reasonable attitude to assume.  
   Where what should be taught was determined by pastors, 
Hobbes took the trouble to note that people still retained the 
liberty to interpret the Scriptures as they pleased.85 This, together 
with his dim view of making new articles of faith, suggests 
Hobbes regarded the determination of controversies by pastors as 
the source of the restriction of religious liberty. This remark also 
indicates that Hobbes’s cases for the liberty to interpret the 
Scriptures by themselves in Leviathan are not only new but also 
probably departures from the position in De Cive. In it Hobbes 
argued that Christians under heathen kings should follow some 
Christian churches about supernatural matters.86 This argument, 
in turn, was derived from the contrast in the previous section 
between individuals and the church, and from the denial of the 
former as interpreters of the Scriptures.87 
   In Leviathan Hobbes not only supported mutual toleration in 
this way, but also condemned persecution by the civil sovereign as 
unreasonable. Here again, what should be paid attention to is the 
attitude of heathen kings towards Christians. In so far as heathen 
kings think of Christianity as a false religion, this example can be 
applied to the relationship between the Christian civil sovereign 
                                               
85 Lev, 42: 812. 
86 DC, 18:13. 
87 DC, 17:27. 
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and “heretical,” “erroneous” Christian subjects. While in De Cive 
Hobbes already showed what Christian subjects could do under 
heathen kings, in the corresponding part in Leviathan Hobbes 
added another argument. 
 
But what Infidel King is so unreasonable, as knowing he has a Subject, 
that waiteth for the second coming of Christ, after the present world 
shall bee burnt, and intendeth then to obey him (which is the intent of 
beleeving that Iesus is the Christ,) and in the mean time thinketh 
himself bound to obey the Laws of that Infidel King, (which all 
Christians are obliged in conscience to doe,) to put to death, or to 
persecute such a Subject?88  
 
   This argument presupposes the duty of Christian subjects 
discussed in the previous section. However, as long as they 
recognize the duty of obedience, it is Hobbes’s insistence that 
toleration of “erroneous” Christian subjects is the reasonable 
policy. Here it is again noteworthy that, like Taylor, Hobbes 
appeals to the notion of reasonableness in his defence of toleration 
in this place and others in Leviathan.   
   How is the famous endorsement of Christian liberty in Chapter 
47 of Leviathan related to the parts considered so far in this 
section and other parts apparent only in Leviathan?89 Hobbes 
says,  
 
We are reduced to the Independency of the Primitive Christians to 
follow Paul, or Cephas, or Apollos, every man as he liketh best: Which, 
                                               
88 Lev, 43: 954. 
89 This thesis calls into question Malcolm’s otherwise excellent introduction 
to Leviathan about this issue. (Hobbes, Leviathan, 61-65.) In the main text 
the consistency of Hobbes’s endorsement of Independency with the general 
features of Leviathan will be shown. Here are pointed out the 
insufficiencies of the grounds Malcolm provides for his position. First of all, 
Malcolm ignores Hobbes’s third ground, coming just after the second. 
Secondly, he misses the different contexts between the last part of Chapter 
37 and this part. While the former is concerned with the preservation of 
public authority, here it is rather assumed and an ideal is discussed.  
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if it be without contention, and without measuring the Dcoctrine of 
Christ, by our affection to the Person of his Minister, (the fault which 
the Apostle reprehended in the Corinthians,) is perhaps the best.90 
 
   The first distinctive feature of this endorsement is Hobbes’s use 
of the Bible. The passages Hobbes points to are 1 Cor. 1:12-13, 3:4, 
22-23. “Every one of you saith, I am of Paul; and I of Apollos; and I 
of Cephas; and I of Christ. Is Christ divided?” “While one saith, I 
am of Paul; and another, I am of Apollos; are ye not carnal?” 
“Whether Paul, or Apollos, or Cephas,… all are yours; And ye are 
Christ’s.” These passages might seem to contrast the lamentable 
division among followers of different preachers and the desirable 
unity under Christ. However, while Hobbes certainly warns of 
possible dissension, he still places high value on following 
individual preachers. The endorsement of pluralism based on 
these passages is worth noting. 
   The second peculiar feature of this argument is that Hobbes 
leaves religious pluralism and a possible source of dissension as it 
is. In De Cive, Hobbes found the direct factor for war in mere 
dissension.91 In Leviathan also Hobbes viewed disagreement as 
dishonouring.92 In view of these negative remarks about 
disagreement, it is certainly easy to understand that Hobbes adds 
the conditionals to the endorsement and weakens the strong 
statement, “the best,” by putting “perhaps” just before it.93 Or 
rather it seems impossible to combine peace with pluralistic 
opinions and their expressions in the first place. Thus Hobbes’s 
                                               
90 Lev, 47: 1116.  
91 DC, 1:5. 
92 Lev, 10: 138. 
93 On the other hand, this expression suggests that Hobbes was conscious 
that this argument was not a demonstration but less than a probable one, 
an anomaly to the scientific nature of Leviathan. His concern with the best 
is also unusual. Then why did Hobbes take all the trouble to show his 
support for Independency as the best policy? Our tentative answer is that 
this is a manifestation of Hobbes’s commitment to “the liberty which is 
harmless to the commonwealth and essential to happy lives for the citizens.” 
DC, 13:16.   
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answer in De Cive was to override rising controversies with the 
authority of the sovereign, but then the religious pluralism as 
Hobbes saw in the England at the time of writing Leviathan 
cannot be explained. Therefore Hobbes provided new ideas to 
make it possible in Leviathan. 
   The first idea concerns humility as the virtue of good pastors 
presented in the third ground for the endorsement of 
Independency.94 This virtue, together with the subtle change 
between De Cive and Leviathan about the notion of honour as one 
of the causes of war,95 seems to make it possible to keep peace 
even among dissenting people if they retain humility. In De Cive 
and The Elements of Law, honour lay in pre-eminence over others, 
or more precisely, in the “conception of our own power, above the 
power of him that contendeth with us.”96 Certainly in Leviathan 
also, “every man looketh that his companion should value him, at 
the same rate he sets upon himselfe,” and this pursuit of honour 
or loathing of dishonour was one of the causes of war.97 
Nevertheless, here to honour or dishonour was relative to the rate 
or value “that each man setteth on himselfe.”98 If a person is a 
man of modesty, he will set on himself a low price, and will not 
easily find himself disdained.   
                                               
94 Lev, 47: 1116. This third ground also functions as an explanation for the 
collapse of the previous clerical authorities. In particular the suppression of 
reason as one of their defects is important, since at the earlier occasion of 
the dispute with Bramhall, Hobbes mentioned it as one of the contributing 
factors for sedition and the Civil War. Thomas Hobbes, The English Works 
of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury, ed. W. Molesworth, vol. 4 (London: John 
Bohn, 1840), 264. (For the whole details of this clash, see Jackson, Hobbes, 
Bramhall and the Politics of Liberty and Necessity: A Quarrel of the Civil 
Wars and Interregnum.) In the Restoration period, on the other hand, 
reasonable religion was a consensus, which shows that this claim of Hobbes 
and radical tolerationists succeeded. 
95 For a parallel change in the status of glory in Hobbes’s psychology among 
his three works of political philosophy, see Gabriella Slomp, Thomas 
Hobbes and the Political Philosophy of Glory  (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2000), 84-92. 
96 EL, 1:9:1; DC, 1:2. 
97 Lev, 13: 190. 
98 Lev, 10: 136. 
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   The second is the liberty to interpret the Scriptures and to 
disagree with other people’s interpretations. If this liberty or right 
is respected by each other, people will not become frustrated with 
those who stick to their opinion.  
   However, Hobbes’s remarks about the liberty suggest further 
than that. As is implied in Chapter 42, Hobbes took a dim view of 
making new articles of faith and pointed out that even after the 
doctrine to teach was decided by teachers, people still retained the 
liberty to interpret the Scriptures. All these remarks point to 
Hobbes’s preference for religious liberty from ecclesiastical power 
or authority. Hobbes’s Independency is just a full realisation of 
this preference. Yet here Hobbes gives a fuller explanation of this 
preference, and this explication shows Hobbes’s characteristic way 
of thinking in contrast with Taylor’s. 
   The argument about Christian liberty is a part of his 
chronological explanation of the rise and downfall of clerical 
power.99 Even at the earliest and best stage of Christianity there 
were “Elements of Power;” for people obeyed the apostles “out of 
Reverence” for them.100 However, 
 
Afterwards the Presbyters (as the Flocks of Christ increased) 
assembling to consider what they should teach, and therefore by 
obliging themselves to teach nothing against the Decrees of their 
Assemblies, made it thought the people were thereby obliged to follow 
their Doctrine, and when they refused, refused to keep them company, 
(that was then called Excommunication,) not as Infidels, but as being 
disobedient: And this was the first knot upon their Liberty.101 
 
                                               
99 Metzger, dealing with not only Leviathan but also Hobbes’s other works, 
provides the whole picture of this chronology of Hobbes. (Metzger, Thomas 
Hobbes und die Englische Revolution 1640-1660, 176-83.) The focus of this 
thesis is on the relationship between this chronology and other features of 
Leviathan. 
100 Lev, 47: 1114. 
101 Ibid. 
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The restriction of Christian liberty began when pastors created a 
kind of new article of faith, and in view of Chapter 42, what is 
noteworthy in this passage are the expressions, “made it thought,” 
or “that was then called Excommunication.” This is not the true 
meaning or effect of excommunication. That is why this “knot” is 
one of “the Inventions of men.”102   
   More importantly, however, this was the time when the 
structure or the relationship between teachers and their followers 
changed. It has been seen that one of the basic and vital insights 
of Leviathan is that positive religion has to be grasped with 
reference to this dual structure, and that religious teachers or 
pretenders of the word of God acquire power over their followers. 
This way of paying attention to the power relationship between 
teachers and their followers is lacking in Taylor’s viewpoint and 
constitutes Hobbes’s distinctive feature.103 Thus, while both 
Hobbes and Taylor saw the time of the apostles as the age of 
integral liberty, they differed in the time when that liberty began 
to be restrained. Taylor found the beginning of the restraint in the 
new article of faith in the Nicene Council, whereas Hobbes looked 
at the matter from a more sociological viewpoint and saw the 
onset of the constraint in a much earlier stage. At the time of the 
apostles, the teachers were pluralistic104 and individualistic, not 
forming any inner groups among themselves. However, the 
Presbyters began to form a group of the teachers who preach the 
same doctrine. So the relation between teachers and followers 
changed from that between individuals to that between a group of 
teachers and individual followers. In the episcopal and Roman 
Catholic system even among teachers hierarchical systems were 
                                               
102 Ibid. 
103 Cf. Walwyn, The Writings of William Walwyn, 107-13; Locke, A Letter 
concerning Toleration, 6-7. 
104 This preference of pluralism of teachers and their doctrines suggests 
that unlike many other English people in the age, Hobbes welcomed the 
fragmentation of Puritanism as an expression of plurality of religious 
opinions and of minimized existence of ecclesiastical power. 
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formed and lower-rank teachers began to obey higher-rank 
ones.105 Nevertheless the followers were at the bottom of the 
hierarchy, now having hierarchical groups on top of them. What 
Hobbes wanted to avoid, if possible, was this contrast between 
groups of teachers and individual followers, or to put in more 
familiar terms, clerical power over lay people. While many radical 
tolerationists in the revolutionary years were anti-clerical,106 this 
presentation of the abolishment of almost all clerical power as an 
ideal reveals a particularly radical feature of Leviathan. 
   This attitude can also be found in the second ground for the 
endorsement of the Independency.107 “It is unreasonable in them, 
who teach there is such danger in every little Error, to require of a 
man endued with reason of his own, to follow the Reason of any 
other man, or of the most voices of many other men.”108 This 
defence of individual judgement and reason is in accordance with 
Hobbes’s preference of the liberty to interpret the Scriptures by 
oneself, and with the duty of the use of reason as a solution to the 
challenge of the enthusiasts.109 The point is, however, that here 
again Hobbes defends individuals against the majority. Following 
any other man than oneself is “little better, then to venture his 
Salvation at crosse and pile.”110  
   In his opposition to laws over conscience, Hobbes brings forward 
a similar argument and clarifies the reasoning behind this 
judgement. Such laws are against the law of nature, 
                                               
105 Lev, 47: 1114. 
106 Coffey, "The Toleration Controversy during the English Revolution," 54-
55. 
107 Here it is noteworthy that when Hobbes refers to “Independency,” he 
does not mean the independency and autonomy of local congregations but 
the independency of Christian followers. Though both of them overlap to a 
great extent, still Hobbes’s concern is not with a minimal religious group 
itself but rather with subordinate people even in the minimal and the 
simplest group. 
108 Lev, 47: 1116. 
109 One of Hobbes’s complaints against the ecclesiastics, in particular the 
Roman Church, is that they “take from young men, the use of Reason,” by 
their metaphysics, miracles and so on. Lev, 47: 1120.  
110 Lev, 47: 1116. 
184 
 
 
and especially in them, who teach, that a man shall bee damned to 
Eternall and extream torments, if he die in a false opinion concerning 
an Article of the Christian Faith. For who is there, that knowing there 
is so great danger in an error, whom the natural care of himself, 
compelleth not to hazard his Soule upon his own judgement, rather 
than that of any other man that is unconcerned in his damnation?111 
  
Though this argument concerns the relationship between the 
sovereign and citizens, the contrast here is between individuals 
and “any other man”, and thus Hobbes could use a similar type of 
this discussion in his justification for the endorsement of 
Independency too. Then, the scope of this defence of individual 
freedom is quite broad. Actually in this argument typical elements 
in our notion of human right can be seen: grasping each 
individual as holding something vital for himself, in this case his 
salvation; and judging how close the connection between the 
important thing and each actor concerned is; and admitting the 
priority of the actor with the closest connection, usually 
individuals, over every other actor, especially groups in power. 
Though Hobbes never intends the restriction of sovereign power 
by this assertion, he does condemn the sovereign’s interfering 
with internal liberty, and on the social level the principle in this 
assertion leads to his preference for complete freedom from 
ecclesiastical power. Thus it is possible to find here a prototypical 
or precursory version of the liberty of conscience as what would 
later be seen as one of human rights. 
 
                                               
111 Lev, 46: 1096. 
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5. Conclusion 
    
 
   It has been for a long time a huge riddle why Hobbes put 
forward the bizarre religious argument in Leviathan. In this 
thesis, the way of solving this enigma has been, in Part 2, to 
establish religious problems peculiar to Leviathan based on the 
comparative textual analysis of Hobbes’s identification of the 
religious problem in his works of political philosophy, and to 
associate the problems with known issues in the Civil War as 
probable hypothetical contexts. In Part 3 the steps taken have 
been to explore the religious contexts of the English Civil War to 
clarify the wider and more specific implications of those issues, 
and then in Part 4 to test the contexts as the hypotheses by 
considering arguments unique to Leviathan in the contexts. 
Through these procedures, this thesis has aimed to clarify specific 
political significances of Hobbes’s religious discussion distinctive 
of Leviathan. Since Hobbes scarcely specified the precise sources 
he was drawing on or disagreeing with, there is almost always 
some uncertainty in connecting Hobbes’s argument with known 
historical issues, and the degree of certainty of the explanation 
here will vary according to the situation.1 However, even if 
reaching absolute certainty is impossible, it is still possible to 
approach a more probable explanation.2 In any case, the most 
sceptical will admit that this kind of procedure will at least help 
to show the precise nature of Hobbes’s originality in his age.3 
                                               
1 Conversely, the cases where the precise sources are known can be said to 
be a simpler version of this general situation. 
2 Skinner’s scepticism about the notion of influence, though useful, needs 
this kind of complement. Quentin Skinner, "Meaning and Understanding in 
the History of Ideas," in Visions of Politics: Regarding Method (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002), 75-76. Cf. the position of Hoekstra in 
Hoekstra, "Disarming the Prophets: Thomas Hobbes and Predictive Power," 
98. 
3 Understanding this, in turn, is necessary for explaining why critics of 
186 
 
   The main tenet of the answer is that the religious argument 
unique to Leviathan can be understood, generally speaking, as 
Hobbes’ reaction to the emergence of radical Puritanism, and 
more specifically, of enthusiasm, “the Foole,” and the toleration 
controversy. The main focus in this thesis has been on how 
Hobbes grappled with the threat of enthusiasm and with new 
arguments appearing in the toleration controversy.  
   For many people in his period, enthusiasm was a challenge to 
the authority of the Scriptures, and it prompted new defences of 
biblical authority. Hobbes’s new argument on this topic can be 
connected with this type of work. However, Hobbes’s approach and 
answer, the civil sovereign as the foundation of biblical authority, 
was quite different from other ones in the Civil War. This was 
related to Hobbes’s insight into the sociological significance of 
enthusiasm and more generally of the pretended word of God, 
specifically concerning dominion of successful preachers of the 
divine word over their followers. Hobbes was especially alert to 
the political threat of enthusiasm, and his solution to it was the 
duty of radical scepticism. A sceptical and critical attitude 
towards the pretended word of God was the effective way of 
preventing the abuse of divine authority including enthusiasm. 
The duty of scepticism, in turn, required the kind of certainty as 
to biblical authority which would withstand such scepticism. 
Probable arguments or “moral certainty” which other people 
offered were not sufficient for Hobbes. 
   The encouragement of scepticism itself was also quite 
uncommon in his age. While religious scepticism became, or was 
perceived to become, more widespread during the Civil War, it 
was usually denounced as undermining Christianity. The 
exception was tolerationists, and they often advocated giving 
                                                                                                                       
Hobbes attacked him among others, or why Hobbes, among others, had a 
great and long-standing influence on the England of the latter 17th century 
and further. These points can be added to Parkin’s valuable work on 
Hobbes’s reception. 
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reasons for their faith. The connection between the case for 
toleration and the support of individual judgement can also be 
seen in Leviathan. When Hobbes offered new arguments 
defending the liberty of conscience, the minimal internal liberty or 
the Independency of the primitive Christians, they were often 
connected with his espousal of individual judgement. However, 
Hobbes was perhaps the most stringent in that he proposed 
scepticism as everyman’s duty, and that he directed the scepticism 
explicitly at the most authoritative prophet in the Bible, Moses, 
and implicitly at the apostles too; by presenting the exemplary 
model of his own radical scepticism,4 in Leviathan Hobbes conveys 
to the reader the spirit of scepticism and contributes to the duty of 
every citizen to take a sceptical attitude towards the pretended 
word of God. 
    Another main feature of Leviathan, partly related to Hobbes’s 
radical scepticism, lies in his reply to the demand for religious 
truth in his age:  Hobbes blurs the traditional understanding of 
the distinction between true and false religion. In the first place, 
for ordinary Christians the status of Christianity as a true 
religion turns out to be lacking in scientific foundation except for 
the authority of the civil sovereign. Hobbes argues that common 
Christians believe, but do not know, that the Bible is the word of 
God. What Leviathan suggests is that Christian faith is a kind of 
fiction: it involves treating the supernatural, which natural 
reason can neither prove nor disprove, as if it were truth, to lead a 
voluntary Christian life. In the second place, in Chapter 12 the 
traditional feature of false religion, its political nature, is applied 
to true religion. Thirdly, the philological analysis in Chapter 36 
reveals that the difference between true and supernatural 
revelation on the one hand and false and natural revelation on the 
other is so subtle that, without the help of the criteria in the 
                                               
4 Cf. Lev, 47: 1124. 
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Scriptures, mere natural reason cannot discern true prophets 
from false ones. Finally, the case for mutual toleration in Chapter 
42 shows that even the authoritative and “true” teachers of 
Christianity such as Christ and the apostles admitted the 
audience the right to judge whether their teaching was true or not. 
   This leads to the theoretical significance of the biblical 
interpretation as a part of philosophical discourse in Leviathan. It 
seems that the scriptural interpretation functions as something 
like an ideal gas, a fiction which makes it possible to explore 
further truths, though of course for Hobbes the Bible was the true 
word of God owing to the authority of the civil sovereign. For 
example, Chapter 32 in Leviathan suggests that natural reason 
alone cannot reach certainty in judging the claim of pretended 
prophets, and thus that mere natural reason can neither identify 
nor treat true prophets as such. It is only in the argument form of 
scriptural interpretation that true prophets proper can be 
discussed. Similarly, common people are fallible, and only the 
examples of Moses, Christ or the apostles make it possible to 
consider without any qualifications what attitude preachers of the 
true religious doctrines can or should take towards dissenters 
from the religious truth. 
   As for Hobbes’s use of the Bible in general, firstly, Hobbes in 
Leviathan pays less attention to, or is less careful about, following 
the wording of the version of the Bible he used than in De Cive. 
He often departs from the wording in the KJV according to his 
political inclination, his own topic of discussion, and what he saw 
as the content of the wording. This new attitude probably reflects 
his deeper understanding of the nature of the Bible. It is not a 
book of natural science and as such includes ambiguous words 
and metaphorical expressions. Thus one of the main tasks of the 
biblical interpretation in Leviathan was to explain such words or 
expressions in clear words of natural science. Secondly, Hobbes in 
Leviathan tends to apply the model or message in the Bible 
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directly to his contemporary political issues than in De Cive. In 
other words, the sense of distance between Hobbes’s own age and 
the biblical age is less clear in Leviathan. For example, while in 
both works Moses and Abraham are discussed, in Leviathan 
Hobbes begins to compare them to Christian sovereigns, and the 
analogy enables him to apply directly to the latter what is shown 
about Abraham or Moses. Another example concerns the biblical 
passages suggesting the criteria for judging prophets. Although 
the same passages are cited in both works, only in Leviathan does 
Hobbes use the criteria for dealing with the threat of the 
enthusiasts in his own age. This change is related to the 
development of Hobbes’s religious scheme. In his biblical 
chronology Hobbes for the first time in Leviathan connected 
without interruption the time of the Old testament to that of 
Christian sovereigns. Also only in Leviathan did Hobbes show 
that the foundation of the authority of Moses was the same as 
that of ordinary civil sovereigns. 
   Finally, this thesis concludes by pointing out four respects in 
which Hobbes’s theoretical development from De Cive to 
Leviathan as shown by this research contributed to what is now 
called the Enlightenment. Firstly, compared with De Cive, 
Leviathan developed the analysis of the foundation of Christian 
religion as a positive religion.5 It gives careful thought to the 
authority of the Bible, mentions the Muslims and Islam, and pays 
attention to the interaction between the apostles and the 
heathen.6 This can be seen as a forerunner of comparative religion 
in the Enlightenment period, though Hobbes’s analysis, far from a 
                                               
5 From The Elements of Law to Leviathan Hobbes consistently pursued 
clarifying the foundation of Christianity. In The Elements of Law belief in 
Jesus Christ as the only fundamental article of faith necessary for salvation 
can be seen as the main product of this pursuit. The development in De 
Cive lies in the new discussion of natural religion and in the fuller 
treatment of the kingdom of God in the Old Testament. 
6 It also reveals the remnants of the pagan religion in Hobbes’s 
contemporary form of Christianity in Chapter 45. 
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disinterested investigation, reveals his political concern markedly 
and directly. 
   The second contribution of Leviathan lies in the treatment of 
the notion of divine authority. Hobbes gave a rational foundation 
for the “divine” authority of the Scriptures, denied any claim of 
divine right by the clergy, pointed out the internal contradiction 
among the apostles, the most authoritative preachers of the word 
of God, and stopped the notion of divine authority from hindering 
critical thinking or the use of natural reason. He transformed the 
notion of divine authority so that it could function only as the 
support of the civil sovereign. 
   The third aspect is concerned with the notion of the 
supernatural. Hobbes’s new foundation of the authority of the 
Bible in Leviathan gave him the theoretical foundation of his 
eschatology, and thus helped him to decrease the sphere of the 
supernatural from De Cive to Leviathan. Also his application of 
the mechanical epistemology to pretended supernatural 
revelation and to revelation in the Scriptures, both true and false, 
enabled him again to lessen dramatically the supposed domain of 
the supernatural. This presentation of the possibility that alleged 
supernatural phenomena might in fact be completely natural in 
turn helped him to encourage a critical attitude towards 
pretended supernatural matters. 
   Fourthly and finally, the religious part of Leviathan allocates 
much more space than that of De Cive for matters which do not 
seem to be directly relevant to social and political matters, such 
as the explanation of the development of philosophical sects and 
of errors of Scholastic metaphysical doctrines in Chapter 46  and 
the long philological investigation in Part 3.7 Similarly, although 
Hobbes published the third section of his trilogy, De Cive, as an 
individual work on politics, probably dependent on, but distinct 
                                               
7 Lev, 46: 1082. 
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from, his works on body and man,8 he included in Leviathan the 
mechanical epistemology in Part 1 as a part of his political theory. 
This thesis has mainly focused on Part 3 and shown how Hobbes’s 
philological investigation of the Bible supported by the 
mechanical epistemology in Part 1, the seemingly purely 
theoretical and scholarly type of examination, works upon the 
deepest assumption of Christian religion and underlies radical 
practical conclusions unique to Leviathan. This implies that social 
and political problems have their deeper roots in errors about 
more theoretical and abstract matters, and that the development 
of theoretical science will help solve social problems in the future, 
which is the basic tenet of the Enlightenment. 
   
                                               
8 There has been much discussion over the precise nature of the 
relationship between Hobbes’s natural science and civil science. See, for 
example, Tom Sorell, Hobbes  (London: Routledge, 1991); Malcolm, 
"Hobbes's Science of Politics and His Theory of Science." 
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